State v. Pflepsen
| Decision Date | 01 April 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. C0-98-616,C0-98-616 |
| Parties | STATE of Minnesota, petitioner, Appellant, v. Richard Leroy PFLEPSEN, Respondent. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 28.01, subd. 3, and Minn. R. Civ.App. P. 102 provide the Minnesota Court of Appeals with the authority to suspend requirements of the rules governing appeals in order to treat an erroneous, but timely, notice of appeal as a petition for writ of prohibition.
Upon vacation of a felony conviction on appeal, a district court retains jurisdiction on remand to impose, for the first time, a sentence or stay of sentence for one of a defendant's two lesser-included misdemeanor offenses and, at that sentencing, the district court is authorized to order restitution under Minn.Stat. § 609.125, subd. 1(4) (1998).
When a defendant is found guilty of more than one included offense, the defendant may be formally adjudicated guilty and convicted of and sentenced for only one of the included offenses.
Under the facts and circumstances of this case, the district court may, on remand for proper adjudication of conviction and resentencing, impose restitution as part of its disposition.
Michael Hatch, Minnesota Attorney General, St. Paul, James Backstrom, Dakota County Attorney, Charles A. Diemer, Assistant Dakota County Attorney, Hastings, for appellant.
John M. Stuart, State Public Defender, Susan K. Maki, Assistant State Public Defender, Minneapolis, for respondent.
Heard, considered, and decided by the court en banc.
At issue in this case are several complicated procedural questions stemming from the sentencing of respondent Richard Leroy Pflepsen. Pflepsen was sentenced by the Dakota County District Court for three crimes--criminal vehicular operation, careless driving, and inattentive driving--all arising out of the same December 27, 1994 automobile collision. We must determine whether the district court followed the proper procedure in: (1) sentencing Pflepsen after a jury found him guilty of the three above-named offenses; and (2) resentencing Pflepsen for the lesser-included misdemeanor convictions--careless driving and inattentive driving--after the Minnesota Court of Appeals vacated Pflepsen's felony criminal vehicular operations conviction. As a preliminary matter, we also must decide whether the court of appeals had authority to treat Pflepsen's improper notice of appeal as a petition for a writ of prohibition and to then review his claim. We reverse the court of appeals, vacate the district court's sentencing orders, and remand for adjudication of conviction and resentencing.
On December 27, 1994, while driving his automobile south on Highway 35E in Eagan, Minnesota, Pflepsen ran into a Chevrolet Beretta that was stalled on the shoulder of the highway. The Beretta's owner and her father, who were standing in front of the Beretta, were severely injured in the collision. A grand jury subsequently indicted Pflepsen for one count each of criminal vehicular operation, careless driving, and inattentive driving, all arising from the December 27 collision. Criminal vehicular operation is a felony offense; the other two offenses are lesser-included misdemeanors. See Minn.Stat. §§ 609.21, subd. 2a, 169.13, subd. 2, and 169.14, subd. 1 (1998).
Following trial, a jury found Pflepsen guilty on all three counts. The district court held a sentencing hearing on July 10, 1996. Prior to that hearing, the Beretta's owner had filed a Request for Restitution in accordance with Minn.Stat. § 611A.04, subd. 1 (1998), in which she requested $139,591.25 in restitution for medical costs, lost wages, and other miscellaneous losses. At the July 10 hearing, both Pflepsen and his counsel discussed Pflepsen's ability to pay the proposed restitution. The court then issued the following sentencing order:
At this time then, the Court adjudges you guilty, Richard Leroy Pflepsen, of the crime of--crimes of criminal vehicular operation resulting in substantial bodily harm, careless driving and inattentive driving.
The court will stay imposition of sentence and place you on probation to Dakota County Community Corrections for a period of five years.
* * * *
Because you're not employed at this time, Mr. Pflepsen, I'm not going to impose any fine except a mandatory surcharge of $50. I will, however, order that you pay restitution to the victim; the sum of restitution has been determined to be $139,591.25
The sentencing hearing closed with the following exchange between the district court and the prosecutor:
The court's written sentencing order states that Pflepsen was found guilty of all three offenses, but does not specify for which count(s) Pflepsen was formally convicted or sentenced. Similarly, the Warrant of Commitment lists all three offenses without specifying for which count(s) the probation conditions were imposed.
