State v. Pollard
| Decision Date | 10 November 1969 |
| Docket Number | No. 54065,No. 2,54065,2 |
| Citation | 447 S.W.2d 249 |
| Parties | STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Larry Lee POLLARD, Appellant |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
John C. Danforth, Atty. Gen., Warren k. Morgens, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent.
Madigan & Hadican, J. Martin Hadican, St. Louis, for appellant.
Defendant was charged with the crime of forcible rape. The punishment provided by statute ranged from two years imprisonment to death. Section 559.260, RSMo 1959, V.A.M.S. The jury assessed punishment at fifty years imprisonment and defendant has appealed.
The issues presented here do not demand a detailed recitation of all the evidence. Connie, Tommie and Gloria, three young girls, left their place of employment in downtown St. Louis at approximately midnight on May 23, 1967. They walked two blocks to a parking lot to ride in Gloria's car to their apartment house. As they got into the front seat, there was a 'shot' which struck Tommie in the lower chest, and defendant forced himself into the back seat. While pointing a gun at them, a few of defendant's immediate comments were: 'drive,' 'get out of here,' and 'I've already killed three people and a few more won't make any difference, so do as I say.' He told Gloria to drive west on U.S. Highway 40 with the command 'don't do anything to attract attention.' The first stop was at a filling station. Gloria was told to buy one dollar's worth of gas, and 'Don't make a move * * *' Later a stop was made that defendant could drive. His speed was 95 to 100 miles per hour. They traveled across St. Charles County and in Warren County defendant turned off on secondary roads. He stopped, pointed the gun at Gloria and Connie, ordered them to get out of the car and said, 'Put your hands up.' He relieved himself and ordered the two back into the car. After more driving, he again stopped and directed the same two girls to stand in the road and 'strip.' He put their clothes on top of the car and ordered them to start walking into a field. Tommie, who had been moaning, apparently regained consciousness and from the car called, 'Mr., come here * * * don't do anything to us.' Defendant then had the two girls dress and get back into the car. A further comment was that if they cooperated, he wouldn't have to kill them. When they begged defendant to take Tommie to a doctor, he said he was looking for one. He, again, drove at a high speed and failed to make a corner. The car went through a fence and stopped in a barn lot. Connie, after recovering from being knocked unconscious, found defendant and Gloria missing. She consoled Tommie and then went for help. Fearing defendant was nearby, she skipped the first farm residence and at the second awakened the occupants who called the law enforcement officials. She and Tommie were taken to a hospital in St. Charles. After the wreck, defendant told Gloria, 'Come on, we're leaving.' He led her some distance across a field to where he had intercourse with her. He then climbed a small tree to observe what might be going on at the car. Soon after another act of intercourse, he observed officers at the wreck and the patrol plane overhead. Defendant attempted to burn a driver's license and other papers taken from a billfold. All of which indicated different names from that of defendant. When defendant and Gloria returned to the car, it was nearly daylight and the officers were there. Gloria was taken to a doctor. After his arrest, defendant signed a written statement. It was consistent with the testimony previously outlined, but after explaining the wreck and that he and Gloria left alone, he said, 'This is where I want to talk to a lawyer before I go any farther.'
Defendant testified at the trial. He did not deny any of the events of the night, except to say that Gloria offered no resistance to his advances. Gloria testified that intercourse followed such statements as 'do what I tell you, you won't get hurt' and 'it was going to happen one way or the other so I might as well cooperate with him.' She expressed a fear of striking defendant or making him mad, but testified she tried to dissuade him by talking and continuing to shove on his chest. His gun, at first in a shoulder holster, was placed beside them.
First, defendant contends the trial court erred in conducting the trial in the National Guard Armory instead of in the regular courthouse, and publishing its intent to do so. The trial judge, relying upon a Grand Jury finding, '* * * that the Warren County Courthouse was dangerous and unfit for occupancy; that the joists in the attic are separating; that the walls * * * are separating; * * *,' ordered the trial held in the Armory Building and designated it as a 'temporary courtroom,' '* * * in the interest of the safety of said jurors, witnesses, court personnel and the public at large.' This order was published. The parties agree that Section 510.200 provides, 'All trials upon the merits shall be conducted in open court and so far as convenient in the regular courtroom,' and that this court has heretofore approved the use of temporary facilities for conducting court proceedings. For an extended discussion of this point see State ex rel. Green v. James, 355 Mo. 223, 195 S.W.2d 669, 671. However, in such instances, regardless of the necessity for use of temporary facilities, this court has always considered whether or not any of the parties were thereby prejudiced. Defendant fails to designate any specific feature of the building or particular incident, occasioned by use of the temporary facilities, from which prejudice resulted. In searching the record, we, too, fail to find any. The argument is based on the general thought that the armory itself created an atmosphere of militancy and hostility. To the contrary, from the record it is obvious that the entire trial was conducted calmly and with decorum, with practically no conflict in the evidence, and with all due solemnity demanded by the proceedings. Further, the notice to jurors and others of the place of the trial was formal and for the convenience of all concerned, and, indeed, protected the right of defendant to have a public trial. We do not, contrary to defendant's suggestion, see the necessity for comparing this rather perfunctory notice with the...
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