State v. Pill
| Decision Date | 24 March 1967 |
| Docket Number | CA-CR,No. 2,2 |
| Parties | The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Joseph R. PILL, Appellant. 78--2. |
| Court | Arizona Court of Appeals |
Darrell F. Smith, Atty. Gen., Phoenix, William J. Schafer, III, Pima County Atty., Tucson, for appellee.
Ralph E. Seefeldt, Tucson, for appellant.
The defendant pleaded guilty to charges of grand theft and passing a forged check and consecutive sentences of imprisonment were subsequently imposed. An appeal was taken to this court in 1965, and, finding that the defendant's contentions with regard to his sentence were without merit, we affirmed the judgment. See State v. Pill, 1 Ariz.App. 132, 400 P.2d 339 (1965); review denied by Supreme Court.
The defendant proceeded to file assorted petitions for writs of habeas corpus in the superior and appellate courts of this state, all of which were denied. He then filed in Pima County superior court a motion to vacate his sentence which was duly denied, as was a motion to reconsider. This appeal followed.
The 'motion to vacate', prepared and filed pro se by the defendant, purports to attack the validity of the judgment of conviction on the grounds that the trial court lacked jurisdiction. The claimed jurisdictional defect is that defendant was deprived of his constitutional right to a preliminary hearing. Before considering the merits of defendant's claim, we consider it necessary to consider the appealability of the subject order.
We have previously passed upon this very question, holding that a denial of a motion to vacate a sentence and judgment is not an appealable order within the purview of A.R.S. § 13--1713; State v. Edge, 2 Ariz.App. 147, 148, 406 P.2d 865 (1965). 1 We have reconsidered our holding in Edge, supra, and to the extent that it holds there is no appeal from a denial of a motion to vacate a judgment and sentence, we retract such holding.
A.R.S. § 13--1713 provides for an appeal by a defendant from:
Although the Rules of Criminal Procedure make no provision for setting aside a void judgment, the trial court has inherent power to modify or vacate its own judgments and orders in criminal cases. State v. Lopez, 96 Ariz. 169, 172, 393 P.2d 263 (1964); State v. Adams, 4 Ariz.App. 298, 419 P.2d 739 (1966), rev. den. 1967. As pointed out in these cases, the only requirement is that a motion seeking relief from the operation of the judgment be made within a reasonable time. We hold, therefore, that an order refusing to set aside a void judgment of conviction, upon motion made within a reasonable time after judgment, is an order affecting substantial rights, hence appealable under A.R.S. § 13--1713. See People v. Hall, 115 Cal.App.2d 144, 251 P.2d 979 (1953); People v. Thomas, 52 Cal.2d 521, 342 P.2d 889 (1959).
However, notwithstanding such an order is appealable, it was not intended to provide a means of procuring successive appeals from the same judgment. The legislature has seen fit to provide for appeal from the final judgment of conviction Or from certain post-judgment orders. This does not mean that one aggrieved by such judgment may appeal from the judgment, prosecute an appeal therefrom resulting in affirmance of the judgment, and then return to the trial court to start the process all over again. The defendant Pill, just as the defendant in State v. Edge, supra, availed himself of appellate review and failed to raise the question which he now seeks to raise.
It is well settled that all questions raised on appeal and all that Might have been raised are finally adjudicated and cannot be relitigated by means of habeas corpus. State ex rel. Ronan v. Superior Court, 94 Ariz. 414, 385 P.2d 707 (1963); Eyman v. Cumbo, 99 Ariz. 8, 405 P.2d 889 (1965). As the Supreme Court of this state said in State ex rel. Galbraith v. Superior Court, 22 Ariz. 452, 197 P. 537 (1921);
22 Ariz. at 455, 197 P. at 538.
We believe this principle equally applicable to appeals such...
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Grant v. State
...a criminal defendant may not attack his conviction piecemeal. Hodsdon v. Superior Court, 239 A.2d 222 (Del.1968); State v. Pill, 425 P.2d 588(4), 5 Ariz.App. 277 (1967); State v. Pierson, 489 P.2d 23, 107 Ariz. 386 (1971). In the absence of statute, the defendant is entitled to but one appe......
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State v. Hellickson
...a post-sentence adjudication on such a motion, based upon a claim the judgment is void or unauthorized, is appealable. State v. Pill, 5 Ariz.App. 277, 425 P.2d 588, 589; People v. Thomas, 52 Cal.2d 521, 342 P.2d 889, 893; and State v. Alm, 261 Minn. 238, 111 N.W.2d 517, In the same vein, it......
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Griswold v. Gomes
...petitions for writ of habeas corpus. See, e.g., State v. Superior Court, 103 Ariz. 208, 439 P.2d 294 (1968); State v. Pill, 5 Ariz.App. 277, 425 P.2d 588 (1967). It is obvious from our review of the record in this case that appellant Griswold has been afforded every appellate opportunity av......
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State v. Jackson
...have jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) §§ 12-120.21(A)(1),2 13-4031, and -4033(A)(1), (3). See State v. Pill, 5 Ariz. App. 277, 278-79 (1967) (concluding an order denying a motion to modify or vacate a judgment in a criminal case made within a reasonable time after ......