Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. Yon

• Decision Date: 30 August 1990
• Docket Number: No. 18130,18130
• Citation: 118 Idaho 367,796 P.2d 1040
• Parties: SAFECO INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. David YON; Joe Bussell, Sr.; Lorna Vasquez; and Joe Bussell, Sr. as guardian ad litem for Joe Bussell, III, Rebecca Jo Bussell and Pennie Marie Miller, Minors, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: Idaho Court of Appeals

Page 1040

796 P.2d 1040

118 Idaho 367

SAFECO INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. David YON; Joe Bussell, Sr.; Lorna Vasquez; and Joe Bussell, Sr. as guardian ad litem for Joe Bussell, III, Rebecca Jo Bussell and Pennie Marie Miller, Minors, Defendants-Appellants.

No. 18130.

Court of Appeals of Idaho.

Aug. 30, 1990.

Michael J. Vrable, Hayden, for defendant-appellant Yon.

Thomas A. Mitchell, Coeur d'Alene, for remaining defendants-appellants.

Huppin, Ewing, Anderson, P.S., Coeur d'Alene, for plaintiff-respondent. Irving "Buddy" Paul argued.

WALTERS, Chief Judge.

This appeal involves the question of whether collateral estoppel forecloses consideration in a civil action of an issue previously resolved in a criminal case. We are asked to decide whether the district court properly determined that the appellants were precluded from asserting, in an action to recover damages for wrongful death, that David Yon did not intend to kill Joe Bussell, Jr., after Yon had been convicted of second degree murder for causing the death of Bussell. Appellants, Yon and Bussell's heirs, ¹ maintain that the issue of intent in a civil trial is separate and distinct from the issue of intent in a criminal trial. Bussell's heirs also maintain that they were not parties to the criminal trial and consequently the doctrine of collateral estoppel should not apply to them. We affirm the decision of the district court granting summary judgment on the basis of collateral estoppel.

On January 3, 1987, David Yon shot and killed Joseph Bussell, Jr. Yon was charged with second degree murder in connection with the killing. At trial, Yon maintained he was innocent. He testified that Bussell had confronted him with a pistol while he was napping, a struggle for the weapon ensued, and that the gun discharged during the struggle, resulting in Bussell's death. However, the jury rejected Yon's defense and found him guilty of second degree murder. We upheld that verdict on appeal. State v. Yon, 115 Idaho 907, 771 P.2d 925 (Ct.App.1989).

At the time of the shooting, Yon was insured under a homeowner's policy issued by Safeco. Bussell's heirs filed a wrongful death action against David Yon seeking to attach the insurance policy assets. The Safeco policy contained a standard exclusion for bodily injury "expected or intended by any insured." Safeco filed this action seeking a declaratory determination that it had no duty to defend and indemnify Yon in the wrongful death action. Safeco moved for summary judgment. Safeco maintained that because Yon was convicted of second degree murder in the killing his conduct was "intended" for the purposes of the exclusionary clause and, accordingly, Safeco was not liable under the policy. Therefore, Safeco asserted, the appellants were collaterally estopped from raising that issue again in a civil trial. After taking judicial notice of the record in the criminal case, the district court agreed with Safeco and granted Safeco's motion for summary judgment. Yon and Bussell's heirs appeal. We affirm.

Preliminarily we note the standard for reviewing the trial court's decision granting summary judgment. We must examine the record and determine whether there is a genuine issue of any material fact and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. I.R.C.P. 56(c). In examining the record, we must liberally construe all facts in favor of the non-moving party, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of such party. Anderson v. City of Pocatello, 112 Idaho 176, 731 P.2d 171 (1987). However, the question of whether the trial court properly applied collateral estoppel or issue preclusion is a question of law which we review freely. Aldape v. Akins, 105 Idaho 254, 668 P.2d 130 (Ct.App.1983) (review denied ).

Appellants maintain that the district court erred when it held, as a matter of law, that the issue of intent was decided in the criminal action thereby precluding them from relitigating the issue in the civil trial. The Idaho Supreme Court has held that collateral estoppel should apply when the following questions have been answered affirmatively: (1) Did the party against whom the earlier decision is asserted have a full and fair opportunity to litigate that issue in the earlier case? (2) Was the issue decided in prior litigation identical with the one presented in the action in question? (3) Was the issue actually decided in the prior litigation? (4) Was there a final judgment on the merits? (5) Was the party against whom the plea is asserted a party in privity with the party to the prior adjudication? Anderson v. City of Pocatello, supra, 112 Idaho at 183-184, 731 P.2d at 178-179. Appellants base their appeal on questions two and five. They maintain the district court erred in deciding that the issue of intent in the criminal trial is identical with the issue of intent necessary in determining whether the insurance policy exclusion applies in the wrongful death action. In addition, Bussell's heirs argue that collateral estoppel should not apply to them in particular because they were not parties to the previous criminal action. We address each issue in turn.

