State v. Pillon

Decision Date27 January 2020
Docket NumberNo. 78599-1-I,78599-1-I
Citation11 Wash.App.2d 949,459 P.3d 339
Parties The STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Charles Edwin PILLON, Appellant.
CourtWashington Court of Appeals

Corey Evan Parker, Law Office of Corey Evan Parker, 1230 Rosecrans Ave. Ste. 300, Manhattan Beach, CA, 90266-2494, for Appellant.

Scott A. Marlow, Washington State Attorney General's Offi., Tienney K-M Milnor, Attorney General of Washington, 800 5th Ave. Ste. 2000, Seattle, WA, 98104-3188, Criminal Justice - Criminal Litigation Unit Atty. General, 800 Fifth Avenue Suite 2000, Ms-tb-14, Seattle, WA, 98104, for Respondent.

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO PUBLISH

Schindler, J.P.T.* ¶1 The trial court found Charles Edwin Pillon guilty of violation of the Hazardous Waste Management Act, RCW 70.105, count 1; wrecking vehicles without a license and with a prior conviction in violation of RCW 46.80.020, count 2; and unlawful dumping of solid waste without a permit in violation of RCW 70.95.030 and .240, count 3. Pillon seeks reversal of count 1 and count 2. Pillon contends (1) sufficient evidence does not support finding the State proved the elements of violation of the Hazardous Waste Management Act and wrecking vehicles without a license beyond a reasonable doubt, (2) the court abused its discretion and violated his right to present a defense by excluding witness testimony, (3) the judge violated his due process right to a fair trial by asking questions, and (4) cumulative error deprived him of the right to a fair trial. We affirm.

FACTS1

¶2 In 1977, Charles Edwin Pillon purchased a 10-acre parcel of property on Renton Issaquah Road Southeast in unincorporated King County. Pillon has lived on the property since 1979.

¶3 Pillon used "a large portion of the property to store, collect, accumulate, and dispose of various items of solid waste." Pillon allowed members of the public to leave solid waste and vehicles on his property in exchange for a "tipping fee." Between February 25, 2015 and February 25, 2016, Pillon " ‘put the word out’ " to the community "that people could dump solid waste" on his property. Pillon would also "collect solid waste to bring back to his property." Pillon admitted to "receiving onto his property approximately 120 cubic yards of solid waste per month." In exchange for assisting Pillon in collecting the tipping fees and working on his property, Pillon allowed "individuals to live in the used motor homes and recreational vehicles." The individuals would move "items of solid waste into the areas of the property where" that type of item was "stored and/or disposed," collect "recyclable materials," and remove "metals from the vehicles and solid waste brought onto the property" to be "sold as scrap." The parts and materials removed from the vehicles, boats, and boat trailers were "sorted and placed into a collection ‘tub’ " and sold as scrap.

¶4 On March 27, 2015, Washington State Patrol (WSP) aircraft videotaped the condition of the property. A screenshot from the videotape shows solid waste "stored and/or disposed" in three different areas on the property: a bus and recreational vehicle (RV) area, a workshop area, and a landfill area:

¶5 Pillon did not have a permit or license to store or dispose of solid waste or hazardous waste. Storm water and groundwater from Pillon’s property drains into nearby May Creek and "ultimately, to Lake Washington."

¶6 On December 3, 2015, Seattle and King County Public Health (SKCPH) issued a notice of violation to Pillon for the collection and disposal operation. On January 11, 2016, WSP aircraft took another video of the property.

¶7 WSP obtained a warrant to search the Pillon property on February 25, 2016. WSP Trooper Troy Giddings executed the warrant to search the property. Washington State Department of Ecology (WDOE) and United States Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) employees took photographs and obtained random samples for testing from the soil and the containers located in the "Bus/RV" area, the workshop area, and the landfill area.

¶8 There were "[a]pproximately 2,000 containers" located on Pillon’s property and it was "impossible to determine how many containers could be buried under solid waste piles." The agency employees selected nine containers from the three different areas "in an effort to randomize the sample as much as possible to provide a fair representation of the types, location, and condition of the various containers" on the property.

¶9 Laboratory tests identified high levels of arsenic, cadmium, and chromium in the soil samples and characteristics of ignitability in the container samples from the Bus/RV area. Soil and container samples from the workshop area contained high levels of lead, arsenic, cadmium, and chromium. Soil samples from the landfill area contained high levels of arsenic and chromium.

¶10 The Washington State Office of the Attorney General and the King County Office of the Prosecuting Attorney (collectively, the State) filed charges against Pillon. The State alleged that between December 15, 2015 and February 25, 2016, Pillon violated the Hazardous Waste Management Act, chapter 70.105 RCW, and chapter 173-303 WAC, count 1; engaged in wrecking vehicles without a license and with a prior conviction in violation of RCW 46.80.020, count 2;2 and unlawfully dumped solid waste without a permit in violation of RCW 70.95.030 and .240, count 3.

