State v. Piper
| Decision Date | 31 October 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. S–13–1029,S–13–1029 |
| Citation | 855 N.W.2d 1 |
| Court | Nebraska Supreme Court |
| Parties | State of Nebraska, appellee, v. Kerstin M. Piper, also known as Kerstin M. Clarkson, appellant. |
Bell Island, of Island & Huff, P.C., L.L.O., Scottsbluff, for appellant.
Jon Bruning, Attorney General, and Nathan A. Liss, Lincoln, for appellee.
Heavican, C.J., Wright, Connolly, Stephan, McCormack, Miller–Lerman, and Cassel, JJ.
1. Criminal Law: Courts: Appeal and Error.In an appeal of a criminal case from the county court, the district court acts as an intermediate court of appeals, and its review is limited to an examination of the record for error or abuse of discretion.
2. Courts: Appeal and Error.Both the district court and a higher appellate court generally review appeals from the county court for error appearing on the record.
3. Judgments: Appeal and Error.When reviewing a judgment for errors appearing on the record, an appellate court's inquiry is whether the decision conforms to the law, is supported by competent evidence, and is neither arbitrary, capricious, nor unreasonable.
4. Appeal and Error.An appellate court independently reviews questions of law in appeals from the county court.
5. Statutes: Appeal and Error.Statutory interpretation presents a question of law, for which an appellate court has an obligation to reach an independent conclusion irrespective of the determination made by the court below.
6. Constitutional Law: Search and Seizure: Motions to Suppress: Appeal and Error.In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress based on a claimed violation of the Fourth Amendment, an appellate court applies a two-part standard of review. Regarding historical facts, an appellate court reviews the trial court's findings for clear error, but whether those facts trigger or violate Fourth Amendment protections is a question of law that an appellate court reviews independently of the trial court's determination.
7. Statutes.Absent a statutory indication to the contrary, words in a statute will be given their ordinary meaning.
8. Statutes.It is not within the province of the courts to read a meaning into a statute that is not there or to read anything direct and plain out of a statute.
9. Statutes.Statutes relating to the same subject matter will be construed so as to maintain a sensible and consistent scheme, giving effect to every provision.
10. Statutes: Legislature: Intent: Appeal and Error.In construing a statute, an appellate court's objective is to determine and give effect to the legislative intent of the enactment.
11. Statutes.A court must attempt to give effect to all parts of a statute, and if it can be avoided, no word, clause, or sentence will be rejected as superfluous.
12. Motions to Suppress: Appeal and Error.When a motion to suppress is overruled, the defendant must make a specific objection at trial to the offer of the evidence which was the subject of the motion to suppress in order to preserve the issue for review on appeal.
13. Motions to Suppress: Trial: Pretrial Procedure: Appeal and Error.When a motion to suppress is denied pretrial and again during trial on renewed objection, an appellate court considers all the evidence, both from trial and from the hearings on the motion to suppress.
14. Pretrial Procedure: Rules of Evidence.A suppression hearing is a preliminary hearing within the meaning of Neb. Evid. R. 1101(4)(b), Neb.Rev.Stat. § 27–1101(4)(b) (Reissue 2008).
15. Pretrial Procedure: Rules of Evidence.In a criminal case, the Nebraska rules of evidence do not apply to suppression hearings.
16. Constitutional Law: Search and Seizure.The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and article I, § 7, of the Nebraska Constitution protect individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures by the government.
17. Constitutional Law: Highways: Motor Vehicles: Investigative Stops: Search and Seizure.A vehicle stop at a highway checkpoint effectuates a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
18. Highways: Investigative Stops.A highway checkpoint must be both authorized by an approved plan and conducted in a manner that complies with the plan and the policy established by the authority at the policymaking level.
Kerstin M. Piper, also known as Kerstin M. Clarkson, appeals from the district court's order which affirmed her conviction and sentence in the county court for driving while under the influence (DUI), second offense. She challenges the county court's determinations that the Nebraska rules of evidence did not apply at the hearing on her motion to suppress and that the Nebraska State Patrol checkpoint at which Piper was stopped was constitutional. Finding no error in these determinations, we affirm the order of the district court which affirmed Piper's conviction and sentence.
In an appeal of a criminal case from the county court, the district court acts as an intermediate court of appeals, and its review is limited to an examination of the record for error or abuse of discretion. State v. McCave, 282 Neb. 500, 805 N.W.2d 290 (2011). Both the district court and a higher appellate court generally review appeals from the county court for error appearing on the record. Id. When reviewing a judgment for errors appearing on the record, an appellate court's inquiry is whether the decision conforms to the law, is supported by competent evidence, and is neither arbitrary, capricious, nor unreasonable. Id. But we independently review questions of law in appeals from the county court. Id. Statutory interpretation presents a question of law, for which an appellate court has an obligation to reach an independent conclusion irrespective of the determination made by the court below. See State v. Taylor, 286 Neb. 966, 840 N.W.2d 526 (2013).
