State v. Piorkowski

• Decision Date: 24 September 1996
• Docket Number: No. 13537,13537
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Michael PIORKOWSKI.

Page 582

682 A.2d 582

43 Conn.App. 209

STATE of Connecticut v. Michael PIORKOWSKI.

No. 13537.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Submitted on Briefs May 22, 1996.

Decided Sept. 24, 1996.

Certification Granted, limited to the following issue: Nov.20, 1996.

Elizabeth M. Inkster, Assistant Public Defender, with whom, on the brief, was Joseph G. Bruckmann, Public Defender, for appellant (defendant).

Judith M. Rossi, Assistant State's Attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Eugene J. Callahan, State's Attorney, and James Bernardi Assistant State's Attorney, for appellee (State).

Before EDWARD Y. O'CONNELL, FOTI, LAVERY, LANDAU, HEIMAN, SPEAR and FRANCIS X. HENNESSY, JJ.

SPEAR, Judge.

Our Supreme Court, in reversing this court's decision, ¹ has determined that the defendant's claims on his motion to suppress are reviewable on appeal pursuant to Practice Book § 4003(b). ² On remand, the Supreme Court has directed us to determine whether the trial court properly refused to suppress two statements that the defendant gave to police officers.

The defendant asserts that his first statement, given October 21, 1992, should be suppressed pursuant to General Statutes § 54-1c ³ because it was obtained in violation of the prompt arraignment requirements of General Statutes § 54-1g. ⁴ He claims that his second statement, given October 22, 1992, should be suppressed because it was obtained in the absence of the attorney who had earlier been appointed to represent him, in violation of his right to counsel under article first, § 8, of the constitution of Connecticut. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The record discloses the following factual and procedural history. The defendant was arrested on drug charges early in 1992 and thereafter was recruited as a confidential informant by the Norwalk police department. He informed the police that Tim Lee was involved in marijuana trafficking. During the ensuing investigation of Lee, the defendant arranged to purchase marijuana from Lee. That transaction was observed by an officer of the Norwalk police department, but without the knowledge of the police, the defendant had also arranged to sell cocaine to Lee. Some time after that transaction, the defendant killed Lee during an argument over the cocaine sale.

The following facts relating to the defendant's statements were set out in State v. Piorkowski, 236 Conn. 388, 672 A.2d 921 (1996). "On approximately October 10, 1992, Lee's body was discovered in New Jersey. In the early morning of October 20, 1992, Norwalk Detective Robert DeLallo learned that Christine Thompson, a friend of Lee, had given New Jersey police a statement implicating the defendant in Lee's murder. At approximately 7:30 a.m. on October 20, DeLallo and other officers located the defendant in Norwalk and, during a frisk of the defendant for weapons, found drugs and drug paraphernalia on his person. The police arrested the defendant on drug charges, orally advised him of his Miranda rights, and brought him to the Norwalk police station at approximately 8 a.m.

"The defendant was not presented in court on the drug charges on October 20, but was held in the police department lockup while the police continued to investigate Lee's murder. At approximately 11 p.m., on October 20, the police secured an arrest warrant charging the defendant with Lee's murder. At approximately midnight on October 21, [Detective James] Saraceni and Detective Nelson Alicia awakened the defendant in his lockup cell. The defendant indicated that he wanted to talk with Saraceni, after which the detectives took the defendant to an interview room, where Saraceni informed him that the police had an arrest warrant for the defendant on a murder charge. Saraceni told the defendant that he would talk to him only after giving him the Miranda warnings and having him fill out a waiver of rights form. Saraceni read the waiver of rights form to the defendant, who did not sign the form. Saraceni then interrogated the defendant in Alicia's presence. During the interrogation, the defendant spoke freely, giving a detailed statement implicating himself in Lee's murder.

"The detectives concluded their interrogation of the defendant at approximately 2 a.m. on October 21, 1992. Later that day, approximately twenty-six hours after his arrest on the drug charges, the defendant was arraigned in geographical area number twenty of the Superior Court on both the drug and murder charges; that court had been in session on October 20. A public defender was appointed to represent the defendant on both charges.