I

We begin our analysis by addressing the appellants' argument that the issue of intent decided in the criminal trial is separate and distinct from the issue which must be decided when interpreting an intentional conduct exclusion in an insurance contract. In Idaho, the elements necessary for the prosecution to prove the crime of murder in the second degree are: (a) an unlawful killing, (b) the intent to kill, and (c) malice. State v. Atwood, 105 Idaho 315, 669 P.2d 204 (Ct.App.1983). Because the intent to take a life is an essential ingredient of second degree murder, it is manifest that when the jury found Yon guilty of second degree murder, the jury also concluded that Yon intended to kill Bussell.

However, the appellants maintain that the question of intent--for the sake of interpreting an insurance exclusionary clause--is different from the question decided in the criminal action. They cite Farmers Insurance Group v. Sessions, 100 Idaho 914, 607 P.2d 422 (1980), as authority for this position. In Sessions the Court interpreted an intentional-conduct exclusion clause relieving the insurance company from liability for "bodily injury or property damages caused wilfully, intentionally or maliciously by ... the insured...." Our Supreme Court rejected the trial court's interpretation of the clause to the effect that the insured only need intend to do the act which resulted in the injury. Rather, the Court held, for the intentional conduct exclusion to operate, that the insurance company must be able to show its insured acted for the purpose of causing injury in the person or property which resulted. See also, Maxson v Farmer Insurance of Idaho, Inc., 107 Idaho 1043, 695 P.2d 428 (Ct.App.1985); Rajspic v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 110 Idaho 729, 718 P.2d 1167 (1986). The appellants contend that this "subjective intent" analysis--when interpreting intentional conduct exclusion clauses in insurance contracts--is distinct from the issue of intent decided in a second degree murder trial. In this context, we disagree.

The appellants maintain in this case that the question of whether Yon subjectively intended to injure Bussell is a question of fact which precludes summary judgment. They also argue that the intent to bring about a specific result or injury issue was left undecided in the criminal trial. To buttress their argument, the appellants point out that the jury was instructed, when determining whether Yon's conduct was "willful," to keep in mind that "the word does not require in its meaning any intent to violate the law, or to injure another, or to acquire any advantage." (Emphasis added). See I.C. § 18-101. Appellants submit that the jury, as a consequence of the above instruction, only had to determine that Yon had the intent to commit the act. Appellants contend that for the operation of an insurance exclusion to apply, the insured must have intended to injure another, contrary to the emphasized portion of the instruction. This argument is misleading. The jury in the criminal trial also was instructed that malice is a necessary element for second degree murder. We note that malice is defined by statute as importing "a wish to vex, annoy, or injure another person, or an intent to do a wrongful action...." I.C. § 18-101. The jury was further instructed that "[s]uch malice may be express or implied. It is express when there is manifested a deliberate intention unlawfully to take away the life of a fellow creature. It is implied when no considerable provocation appears, or when the circumstances attending the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart." See I.C. § 18-4002. Through this definition, the jury--in finding Yon guilty of second degree murder--necessarily found that Yon intended to achieve the result obtained, the death of Bussell, when he pulled the trigger.

It should be noted that Yon maintains, as he did in his criminal trial, that he never intended to shoot Bussell; instead the gun went off during the struggle and he has no recollection of the exact circumstance. It is apparent that the jury in the criminal case rejected these factual assertions when it found Yon guilty. It is equally clear the jury concluded that Yon wished or intended to kill Bussell when he pulled the trigger. Accordingly, we conclude that the issue of whether Yon intended to harm or injure Bussell was decided in the criminal trial for collateral estoppel purposes. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. v. Abraio, 874 F.2d 619 (9th Cir.1989); State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. v. Estate of Jenner, 874 F.2d 604 (9th Cir.1989); Fire Insurance Exchange v. Abbott, 204 Cal.App.3d 1012, 251 Cal.Rptr. 620 (1988). Accord, White v. Univ. of Idaho, 115 Idaho 564, 768 P.2d 827 (Ct.App.1989) aff'd 118 Idaho 400, 797 P.2d 108 (Sup.Ct. No....