In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress based on a claimed violation of the Fourth Amendment, an appellate court applies a two-part standard of review. State v. Matit, 288 Neb. 163, 846 N.W.2d 232 (2014). Regarding historical facts, we review the trial court's findings for clear error, but whether those facts trigger or violate Fourth Amendment protections is a question of law that we review independently of the trial court's determination. Id.
On July 14, 2012, at approximately 12:30 a.m., the vehicle driven by Piper was stopped at a vehicle checkpoint in Scotts Bluff County, Nebraska. Nebraska State Patrol Trooper Edward J. Petersen approached the vehicle and asked to see Piper's driver's license, vehicle registration, and proof of insurance. He observed that Piper's eyes were bloodshot and watery and that an odor of alcohol was emanating from the vehicle. There were two other people in the vehicle besides Piper.
At Petersen's instruction, Piper drove her vehicle to a nearby parking lot and joined Petersen in his cruiser. Inside the cruiser, Petersen noted an odor of alcohol emanating from Piper's person and decided to administer several standardized, as well as nonstandardized, field sobriety tests, including a preliminary breath test. Because the preliminary breath test registered a breath alcohol content of .174 of 1 gram of alcohol per 210 liters of breath, Petersen arrested Piper for DUI.
At the Scotts Bluff County corrections facility, Petersen administered a chemical breath test, which produced a result of .134 of 1 gram of alcohol per 210 liters of breath. Piper was subsequently charged by complaint in county court with DUI, second offense. (She had previously been convicted of DUI in 2005.)
Piper moved to suppress “all fruits of the illegal search and seizure, and her subsequent arrest.” At the suppression hearing, over Piper's objection, the county court determined that the rules of evidence did not apply.
The State adduced evidence regarding the administration of the July 14, 2012, checkpoint. Petersen testified that the operation of the checkpoint was governed by State Patrol policy; that the checkpoint was operated according to a plan approved by Sgt. Dana Korell, who worked in a “supervisory capacity” at the State Patrol; and that to Petersen's knowledge, every car that came through the checkpoint was stopped. He also testified to the purpose for the checkpoint: “[W]e were specifically doing a DUI—you know, it was an alcohol-related enforcement project.” He further explained, “I was paid through an alcohol enforcement grant. And that's what we were targeting
was alcohol-related violations, but I was just told that this was just a vehicle check.” Piper offered no evidence at the suppression hearing.
The county court suppressed all evidence of the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, the nonstandardized field sobriety tests, and the preliminary breath test. It concluded that (1) the July 14, 2012, checkpoint “conform[ed] to the standard established ... for a proper police ‘check point’ ”; (2) the odor of alcohol and Piper's watery eyes justified Petersen's continued investigation; and (3) there was probable cause to arrest Piper.
At the start of trial, Piper renewed her objection to any evidence obtained from the July 14, 2012, checkpoint. The county court stated that it was “reaffirming” its ruling on the motion to suppress, but recognized Piper's continuing objection on the issue. Piper also objected to the State's adducing any evidence regarding the checkpoint, because it “has already been litigated” and would thus be irrelevant. The court ruled as follows:
So as far as any objections to testimony or information regarding the checkpoint, I will—I'm going to have to reserve my rulings for the—for the trial. If [the prosecutor] gets extremely detailed and I think we're wasting time, then, of course, an objection will probably be appropriate, and I'll probably sustain it, but I can't—I can't prejudge that.
Piper did not make any additional objections that the State's evidence regarding the checkpoint was repetitive.
The State presented evidence that the plan for the July 14, 2012,...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Pauli, A19-1886
...104 analogues exempt suppression hearings from the strict confines of their state's rules of evidence. See , e.g. , State v. Piper, 289 Neb. 364, 855 N.W.2d 1, 9–10 (2014) (holding the Rules of Evidence do not apply to address preliminary questions of admissibility, which includes suppressi......
-
State v. Cotton
...note 4.14 Foster , supra note 7.15 Stevens , supra note 4.16 State v. Smith, 284 Neb. 636, 822 N.W.2d 401 (2012).17 State v. Piper, 289 Neb. 364, 855 N.W.2d 1 (2014), citing Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 10.1 (5th ed. 2009).18 Piper , supra note 17.19 State v. Howell, 188 Neb......
-
State v. Perry
...probation. AFFIRMED. Heavican, C.J., and Miller–Lerman, J., participating on briefs.McCormack, J., not participating.1 State v. Piper, 289 Neb. 364, 855 N.W.2d 1 (2014) ; State v. Matit, 288 Neb. 163, 846 N.W.2d 232 (2014).2 Id.3 State v. Wells, 290 Neb. 186, 859 N.W.2d 316 (2015) ; State v......
-
State v. Prior
...I, § 7, of the Nebraska Constitution protect individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures by the government. State v. Piper , 289 Neb. 364, 855 N.W.2d 1 (2014). However, when individuals voluntarily abandon property, they forfeit any expectation of privacy in the property that the......