State v. Pinckney, 2D13–2595.

Decision Date09 September 2015
Docket NumberNo. 2D13–2595.,2D13–2595.
PartiesSTATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Herbert Adolphus PINCKNEY, Appellee.
CourtFlorida District Court of Appeals

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Brandon R. Christian, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellant.

Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Allyn M. Giambalvo, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellee.

Opinion

CRENSHAW, Judge.

The State of Florida appeals a downward departure sentence of twelve months' probation in this battery case, asserting that the court lacked competent, substantial evidence to impose the departure sentence. Specifically, it argues that there was insufficient evidence that the victim provoked the incident within the meaning of section 921.0026(2)(f), Florida Statutes (2011).1 Because the downward departure sentence lacks competent, substantial evidence to support it, we reverse and remand for resentencing.

Herbert Pinckney, the defendant, pleaded to the battery of a woman with whom he had a relationship. The record suggests that Pinckney pleaded under the impression he was likely to get a departure sentence, though this was not based on a plea bargain with the State but rather on comments by the judge. A nonvictim witness was prepared to testify for the State at trial but because of the plea only testified at the sentencing hearing. Her testimony, which the court explicitly found credible, indicated that the victim was not the initial aggressor. Specifically, the witness testified that the victim was outside the car and talking to the driver who then got out and attempted to drag the victim into the car. The driver was then assisted by the passenger in throwing the victim to the ground and kicking and punching her. Pinckney, too, testified and asserted that the victim was the initial aggressor, that the victim spat upon him, and that she took a swing at him before getting out of the car; his testimony was found not to be credible. Yet the court, based largely on counsel's comments, granted the downward departure and imposed a year probation.

“The trial court must first determine whether it can depart—whether the defendant has met the burden of establishing sufficient factual support for a valid legal ground.” State v. Kelleher, 142 So.3d 958, 959 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) (emphasis added) (quoting Kezal v. State, 42 So.3d 252, 254 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) ). The only evidence favoring Pinckney was his own testimony. His counsel attempted to corroborate that evidence which the court accepted on its face: “I find there is credible information from Defense Counsel.” But “it is axiomatic that the arguments of counsel are not evidence....” Geralds v. State, 111 So.3d 778, 795 n. 16 (Fla.2010), as revised on denial of reh'g (Feb. 2, 2012) (quoting Collins Fruit Co. v. Giglio, 184 So.2d 447, 449 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966) ). Counsel's corroboration was not under oath; it was only argument. Favoring the State was the testimony of the nonvictim witness. Regarding the nonvictim witness, the court stated, “I find the testimony of [the witness] from Spokane, Washington to be very credible, and I appreciate her coming all the way across the United States to testify here in Manatee County. And I do find her testimony to be credible.” Then turning to Pinckney's testimony, the court stated, “I do not find Mr. Pinckney's testimony ... to be credible.”

We have to give effect to the court's credibility conclusions. The witnesses provided contradictory testimony, and Pinckney's was not credible; thus, Pinckney's testimony alone fails to establish the requisite element for the downward departure: that the victim was the initial aggressor. Cf. State v. Rife, 789 So.2d 288, 292 (Fla.2001) (discussing broadly the relevant mitigating factor). Because there was no competent, substantial evidence supporting the court's conclusion that the victim was the initial aggressor, this downward departure sentence must be reversed. On remand, the court is free to impose another downward departure if Pinckney can establish a valid basis. See Jackson v. State, 64 So.3d 90, 93 (Fla.2011).

Reversed and remanded for resentencing with directions.

KELLY, J., Concurs.

VILLANTI, C.J., Concurs with opinion.

VILLANTI, Chief Judge, Concurring.

I fully concur in the majority opinion, but write to point out numerous irregularities which may have contributed to the imposition of the erroneous sentence imposed in this case.

After jury selection but before the start of opening statements, defense counsel told the judge that he had a “collateral issue” he wanted to raise concerning whether the trial itself should go forward. Defense counsel then proceeded to discuss at great length the prior relationship between the victim and Pinckney, the victim's criminal history, and details of the victim's alleged involvement in drugs and prostitution. Defense counsel then discussed the evidence presented at a prior trial that involved different charges between the same victim and Pinckney. Defense counsel noted that Pinckney had been acquitted after that prior trial, and he told the court what the trial judge in that prior case had allegedly expressed as his personal opinion about the victim's credibility. Defense counsel then explained that he believed that the victim would have come to this trial and testified that Pinckney was not guilty of these charges; however, the victim currently had a warrant out for her arrest and so would not come to court, in large part because she is very high on cocaine most likely right now, and doesn't want to withdraw in jail.” Defense counsel told the court that he anticipated that Pinckney would have to testify in order to assert his defenses, but that there was a “problem” with Pinckney's prior record and that defense counsel was concerned that the jury was “most likely not going to believe him because of his record.”

The court then turned to the State and asked for its input on the case. The State outlined what it believed the evidence would show. The court then stated that “if your representation to the Court is that you have a case that can survive potentially a judgment of acquittal or anything else, we'll deal with it and the case will go forward.” Immediately thereafter, defense counsel asked to approach the bench and go off the record. The trial court agreed. What followed was a twenty-four...

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4 cases
  • Shine v. State
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • June 13, 2019
    ...quashed on other grounds , 258 So. 3d 1297 (Fla. 2018) ; State v. Milici , 219 So. 3d 117 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017) ; State v. Pinckney , 173 So. 3d 1139 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) ; and State v. Michels , 59 So. 3d 1163 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011), on the issue of whether a defendant is entitled to a de novo se......
  • State v. Diaz
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • February 5, 2020
    ...and criteria’ of the [Criminal Punishment Code]." (quoting Jackson v. State, 64 So. 3d 90, 93 (Fla. 2011) )); State v. Pinckney, 173 So. 3d 1139, 1140 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) ("On remand, the court is free to impose another downward departure if [the defendant] can establish a valid basis.").Rev......
  • State v. Johnson
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • August 17, 2016
    ...was a minor participant in the offense. As the State argues, defense counsel's arguments are not evidence. See State v. Pinckney, 173 So.3d 1139, 1140 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) (noting that the arguments of counsel are not evidence); State v. Bernard, 744 So.2d 1134, 1135 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (“[R]e......
  • State v. Lackey
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • June 1, 2018
    ...legal grounds are supported by competent, substantial evidence. See Jackson v. State, 64 So.3d 90, 93 (Fla. 2011) ; State v. Pinckney, 173 So.3d 1139, 1140 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015).Reversed and remanded. LaROSE, C.J., and ROTHSTEIN–YOUAKIM, J., Concur.1 Mr. Lackey was eighteen years old at the ti......

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