State v. PLCH
| Decision Date | 30 June 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 2000–789.,2000–789. |
| Citation | 826 A.2d 534,149 N.H. 608 |
| Court | New Hampshire Supreme Court |
| Parties | The STATE of New Hampshire, v. Vaclav PLCH. |
Stephen J. Judge, acting attorney general (Kelly A. Ayotte, associate attorney general, on the brief and orally), for the State.
Christopher M. Johnson, chief appellate defender, of Concord, by brief and orally, for the defendant.
Vaclav Plch, by brief, pro se.
The defendant, Vaclav Plch, appeals his first-degree murder conviction, arguing that the Trial Court (Groff , J.) erred in: (1) failing to suppress statements he made during custodial interrogation and after his invocation of the right to counsel; (2) finding that he was adequately informed of his right to have counsel present while being questioned; (3) failing to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a warrant supported by observations made in a prior illegal search; and (4) limiting evidence that the victim had used prescription medication. We affirm.
We recite the following facts as found by the trial court for purposes of ruling on the defendant's motions to suppress. On July 20, 1999, a headless, dismembered body was found in the Piscataquog River in Manchester. The victim was identified as Mary Stetson, and an autopsy determined that her death had been caused by multiple stab wounds.
On August 5, 1999, the defendant's ex-wife, Donna Plch, reported him missing to the Manchester Police. Ms. Plch called the police again the next morning and asked that an officer be sent to the defendant's apartment. She apparently informed the dispatcher that she hadn't seen the defendant in approximately a month and that a large section of carpet was missing from his bedroom.
Officer Jean Roers was sent to the defendant's apartment to obtain information for an attempt-to-locate report. After obtaining some basic information from Ms. Plch, Officer Roers asked why she had mentioned the missing rug in her call to the police. Ms. Plch then opened the door to the defendant's bedroom and walked in. Officer Roers followed. Ms. Plch showed Officer Roers where a section of carpet had been cut and pointed out that the defendant's fishing tackle was scattered around the room and the bag that usually contained it was missing.
Finding the details of the defendant's disappearance suspicious, Officer Roers informed the detective division of her belief that the defendant may have been the victim of a crime. Detectives arrived at the apartment and interviewed Ms. Plch and the defendant's roommate. The police obtained written consents to search the apartment and the apartment building's common areas from the defendant's roommate and the building's manager respectively.
The police applied for and obtained a search warrant for the first floor of the apartment building, including the defendant's apartment. The search pursuant to the warrant uncovered evidence including blood evidence consistent with DNA profiles of the defendant and the victim.
On August 10, 1999, a warrant issued for the defendant's arrest. Acting on information that the defendant was in Austin, Texas, Lieutenant Putney and Detective Soucy flew there and arrested him.
Lieutenant Putney interviewed the defendant in a police station interview room. He advised the defendant of his rights by reading each right listed on the Austin Police Department's Miranda form, see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and asking the defendant if he understood that right. With regard to the right to counsel, the following conversation took place:
The defendant signed the Miranda waiver form and the interview proceeded for approximately forty-five minutes. At that point, the defendant stated: "Now I want my lawyer." The following colloquy then occurred:
The defendant was then left alone in the room for approximately twenty minutes until Lieutenant Putney returned and informed him of the charge he faced, which prompted the following exchange:
Approximate forty minutes later, Detective Soucy and Austin Police Detective Thompson took the defendant to the booking room. The defendant began to make potentially incriminating statements to Detective Soucy, who immediately informed the defendant that he could not speak to him because he had requested an attorney. The defendant nevertheless indicated twice that he wanted to talk at that time. Detective Soucy consulted with Detective Thompson who proposed that they finish the booking process and give the defendant time to think. Detective Thompson then gave the defendant the telephone extension of the homicide unit and told him to have the booking officers call if he still wished to talk.
Meanwhile, the detectives went to the homicide unit where Detective Soucy spoke by telephone with the New Hampshire attorney general's office. Upon advice of an assistant attorney general, Detective Soucy brought the defendant back to an interview room to allow him a chance to speak. The defendant was read his Miranda rights, which he waived. During the ensuing interview, the defendant made incriminating statements, including revealing where he had disposed of the missing body parts. The defendant was also interviewed again the next day after an additional Miranda waiver.
The defendant moved to suppress his statements to the detectives in the Texas interviews on the grounds that Lieutenant Putney: (1) conducted the functional equivalent of interrogation of the defendant after he had requested counsel; and (2) failed to "adequately and accurately" inform the defendant of his right to have counsel present during questioning. The trial court denied the motion. On appeal, the defendant contends that the court erred in its rulings on both grounds.
In considering each of the defendant's State and Federal Constitutional claims, we first address his claims under our State Constitution, and cite federal opinions for guidance only. See State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 231, 233, 471 A.2d 347 (1983). State v. Roache, 148 N.H. 45, 46, 803 A.2d 572 (2002) (citation omitted).
The defendant asserts violations of his rights to due process and counsel, and of the protections against self-incrimination under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal Constitution and Part I, Article 15 of the State Constitution. The defendant argues that the trial court erred in admitting his custodial statements to the police in Texas because the officers failed to scrupulously honor his invocation of the right to counsel. Both the United States Supreme Court and this court have developed procedural protections to be adhered to during custodial interrogations. See Roache, 148 N.H. at 48, 803 A.2d 572; Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474, 86 S.Ct. 1602. Accordingly, before interrogating a person in custody, the police must inform him that "he has a right to remain silent, that anything he says can and will be used against him, and that he has a right to counsel." Roache, 148 N.H. at 48, 803 A.2d 572. "If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474, 86 S.Ct. 1602; see also State v. Nash, 119 N.H. 728, 731, 407 A.2d 365 (1979). "Interrogation," for Miranda purposes, encompasses not only "express questioning" but also "its functional equivalent."
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300–01, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980). That is, interrogation includes "any words or actions on the part of the...
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