COUNT I
VIOLATION OF HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT ACT
On or between December 15, 2015, and February 25, 2016, in the State of Washington, the above-named Defendant did knowingly transport, store, handle, or dispose of a hazardous substance, to wit: solid waste exhibiting characteristics of ignitability, corrosivity, reactivity, and/or toxicity as stated in WAC 173-303-090, in violation of Ch. 70.105 RCW, to wit: implementing regulations WAC 173-303-140 and WAC 173-303-800(2), and did so in a manner which the Defendant knew placed the natural resources owned by the state of Washington in imminent danger of harm; contrary to RCW 70.105.085(1)(b) and 70.105.010. (Class C felony with a maximum penalty of five (5) years imprisonment and/or a $10,000 fine, pursuant to RCW 9A.20.021(1)(c), plus restitution, assessments and court costs.)
COUNT II
WRECKING VEHICLES WITHOUT A LICENSE WITH PREVIOUS CONVICTION
On or between December 15, 2015, and February 25, 2016, in the State of Washington, King County, the above-named Defendant, did engage in the business or wrecking vehicles without having first applied for and received a license, and the Defendant was previously convicted of violating RCW 46.80.020 in State of Washington v. Charles Edwin Pillon, King County Superior Court Cause Number 06-1-12433-9 KNT; contrary to Revised Code of Washington 46.80.020. (Class C felony with a maximum penalty of five (5) years imprisonment and/or $10,000 fine, or both pursuant to RCW 46.80.020(2)(b) and RCW 9A.20.021(1)(c), plus restitution, assessments and court costs.)
COUNT III
UNLAWFUL DUMPING OF SOLID WASTE WITHOUT A PERMIT
On or between February 25, 2015, and February 25, 2016, in the State of Washington, King County, the above-named Defendant, did dump or deposit solid waste onto or under the surface of the ground, in an amount of one cubic yard or more; contrary to RCW 70.95.030, and RCW 70.95.240, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Washington. (Gross misdemeanor with a maximum penalty of three hundred sixty-four (364) days jail and/or a $5,000 fine pursuant to RCW 9A.20.021(2) and RCW 70.95.240(3)(c), plus restitution and assessments.)

¶11 Pillon entered a plea of not guilty and filed a motion to waive his right to counsel and proceed pro se. Following a hearing, the court concluded Pillon "knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily" waived his right to counsel. The court found Pillon "understands the charges and consequences of his waiver," he "is competent," and he was "entitled to exercise his constitutional right to represent himself."

¶12 The court scheduled the trial to begin on April 2, 2018. Pillon waived his right to a jury trial. Before trial, Pillon and the attorney representing the State entered into "Stipulations of the Parties Regarding Agreed Facts, Testimony, and Evidence." The parties stipulated that a number of facts were "true and may be considered by the court as undisputed evidence in this case." The parties stipulated to the admissibility of evidence, including an October 2014 SKCPH "Environmental Health Assessment" of the Pillon property, the WSP aerial videos and photographs of the property, receipts seized from Pillon’s residence during execution of the search warrant that showed money received for scrap metal, and a certified copy of the previous 2007 conviction for wrecking motor vehicles without a license. Pillon agreed to waive foundation objections to the testimony of State witnesses, including testimony about results from the testing of the soil and container samples obtained from his property.

¶13 The parties entered into a "Contingent Stipulation":

The purposes of this stipulation is to avoid the necessity of the below named witness having to testify if the court finds the information relevant and admissible. If the court rules that the testimony/witnesses below are relevant and admissible, the parties agree and stipulate that the court can consider the below summaries as substantive evidence in lieu of having the witness(es) testify. Mr. Pillon fully understands the contingent nature of this stipulation, including that the State will be moving to exclude the testimony of these witnesses.[3 ]

¶14 The Contingent Stipulation notes the evidentiary objections of the State to potential defense witness testimony:

The State takes the position that the potential testimony summarized below is irrelevant and its admission should be precluded by, inter alia, Rules of Evidence (ER) 401, 402, 403, 602, and 701. Mr. Pillon takes the position that this testimony is
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2 cases
  • State v. Pemberton
    • United States
    • Washington Court of Appeals
    • 8 Junio 2020
    ...incorrect or challenge them on appeal. Unchallenged findings of fact are verities on appeal. State v.Pillon, 11 Wn. App. 2d 949, 971, 459 P.3d 339 (2020). Accepting the trial court's findings as verities, we can conclude only that the government did not act outrageously. Indeed, given that ......
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    • Washington Court of Appeals
    • 10 Marzo 2020
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