State v. Picotte
| Decision Date | 16 May 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 01-3063-CR.,01-3063-CR. |
| Citation | 261 Wis.2d 249,661 N.W.2d 381,2003 WI 42 |
| Parties | STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Waylon PICOTTE, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Wisconsin Supreme Court |
For the defendant-appellant there were briefs by John T. Wasielewski and Wasielewski & Erickson, Milwaukee, and oral argument by John T. Wasielewski.
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by David J. Becker, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general.
¶ 1.
This case comes before the court on certification by the court of appeals pursuant to Wis. Stat. (Rule) § 809.61 (1999-2000).1 The circuit court for Brown County, Peter J. Naze, Judge, entered a judgment of conviction for first-degree reckless homicide (Wis. Stat. § 940.02), party to a crime, against Waylon Picotte, the defendant. It also entered an order denying the defendant's postconviction motions.
¶ 2. The issue presented by this case is whether the defendant's conviction for first-degree reckless homicide is barred because the victim did not die within a year and a day of the infliction of the fatal injuries.
¶ 3. The defendant's postconviction motions asserted that his conviction of first-degree reckless homicide was barred because it violated the common-law year-and-a-day rule, which establishes an irrebuttable presumption that death occurring more than one year and one day after an accused's injury-inflicting act was not caused by the accused.
¶ 4. The circuit court denied the defendant's motions. The circuit court concluded that even if the year-and-a-day rule were part of the law of Wisconsin after adoption of the Wisconsin Constitution, the legislature eliminated the year-and-a-day rule by enacting Wis. Stat. § 939.74(2), authorizing a prosecution for violation of § 940.02 () to be commenced at any time.2
¶ 5. We disagree with the circuit court and hold that the defendant's conviction in this case is barred by the common-law year-and-a-day rule. In order to reach this conclusion, we must address four successive questions of law that this court decides independent of the circuit court but benefiting from the circuit court's analysis. The four questions and this court's answers to them are as follows:
I
¶ 6. The relevant undisputed facts of this case are as follows. Waylon J. Picotte, the defendant, was involved, along with another, in a fight outside of a Green Bay bar on September 26, 1996. During the fight, John Jackson was struck in the face and hit his head on a brick wall. Jackson suffered brain damage that left him in a coma. The defendant was charged with aggravated battery and substantial battery on October 21, 1996.3 He pled guilty and was sentenced to 15 years in prison.4
¶ 7. More than two years later, on June 8, 1999, Jackson died from complications arising from the injuries sustained in the fight. The defendant was then charged with first-degree reckless homicide, party to a crime, in violation of Wis. Stat. §§ 940.02(1) and 939.05.5 After a jury trial, the defendant was convicted and sentenced to 30 years in prison. ¶ 8. The defendant filed postconviction motions asserting, among other issues, that his prosecution and conviction for first-degree reckless homicide violated the common-law year-and-a-day rule.6 The circuit court affirmed the conviction and the court of appeals certified the issues relating to the year-and-a-day rule for review by this court.
II
[1] ¶ 9. We address first whether the year-and-a-day rule has been the common-law rule in Wisconsin since statehood. We agree with both the State and the defendant that the year-and-a-day rule has been the law of Wisconsin since statehood, preserved through Article XIV, Section 13 of the Wisconsin Constitution.
¶ 10. Article XIV, Section 13 of the Wisconsin Constitution reads as follows:
Common law continued in force. Such parts of the common law as are now in force in the territory of Wisconsin, not inconsistent with this constitution, shall be and continue part of the law of this state until altered or suspended by the legislature.
Decisions of this court make clear that Article XIV, Section 13 specifically incorporates the common law of England as it existed in 1776 into the law of this state.7
¶ 11. The year-and-a-day rule is a common-law criminal rule of causation that dates back to thirteenth-century England.8 According to the rule, no homicide is committed unless the victim dies within a year and a day after the injury is inflicted, for if the victim dies more than one year and a day from the injury it is "conclusively presumed that the injury did not cause the death."9 The year-and-a-day rule was plainly part of English common law at the time of the American Revolution,10 and was therefore the law in Wisconsin at statehood.11
[2, 3] ¶ 12. The circuit court ruled that while the year-and-a-day rule may have been the law in Wisconsin, the legislature abrogated the common-law rule when it enacted Wis. Stat. § 939.74(2). We agree with both the State and the defendant that the circuit court's ruling is erroneous. Section 939.74(2) eliminates any statute of limitations for a prosecution for first-degree reckless homicide. It provides that a prosecution under § 940.02 "may be commenced at any time." A statute of limitations sets the time within which a prosecution must be commenced after the crime is completed. In contrast, the year-and-a-day rule is a substantive principle of criminal law defining when a murder has been committed. "There is no question that the year-and-a-day rule has long been recognized in the common law as substantive legal principle."12 In adopting § 939.74(2),the legislature did not act to alter or suspend the year-and-a-day rule.
¶ 13. In fact, legislative history relating to the Wisconsin Criminal Code indicates that the year-and-a-day rule has been and remains to this day a part of the common law of this state. The 1953 revision of the Wisconsin Criminal Code, which never went into effect, included the following provision, abolishing the year-and-a-day rule.13
339.15 YEAR AND A DAY RULE ABOLISHED. In a prosecution for homicide the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the causal relation between the homicidal act and death, but shall not be required to prove that death occurred within a year and a day of such act.14
¶ 14. The very fact that the drafters included this provision is strong evidence that the legislature understood the year-and-a-day rule to be part of the common law of Wisconsin. Assistant Attorney General William Platz, one of the architects of both the 1953 and the 1955 versions of the criminal code, explained the removal of that provision from the code as a policy decision to leave the year-and-a-day rule in effect for Wisconsin.
Another section [of the 1953 version of the criminal code] deleted by the committee would have abolished the rule in homicide cases that death must occur within a year and a day from the felonious act of causing death. This was a policy decision by the committee and leaves the law as it has been.15
¶ 15. Thus, we conclude that the year-and-a-day rule was incorporated into the laws of Wisconsin by Article XIV, Section 13 of the Wisconsin Constitution and has not been altered or suspended by the legislature.
III
[4] ¶ 16. We next consider whether this court has the authority to abrogate the year-and-a-day rule. The defendant asserts that Article XIV, Section 13 of the Wisconsin Constitution permits only the legislature to abrogate the common law and that this court does not have the authority to abrogate the common-law year-and-a-day rule. We disagree with the defendant. It is now well established that Article XIV, Section 13 did not usurp the traditional authority of the judiciary to develop the common law in Wisconsin.
¶ 17. This court addressed the effect of Article XIV, Section 13 on the judiciary's power to develop the common law in State v. Esser, 16 Wis. 2d 567, 115 N.W.2d 505 (1962). Esser was an appeal by the State, in which the State argued that the trial court had misinstructed the jury when it defined the defense of insanity in terms more broad than the common-law...
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TABLE OF CASES
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