State v. Plummer
| Decision Date | 19 March 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 85-541,85-541 |
| Citation | 22 OBR 461,490 N.E.2d 902,22 Ohio St.3d 292 |
| Parties | , 22 O.B.R. 461 The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. PLUMMER, Appellant. |
| Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
Absent a showing of prejudice to a defendant, the results of a urine-alcohol test administered in substantial compliance with Ohio Adm.Code 3701-53-05 are admissible in a prosecution under R.C. 4511.19.
At approximately 1:45 a.m. on August 28, 1983, appellant, William D. Plummer, lost control of his car while driving westbound on County Road 70. Appellant's car veered off the right side of the road, crossed a ditch, ran some distance through a field, turned back toward the road and came to rest in the ditch. Appellant was rushed to Lodi Hospital for treatment. Miraculously, he was not badly injured.
Trooper Richard Chris Eckstein of the State Highway Patrol arrived at the accident scene. After completing his investigation, Eckstein went to the hospital to check on appellant. While taking a statement, the trooper noticed that appellant's eyes were bloodshot, his pupils were dilated and his breath smelled of alcohol. Eckstein obtained a urine sample from appellant at 3:05 a.m.
That sample was mailed to the Ohio State Patrol Crime Laboratory in Columbus for analysis at 4:30 a.m. that day. It arrived at the laboratory on August 30, 1983 at 8:34 a.m. The sample was logged in and assigned a laboratory number. Sergeant Blaine W. Keckley of the State Highway Patrol testified that he did not actually begin the process of analyzing appellant's urine sample until "probably around lunch time." Sergeant Keckley did not testify as to whether the urine sample had been refrigerated during the period of time between its arrival at the laboratory and the time he began his analysis. The report from the laboratory showed an alcohol concentration of .20 grams per one hundred milliliters, in excess of the .14 grams limit of R.C. 4511.19(A)(4).
Appellant was charged with driving while under the influence of alcohol in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1) and 4511.19(A)(4). At trial, Keckley testified that appellant's test result was "point two zero percent urine alcohol." Appellant moved to strike this evidence on grounds that Ohio Department of Health rules governing the analysis of urine samples had not been followed. The trial court overruled appellant's motion to strike.
The court found appellant guilty of violating R.C. 4511.19(A)(1) and 4511.19(A)(4) and sentenced him under R.C. 4511.19(A)(1). The court of appeals affirmed the conviction.
The court, finding its judgment to be in conflict with the judgment of the Court of Appeals for VanWert County in State v. Davies (Aug. 24, 1983), No. 15-82-6, unreported, certified the record of the case to this court for review and final determination.
Ronald L. Rehm, Orrville, for appellee.
Eric D. Ritz, Medina, for appellant.
In the case sub judice appellant contends that in order for a urinalysis test result to be admissible in a prosecution under R.C. 4511.19, 1 the urine sample must be treated in compliance with the regulation set forth in the Ohio Adm.Code 3701-53-05(F). For the following reasons, we find that there has been substantial compliance with this regulation and affirm appellant's conviction.
Appellant's test result showed a urine-alcohol content of twenty hundredths of a gram by weight per one hundred milliliters of his urine, in excess of the statutory limit set forth in R.C. 4511.19(A)(4). Whether a person's blood-alcohol, breath-alcohol or urine-alcohol content is tested, R.C. 4511.19(B) requires that "[s]uch bodily substance shall be analyzed in accordance with methods approved by the director of health * * *."
In regard to the collection and handling of urine specimens, the Director of Health has promulgated Ohio Adm.Code 3701-53-05(F) which states that "[w]hile not in transit to a laboratory or under examination all urine * * * specimens shall be refrigerated at a temperature of forty-two degrees Fahrenheit or below."
In the case sub judice, strict compliance with this regulation has not been shown. In the one hour and twenty-five minute period of time between collection of appellant's urine sample and mailing to Columbus, Eckstein indicated the specimen was not refrigerated. Further, Keckley did not say that appellant's specimen was refrigerated during the morning of its arrival in the Columbus laboratory, prior to its examination around lunch time that day. If, however, we were to agree with appellant that any deviation whatsoever from this regulation rendered the results of a urine analysis inadmissible, we would be ignoring the fact that strict compliance is not always realistically or humanly possible.
This court, in State v. Steele (1977), 52 Ohio St.2d 187, 370 N.E.2d 740 , held that rigid compliance with Department of Health regulations in regard to alcohol testing was not necessary in order for test results to be admissible. In Steele, we found that the twenty-minute visual observation period prior to testing required by regulation had been fulfilled even though the arresting officer had averted his gaze from the defendant for a few seconds while the officer exited and walked around his patrol car.
Thus, there is leeway for substantial, though not literal, compliance with such regulations. In the case sub judice a period of one hour and twenty-five minutes elapsed from obtaining appellant's urine sample until mailing. During this interval, packaging, labeling and delivery to mail deposit were required. Once received by the laboratory two days later, there was at worst a three- to four-hour interval when the specimen may not have been refrigerated in compliance with the administrative code. We agree with the court of appeals' reasoning that the storage temperature requirement of Ohio Adm.Code 3701-53-05 contemplates cases involving longer periods of specimen retention, rather than a relatively slight delay between receipt and testing as in this case. Therefore, we find that the state substantially complied with this administrative regulation.
Additionally, appellant has not alleged at any stage of this proceeding, much less demonstrated, that he has been prejudiced in any way by the state's...
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