On August 26, 1996, Pflepsen appealed from the court's judgment. Concluding that Pflepsen's conduct was "easily negligent driving, but [was] not close [to] the egregious driving conduct needed to sustain a [criminal vehicular operation] verdict," the court of appeals reversed Pflepsen's conviction for that offense, but gave no instructions with respect to the proper disposition of the remaining offenses of which Pflepsen had been found guilty. See State v. Pflepsen, No. C3-96-1691, 1997 WL 243443 at * 2 . The state petitioned for review of the court of appeals' decision, but we denied that petition on August 5, 1997. Judgment was entered on the court of appeals' decision on August 25, 1997. See Minn. R. Civ.App. P. 136.02 ().
On September 2, 1997, the district court, on its own motion and without a hearing, issued an order vacating Pflepsen's conviction for criminal vehicular operation. The court's order further provided that
[Pflepsen] shall stand convicted of careless driving and inattentive driving. In view of the conviction being for misdemeanor offenses, the one-year probationary period at this time has expired and the defendant shall be further discharged from probation in this matter.
This order made no mention of restitution. Neither Pflepsen nor his attorneys were notified prior to issuance of the resentencing order. The record does not reflect that Pflepsen waived his right to be present at the resentencing.
In a letter dated September 23, 1997 from the Dakota County Attorney's office to the district court, the county attorney inquired about the status of the court's earlier restitution order and asked that the restitution order be reinstated and converted into a civil judgment. In a response letter, the court wrote, "[i]n view of a civil lawsuit pending to address the issue of damages, I don't believe it is necessary for the Court to take any further action regarding the matter of restitution." The county attorney wrote to the court again on October 2, 1997, informing the court that there was, in fact, no civil lawsuit pending against Pflepsen. Quoting Minn.Stat. § 611A.04, subd. 1, the county attorney also pointed out that a "civil action involving the alleged crime shall not be used by the Court as a basis to deny a victim's right to obtain court ordered restitution." In the letter, the county attorney again asked the court to issue an order for the restitution previously ordered and to docket that order as a civil judgment.
On October 28, 1997, the district court ordered restitution in the amount of $139,376.25 1 and ordered that the restitution be docketed as a civil judgment against Pflepsen pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 611A.04. Shortly thereafter, the state public defender sent the court a letter asking why the October 28 order was filed. In a response letter dated November 10, 1997, the court informed the public defender that the court believed the restitution order was "mandated by law."
Pflepsen moved to vacate the October 28 order. On March 9, 1998, the district court denied Pflepsen's motion, noting that Minn.Stat. § 611A.04, subds. 1 and 3 "mandated that restitution ordered in a criminal case be docketed as a civil judgment, regardless of the pendency of any civil proceeding." The court concluded that it had "erred in not including restitution in its September 2nd order," and that its error was "an oversight amounting to a clerical mistake" that could be corrected.
On April 7, 1998, Pflepsen filed a document with the court of appeals titled "Notice of Appeal to the Court of Appeals." The body of that notice of appeal said "PLEASE TAKE NOTE that * * * [Pflepsen] hereby appeals to the Court of Appeals of the State of Minnesota, from the Order Denying Motion for Correction of Sentence of the District Court of Dakota County." The state moved to dismiss Pflepsen's appeal, arguing that Pflepsen failed to follow the proper procedure for securing review of the sentencing order. Specifically, the state argued that, under Minn. R.Crim. P. 28.02, Pflepsen had no appeal as of right from a misdemeanor sentencing order and could secure review only through a petition for discretionary review.
The court of appeals agreed that Pflepsen had no right of appeal from the sentencing order, but nonetheless determined that, within its discretion, it could and would treat the erroneous notice of appeal as a petition for a writ of prohibition. The court of appeals then ordered the state to serve a response to the petition. The state complied and the court of appeals...
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