State v. Porperfield

• Decision Date: 03 July 1924
• Docket Number: No. 25270.,25270.
• Citation: 264 S.W. 386
• Parties: STATE ex rel. MENTH v. PORPERFIELD, Circuit Judge.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

264 S.W. 386

STATE ex rel. MENTH v. PORPERFIELD, Circuit Judge.

No. 25270.

Supreme Court of Missouri, in Banc.

July 3, 1924.

Prohibition by William Menth against E. E. Porterfield, as Judge of the Circuit Court of Jackson County. Preliminary order discharged.

Ira B. McLaughlin, of Kansas City, for relator.

WALKER, J.

Prohibition to prevent the respondent, as judge of the circuit court of Jackson county, from trying the relator on a charge of rape. The judicial authority of the respondent is assailed on the ground that the relator was, at the time of the commission of the crime, a ward of the juvenile court of Jackson county and hence not subject to the jurisdiction of the respondent as judge of the circuit court.

The statement of faces submitted by the relator, much of which is irrelevant to the determination of the matter at issue, shows he was born January 12, 1203. At about 14 years of age, or more definitely November 28, 1916, he was arraigned before the juvenile court of Jackson county, charged with larceny. Upon proof of his conduct he was declared to be a ward of the court and was committed to the guardianship of a home in Kansas City for delinquent children for a term of four years. The execution of the commitment was held in abeyance until the further order of the court. Three and a half years thereafter, during the term of his former `sentence and when he was more than 16 years of age, on May 29, 1919, he was again arraigned before the juvenile court of Jackson County. Upon what charge the record here does not disclose, except "for good cause shown" and committed for a term of four years from that date to the Missouri Reformatory, and the order of commitment was suspended during good behavior. After the expiration of that term, on September 14, 1923, when he was more than 20 years of age, he was arraigned before the circuit court of Jackson county, charged with the crime of rape, alleged to have been commied September 1, 1923. A plea to the jurisdiction was interposed, which being overruled, the application for a preliminary order was made to this court to restrain the further action of the circuit court, and was granted. The relator attained his majority January 12, 1924.

I. The burden of his contention is that having been declared a ward of the juvenile court May 29, 1919, regardless of the limitations of his sentence, that the court acquired exclusive jurisdiction over him until he attained his majority. This contention relies for its support upon the language of the statutory proviso, section 2591, R.S. 1919, which was not changed in the amendment thereto in 1923 (Laws 1923, p. 153), that when "juwhich risdiction has been acquired under the probe visions [of this section,] over the person of a child, such jurisdiction shall continue, for the purpose of this article, until the child shall have attained its majority." Relator's construction is based upon a literal interpretation of the language of the proviso which ignores the express limitation therein that the jurisdiction thus defined shall be excised for the "purpose of the article." What was the purpose a the article? Not to arraign and try a child for the offense stated in the complaint as the ground of his delinquency, but as was said in effect in State ex rel. Cave v. Tincher, 258 Mo. 1, 166 S. W. 1028, Ann. Cos. 1915D, 696, to confer the added express power upon the courts of otherwise general jurisdiction to take neglected and delinquent children from their parents and commit them to the care and custody of the state for the purpose of their reformation; or, as was more tersely said in State ex rel. Matacia v. Buckner (Mo. Sup.) 254 S. W. loc. cit. 180, the purpose of the power thus conferred was to enable the state, under proper circumstances, to take over the custody of delinquent children in order to secure their training and reformation. This power, salutary when properly exercised, as tending to promote good citizenship, is not dependent wholly upon the statute, but its origin may be traced to that equitable doctrine that "equity acts upon the person," and thus acting, it finds no more inviting filed for its operation than in the protection of the personal rights of infants. Exparte Badger, 286 Mo. 139, 226 S. W. 936, 14 A. L. R. 286; In re Ferrier, 103 Ill. 367, 43 Am. Rep. 10; 14 R. C. L. § 42, p. 267.

That a juvenile court, under the statute (article 6, c. 21, R. S. 1919), upon...