State v. Porter
| Decision Date | 30 November 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 31651.,31651. |
| Citation | 128 P.3d 908,142 Idaho 371 |
| Parties | STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross Respondent, v. Michael S. PORTER, Defendant-Respondent-Cross Appellant. |
| Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
Attorney General, Lawrence G. Wasden, Boise, for appellant. Kenneth K. Jorgensen argued.
Kootenai County Public Defender, John M. Adams, Coeur d'Alene, for respondent.
This Court granted Porter's Petition for Review of the Idaho Court of Appeals' decision, which held that the intent to kill one's victim is not a necessary element of second degree murder or voluntary manslaughter and remanded with instructions to reinstate the second degree murder charge against Porter. Porter argues intent to kill is required for a charge of second degree murder and voluntary manslaughter and that the charge against Porter should be reduced from second degree murder to involuntary manslaughter.
Michael S. Porter met D.J. Flett during an evening of drinking in a bar. A conflict erupted between Porter and Flett outside the bar at approximately 2:00 a.m. Porter punched Flett, who fell. Porter hit him two or three more times in the face as Flett lay on the ground. Flett suffered extensive injuries to his face and head, including brain damage likely caused by his head hitting the pavement after he was knocked unconscious. He died from the injuries.
The State conceded at preliminary hearing that the evidence did not support a finding of intent to kill, but argued that the evidence did show malice aforethought which supported the charge of second degree murder. The magistrate judge held that the State had met its burden to show malice aforethought although there was insufficient evidence to show intent to kill. The magistrate judge bound Porter over for trial on the second degree murder. Porter moved to dismiss the charge in district court or, in the alternative, that the charge be reduced from second degree murder to involuntary manslaughter. The district court reduced the charge to voluntary manslaughter, concluding that the intent to kill was an essential element for second degree murder but not for voluntary manslaughter.
Both parties appealed. The Court of Appeals ruled that neither second degree murder nor voluntary manslaughter requires the defendant possess the intent to kill the victim. The Court of Appeals reversed the district court's order reducing the charge and remanded with instructions to reinstate the second degree murder charge. Porter petitioned this Court for review.
"If from the evidence the magistrate determines that a public offense has been committed and that there is probable or sufficient cause to believe that the defendant committed such offense, the magistrate shall forthwith hold the defendant to answer in the district court." I.C.R. 5.1(b). "The finding of probable cause shall be based upon substantial evidence upon every material element of the offense charged. . . ." Id. I.C. § 19-815A.
When considering a case on review from the Idaho Court of Appeals, this Court gives serious consideration to the Idaho Court of Appeals' decision pursuant to Leavitt v. Swain, 133 Idaho 624, 627, 991 P.2d 349, 352 (1999), but exercises free review over matters of law. Iron Eagle Dev., LLC v. Quality Design Systems, Inc., 138 Idaho 487, 491, 65 P.3d 509, 513 (2003).
Porter contends that the intent to kill is an element of second degree murder, and therefore, a charge of second degree murder is inappropriate since there was insufficient evidence to show Porter had the intent to kill Flett. The State argues that the intent to kill is not a necessary element of second degree murder and the charge against Porter should stand. Murder is defined in Idaho as follows:
Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being including, but not limited to, a human embryo or fetus, with malice aforethought or the intentional application of torture to a human being, which results in the death of a human being. Torture is the intentional infliction of extreme and prolonged pain with the intent to cause suffering. It shall also be torture to inflict on a human being extreme and prolonged acts of brutality irrespective of proof of intent to cause suffering. The death of a human being caused by such torture is murder irrespective of proof of specific intent to kill; torture causing death shall be deemed the equivalent of intent to kill.
I.C. § 18-4001 (emphasis added). Porter contends that the legislature's inclusion of language that murder by torture does not require a specific intent to kill indicates that the legislature intended a finding of specific intent to kill when a murder occurs with malice aforethought. Idaho Code § 18-4002 defines malice:
Such malice may be express or implied. It is express when there is manifested a deliberate intention unlawfully to take away the life of a fellow creature. It is implied when no considerable provocation appears, or when the circumstances attending the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart.
