State v. Picot
| Decision Date | 23 May 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. A02A0129.,A02A0129. |
| Parties | The STATE v. PICOT. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Gerald N. Blaney, Jr., Solicitor-Gen., Emilien O. Loiselle, Jr., Jeffrey P. Kwiatkowski, Asst. Solicitors-Gen., for appellant.
Chestney-Hawkins Law Firm, Sherry Boston, Atlanta, for appellee.
The State appeals from the trial court's order granting Brigitte Merie Picot's motion to exclude all evidence gathered as the result of an allegedly illegal seizure during a traffic stop. The State contends that the trial court erred by (1) concluding that a Gwinnett County police officer did not have the authority to stop Picot for speeding in Snellville, and (2) ruling that, due to having a suspended license, Picot was in custody at the time of the stop (which would have required a reading of her Miranda rights before she could be subjected to field sobriety tests). Since the officer had the authority to arrest Picot after witnessing her speeding (whether in Snellville or Gwinnett County), and since Picot was not in custody prior to undergoing the field sobriety tests, we agree with the State and reverse the trial court's ruling.
At the hearing on defendant's motion, a Gwinnett County officer testified that he saw Picot speeding into the city of Snellville. The officer followed Picot from unincorporated Gwinnett County into Snellville, pacing her car at 70 mph within the Snellville city limits. The posted speed limit in the area was 45 mph.
The officer turned on his blue lights, and Picot pulled over. When the officer asked Picot for her license, he smelled a strong odor of alcohol on her breath. The officer then checked Picot's license number and her name and discovered that her license had been suspended. However, the officer did not tell Picot about this discovery, nor did he tell her that she was under arrest. Based on the smell of alcohol on Picot's breath, the officer called in another Gwinnett County officer to complete the DUI investigation.
The second officer arrived within minutes, and the first officer informed him that he had stopped Picot for speeding and smelled alcohol on her breath and that her license was suspended. The second officer also noticed the odor of alcohol on Picot's breath and further observed that her eyes were bloodshot, her face was flushed, and her walk was unsteady. When the second officer asked Picot if she would agree to take some field sobriety tests, she consented, and the officer then conducted a series of sobriety tests. Picot did not testify at the motion hearing.
The trial court ruled that the first Gwinnett County police officer did not see Picot speeding in Gwinnett County but only in Snellville and was therefore without authority to stop her within the city limits of Snellville. In addition, the trial court concluded that Picot could have reasonably believed that she was in custody at the time that she was pulled over, because she had a suspended license. The trial court then suppressed all evidence gathered in connection with the stop, and the State now appeals.
1. The State argues that the trial court erred by ruling that the Gwinnett County police officer who stopped Picot for speeding was without authority to do so. We agree with the State.
When the evidence is uncontroverted regarding a motion to suppress and no question of credibility is presented, the trial court's application of the law to the undisputed facts is subject to de novo appellate review. Vansant v. State, 264 Ga. 319, 320(1), 443 S.E.2d 474 (1994). Here, the testimony of the Gwinnett County officers is uncontroverted. Since we find that the trial court's application of the law to the undisputed facts was in error, we must reverse the trial court's ruling.
Picot contends that the Georgia Constitution prohibited the Gwinnett County police officer from pulling her over and arresting her in the city limits of Snellville. The relevant provision states that "[u]nless otherwise provided by law ... [n]o county may exercise [police] powers ... inside the boundaries of any municipality or any other county except by contract with the municipality or county affected...." (Emphasis supplied.) Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Par. III(a), (b)(1). Interpreting this constitutional provision, State v. Heredia, 252 Ga. App. 89, 90(1), 555 S.E.2d 91 (2001) (); see State v. Gehris, 242 Ga.App. 384, 386, 528 S.E.2d 300 (2000) () (punctuation and footnote omitted); see also Page v. State, 250 Ga.App. 795, 797, 553 S.E.2d 176 (2001); City of...
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