"At approximately 10:30 p.m. on October 21, DeLallo and Detective Charles Chrzanowski went to the home of Denise Van Valen, with whom the defendant lived, to ascertain whether she had any information regarding the murder of Lee. While they were in Van Valen's home, the defendant called her from the Bridgeport correctional center. Van Valen told the defendant that the detectives were there, and asked him if he wanted to talk to DeLallo. The defendant indicated that he did, and she handed the telephone to DeLallo. When the defendant asked DeLallo to come to the jail to speak to him, DeLallo told the defendant that he would try to see him at the jail the next day. When Van Valen visited the defendant at the jail on October 22, she learned that DeLallo had not yet visited the defendant. Later that day Van Valen called DeLallo and asked him why he had not yet visited the defendant.

"Although DeLallo was aware that the defendant was represented by an attorney on the murder charge, no call was placed to the public defender assigned to the defendant's case. After Van Valen's call to him on October 22, DeLallo spoke to assistant state's attorney James Bernardi and state's attorney's inspector Phil O'Grady, in order to determine whether he could appropriately interview the defendant at the jail. Bernardi and O'Grady advised DeLallo that, if the defendant had initiated the contact with him and had requested to speak with him, it was permissible to interview him regarding the murder charge. Having obtained approval from the state's attorney's office, DeLallo and Alicia visited the defendant at the jail on the evening of October 22. Neither the detectives nor the state's attorney's office informed the defendant's counsel of the detectives' intention to interview the defendant. The detectives read him a Miranda rights and waiver form, which he initialed and signed. They then interviewed him about the Lee murder, and he gave another oral statement." Id., at 393-95, 672 A.2d 921.

The defendant moved to suppress the October 21 statement on the grounds that (1) he had not waived his Miranda ⁵ rights and (2) the statement was the product of a violation of his right to a prompt arraignment, as provided under § 54-1c. In the same motion, the defendant moved to suppress the October 22 statement on the grounds that (1) the statement was the fruit of the illegal October 21 interrogation, and (2) the statement was taken in violation of his right to counsel. ⁶

The trial court denied the motion to suppress, concluding that (1) the defendant had knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights prior to making the October 21 statement, (2) the defendant's arraignment was timely because § 54-1g requires arraignment no later than the next court day following an arrest, (3) the October 22 statement was not invalid because the defendant had validly waived his rights on October 21, and (4) the defendant's right to counsel pursuant to article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution was not violated because that section does not require that counsel be present for a valid postarraignment waiver of the right to counsel.

The defendant entered a conditional plea of nolo contendere to the charge of murder with the agreement of the state and the approval of the court. The defendant expressly conditioned his plea on the right to vacate it if his appeal of the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress was successful with respect to either or both of the statements.

I

The trial court correctly noted that the defendant's prompt presentment claim made pursuant to § 54-1g is controlled by three cases. State v. Vollhardt, 157 Conn. 25, 39, 244 A.2d 601 (1968); State v. Darwin, 155 Conn. 124, 133-34, 230 A.2d 573 (1967), rev'd on other grounds, 391 U.S. 346, 88 S.Ct. 1488, 20 L.Ed.2d 630 (1968); State v. Hardy, 11 Conn.App. 238, 239, 526 A.2d 562 (1987).

In Darwin, the defendant was arrested at about 9:40 a.m. on Friday, December 6, 1963. General Statutes § 54-1b provided at that time that any person arrested be "presented before the circuit court session next held in the circuit where the offense is alleged to have been committed." General Statutes § 54-1c provided at that time that "[a]ny admission, confession or statement, written or oral, obtained from an accused person who has not been so presented to the first session of the [circuit] court ... shall be inadmissible." The Circuit Court convened at 10 a.m. on December 6, 1963, but was not in session on Saturday, December 7 or Sunday, December 8. Darwin was presented at the court session on Monday, December 9, 1963. Darwin claimed that because he was arrested at 9:40 a.m. on December 6, the next session of the Circuit Court was convened at 10:00 a.m. that day. He claimed that because he was not presented on December 6, his statement made between his arrest and his arraignment on December 9 should be suppressed. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's ruling that the "next session" of the Circuit Court meant the regular session next to be held, excluding any session held on the day of the arrest. State v. Darwin, supra, 155 Conn. at 134, 230 A.2d 573.

In Vollhardt, the defendant did not claim that there was a delay in his presentment to the Circuit Court, but rather that his statements made after his arrest and before arraignment should be suppressed because §§...