State v. Pickett, 02-1960.
| Decision Date | 13 November 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 02-1960.,02-1960. |
| Citation | 671 N.W.2d 866 |
| Parties | STATE of Iowa, Appellant, v. Aaron Matthew PICKETT, Appellee. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Mary E. Tabor, Assistant Attorney General, J. Patrick White, County Attorney, and Michael Brennan, Assistant County Attorney, for appellant.
Richard Klausner, Johnson County Public Defender, Iowa City, for appellee.
When the defendant, Aaron Pickett, was placed on probation after pleading guilty to first-offense operating while intoxicated, the court ordered Pickett to pay a probation enrollment fee of $250. Although Pickett paid the fee, he failed to satisfy the conditions of his probation. The court then revoked Pickett's probation and ordered the district department of correctional services to refund the $250 fee he had paid. We granted the State's request for discretionary review of this order. Upon our consideration of the arguments of the parties, we conclude the trial court had no authority to order a refund. Accordingly, we reverse.
Because this case primarily presents an issue of statutory construction, it is helpful to begin our discussion with a brief review of the statute at issue and its related provisions. Iowa Code section 905.14 (2001) imposes an enrollment fee on defendants placed on probation. This statute states:
Iowa Code § 905.14 (emphasis added). "[D]istrict department" is defined as "a judicial district department of correctional services." Id. § 905.1(5). The district departments are intended to "furnish or contract for those services necessary to provide a community-based correctional program" to meet the needs of that judicial district. Id. § 905.2.
Pursuant to the rule-making authority granted in section 905.14, the department of corrections has adopted the following administrative rules:
Iowa Admin. Code rs. 201-42.1(13)-(14) (1997). The record before us does not contain the specific policies and procedures adopted pursuant to these rules by the district department involved in this case.
With this statutory framework in mind, we review the events leading to the present appeal.
On February 19, 2002, Pickett pled guilty to operating while intoxicated, first offense. See Iowa Code § 321J.2. The court granted the defendant a deferred judgment and placed him on "unsupervised probation under the Department of Corrections" for one year. Several conditions were imposed on his probation and he was ordered to pay "an administrative probation supervision fee in the sum of $250.00."
The sixth judicial district department of correctional services (DCS) checked on Pickett's compliance with the court's order on September 13, 2002, and concluded he had not completed the conditions of his probation. Thereafter, DCS wrote to Pickett, referencing his "self-supervised probation" and informing him that he had not complied with the court's order in several particulars, including payment of the administrative fee. The DCS also informed Pickett that he had a scheduled appointment on November 1, 2002, and should be prepared at that time to document that he had completed his probation requirements.
Pickett failed to respond to this letter and a second compliance check by DCS on November 4, 2002, revealed that he had failed to fulfill his obligations under the court's order. The county attorney then filed a request asking that Pickett's probation be revoked due to his noncompliance. Hearing was set for November 26, 2002.
Pickett appeared at the scheduled hearing and acknowledged that he had not completed the conditions of his probation. He did, however, inform the court that he had mailed the $250 enrollment fee the previous day. The court concluded the defendant's probation should be revoked, as well as his deferred judgment. The court then stated its intention to order DCS to refund the fee. Pickett's guilty plea was accepted on the record and the court imposed sentence. A later judgment entry prepared by the court ordered DCS to refund the supervision fee paid by the defendant.
DCS subsequently wrote to the court, informing the court that Iowa Code section 905.14, which provides for payment of a probation enrollment fee, does not permit the sentencing court to waive the fee. DCS told the court that its policy is not to return the fee should the defendant's probation be revoked. The court responded by email, stating that it was not the court's intention to order refunds of "all probation supervision fees when a self-supervised probation is revoked," and that the court did so here "based upon the unique facts in this case." In view of DCS's letter, the court entered a second order specifically addressing the probation supervision fee issue in an effort to clarify its initial order. The court stated in its second order that DCS's position was contrary to the court's prior order, and again ordered DCS to refund Pickett's fee.
This court granted the State's request for discretionary review. The primary issue before our court is whether a district court has authority to order the DCS to refund the $250 fee mandated by section 905.14 when the defendant's probation is subsequently revoked. Before addressing the merits of this issue, however, we first discuss the defendant's claim that the State did not preserve error on the court's refund order.
Pickett claims the State did not preserve error because it failed to object when the court announced at the probation revocation hearing that it intended to order DCS to refund the enrollment fee. It is true that the only formal record made on this issue was a statement by the DCS representative, Allyson Clark, that "we have to have written consent to turn it over." Later, when DCS informed the court that it would not refund the fee because the law prevented the sentencing court from waiving the fee, the court stated in its email to DCS:
[DCS's] position regarding a refund of the probation supervision fee was clearly stated in court by Allyson Clark. I considered that position and determined that the fee should be refunded. No further discussion is necessary.
We think this record supports a conclusion that error was preserved when considered in light of the purposes of our error preservation rules.
Error preservation is important for two reasons: (1) affording the district court an "`opportunity to avoid or correct error'"; and (2) providing the appellate court "`with an adequate record in reviewing errors purportedly committed'" by the district court. DeVoss v. State, 648 N.W.2d 56, 60 (Iowa 2002) (citation omitted). These principles of error preservation are based on fairness:
Id. (citation omitted). The record made in the district court shows that the purposes of error preservation were accomplished here and there is no unfairness in allowing the State to argue on appeal that the court could not order a refund of the probation supervision fee.
Although the objection made by the DCS representative at the probation revocation hearing was rather cryptic, her statement that "written consent" was needed alerted the court to DCS's position that the court could not unilaterally order a refund. Even though the DCS representative did not indicate whose "consent" was thought necessary in order to refund the enrollment fee, based on the governing statutes and rules, it is apparent that the consent required was that of DCS. See Iowa Code § 905.14(3) (); Iowa Admin. Code r. 201-42.1(14) (). Moreover, it can hardly be argued that the trial court did not understand DCS's position at the hearing in view of the court's later statement that it had considered this position in making its ruling.
In summary, then, we conclude the trial court was sufficiently alerted to the objection being raised on appeal so as to allow the court "to avoid or correct error." See DeVoss, 648 N.W.2d at 60. In addition, DCS made an adequate record for purposes of our review. Therefore, we will proceed to the merits of the claimed error.
A. General principles of statutory interpretation. Because the issue before us involves the interpretation of a...
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