(Emphasis added).
Porter relies on several cases from this Court and the Court of Appeals that have statements that intent to kill is an element of murder in the second degree. Yon v. State, 124 Idaho 821, 824-25, 864 P.2d 659, 662-63 (Ct.App.1993); Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. Yon, 118 Idaho 367, 369, 796 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Ct.App.1990); State v. Atwood, 105 Idaho 315, 318, 669 P.2d 204, 207 (Ct.App.1983); State v. Birrueta, 98 Idaho 631, 633, 570 P.2d 868, 870 (1977); and State v. Van Vlack, 57 Idaho 316, 364, 65 P.2d 736, 758 (1937) ().
When analyzing this Court's statement in Birrueta that intent to kill is a necessary element of second degree murder this Court cited to Van Vlack, which states on the pages referenced that, "Intent to take life or the mental state of having an abandoned and malignant heart . . . is the essential ingredient of murder in the second degree." Van Vlack, 57 Idaho at 364, 65 P.2d at 758 (overruled on other grounds by State v. White, 93 Idaho 153, 159, 456 P.2d 797, 803 (1969) (emphasis added)). In State v. Aragon, 107 Idaho 358, 690 P.2d 293 (1984), this Court held that the instructions given in the district court properly defined malice and did not blur the distinction between first and second degree murder. The instructions provided in part:
As set forth in the preceding instructions on murder, any unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought is murder. If nothing further characterizes the killing, the murder is of the second degree. To constitute the higher offense of murder in the first degree, there must be wilfulness, deliberation and premeditation in addition to malice aforethought.
Wilfulness means that there was manifested a clear intent to take life.
Deliberation and premeditation means done with reflection and conceived beforehand and not done upon a sudden heat of passion or other condition precluding the idea of deliberation.
Aragon, 107 Idaho at 362, 690 P.2d at 297. The Court held that malice was properly distinguished from "intent to take life, premeditation, conceived beforehand, and deliberation, done with reflection" and the instructions properly set forth "the additional elements necessary to prove first degree murder, and thus there was no error." Id. at 363, 690 P.2d at 298.
Similarly, State v. Dunlap, 125 Idaho 530, 873 P.2d 784 (1993), indicates that implied malice satisfies the mental state element of murder and is a variety of malice separate from the deliberate intent to kill. Dunlap had been convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death, with specific intent to kill being the aggravating factor for imposing the death penalty. He argued on appeal that specific intent to kill as the aggravating factor must mean something more, such as "heightened premeditation," otherwise the "intent to cause the death" language of the aggravator would be redundant to the necessary elements of murder. This Court set forth the following discussion when rejecting Dunlap's argument:
[T]his argument ignores the definition of malice.
Under I.C. § 18-4002, malice is express when there is manifested a deliberate intention to unlawfully take away a life, or implied, when the circumstances attending the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart. Under this interpretation, an abandoned and malignant heart killing is murder although there is no premeditated intent to kill. If the abandoned and malignant heart murder also involves the enumerated circumstances in I.C. § 18-4003(b), (c), (d), (e) or (f), such as the person murdered is a peace officer, § 18-4003(b), or the person who committed the murder was under a sentence for murder, § 18-4003(c), then that murder is classified as first degree murder under I.C. § 18-4003. See State v. Pratt (James), 125 Idaho 546, 873 P.2d 800 (1993); State v. Lankford, 116 Idaho 860, 781 P.2d 197 (1989). See also Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 113 S.Ct. 1534, 123 L.Ed.2d 188. However, unless the State can show the additional element of specific intent to kill, i.e. a premeditated intent to kill, the circumstances of an abandoned and malignant heart murder will not satisfy I.C. § 19-2515...
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