State v. Piggues

• Decision Date: 28 October 1893
• Citation: 23 S.W. 792,58 Ark. 132
• Parties: STATE v. PIGGUES
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

23 S.W. 792

58 Ark. 132

STATE v. PIGGUES

Supreme Court of Arkansas

October 28, 1893

Appeal from Howard Circuit Court, WILL P. FEAZEL, Judge.

Judgment affirmed.

James P. Clarke, Attorney General, for appellant.

Under sec. 1213, Mansfield's Digest, it was the duty of the sheriff to take defendant into custody, and, if the fine and costs were not paid immediately, to hire him out, etc. 37 Ark. 437. The object of the act of 1887 was to facilitate the collection of fines, etc. The intention of the legislature is the only inquiry here, and such a construction should be placed upon the act as best answers the intention the law-makers had in view. 15 J. R. (N. Y.) 357, 380; 12 Tex 399; 11 Ark. 47. It was not intended to abrograte or repeal sec. 1213, or to discharge the prisoner. 23 Ark. 304. The two laws should be construed in pari materia, and reconciled if possible. 50 Ark. 137; 45 id. 93; 40 id. 448; 5 id. 349. The act merely suspended the execution of the judgment until the bond became due, and facilitates its enforcement, if default was made.

OPINION

BUNN C. J.

The appellee, Boston Piggues, was indicted at the August term 1892, of the Howard circuit court, for the crime of gaming, and, on his plea of guilty, was fined ten dollars. Judgment was rendered under section 1213 of Mansfield's Digest, ^[*] and appellee then gave his obligation with sureties, under the act of April 5, 1887, entitled "An act to facilitate the collection of fines and costs in criminal cases." ^[+] Default was made at the maturity of the obligation, and execution was issued against appellee and his sureties, as provided in the act in such cases, the obligation having the force and effect of a judgment. The execution was returned nulla bona, neither the appellee nor his sureties having property out of which the amount could be made.

At the February term, 1893, of said court, the State, by her attorney, petitioned the court for an execution against the defendant, containing a capias clause, to which the defendant demurred, which was by the court sustained, and the State appealed.

Thus we are presented with the question, whether or not, the note or bond mentioned in the first section of the act of April 5, 1887, having been given, the same is intended to operate as a finality as to the defendant, so far as the criminal prosecution is concerned. This of course involves an inquiry into the meaning of that act, when taken in connection with section 1213 and other sections of Mansfield's Digest.

There is nothing in the act itself which authorizes the sheriff to continue his custody of the defendant after he has given the obligation required. He is then released from the custody of the sheriff, to all intents and purposes, just as he would have been, on his hirer having given the required obligation, had he been hired out under sections 1213 and 1214, Mansfield's Digest. He seems to be no longer the subject of the sheriff's custody in any manner. The act makes no provision for his re-caption. It evidently contemplates that there is nothing else left to do but to collect the obligation. We cannot sanction the arrest...