State v. Porter
| Decision Date | 22 July 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. CR-20-0147-PR,CR-20-0147-PR |
| Citation | 491 P.3d 1100,49 Arizona Cases Digest 8 |
| Court | Arizona Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Keyaira PORTER, Appellant |
Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General, Brunn (Beau) W. Roysden, III, Solicitor General, Michael T. O'Toole (argued), Chief Counsel, Criminal Appeals Section, Linley Wilson, Deputy Solicitor General/Chief of Criminal Appeals, Phoenix, Attorneys for State of Arizona
James J. Haas, Maricopa County Public Defender; Mikel Steinfeld (argued), Deputy Public Defender, Phoenix, Attorneys for Keyaira Porter
Jared G. Keenan, Phoenix, Attorney for Amicus Curiae American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Arizona and Arizona Attorneys for Criminal Justice; and Daniel A. Arellano, Ballard Spahr LLP, Phoenix, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Los Abogados Hispanic Bar Association Inc.
¶1 We consider whether, when a Batson challenge is raised, a trial court must make express findings on the credibility of a demeanor-based justification for a peremptory strike when a non-demeanor-based justification is also offered and there is no evidence that either justification is pretextual. We hold that no such express finding requirement exists under federal or Arizona law.
¶2 Keyaira Porter, an African American, was charged with aggravated assault of a police officer and resisting arrest. During jury selection, the prosecutor used peremptory strikes to remove the only African American venire members: Prospective Jurors 2 and 20. Porter raised a challenge under Batson v. Kentucky , 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). The prosecutor responded that she struck Prospective Juror 2 because (1) the juror's brother had been convicted of aggravated assault—similar to the crime charged in this case—and (2) she "did not seem to be very sure" with her responses as to whether her brother's conviction would impact her ability to be impartial. The prosecutor struck Prospective Juror 20 because she had been the foreperson in a previous criminal case in which the jury acquitted the defendant. In response, Porter only addressed the prosecutor's explanation as to Prospective Juror 2 and emphasized that, when answering the voir dire questions, Prospective Juror 2 said her brother was treated fairly, his experience would not influence her decisionmaking as a juror, and she could follow the rules provided by the court. The trial court considered the arguments and denied the Batson challenge, reasoning that the prosecutor had articulated "reasonable" race-neutral explanations for its peremptory strikes.
¶3 The jury acquitted Porter of aggravated assault but convicted her of resisting arrest. Porter appealed, arguing that the prosecutor's disparate treatment of jurors and the failure to conduct voir dire on the topic of prior jury service revealed the prosecutor's discriminatory intent in jury selection. In a split opinion, the court of appeals remanded the case and directed the trial court to either (1) make the necessary findings relative to Prospective Juror 2, as required by Snyder v. Louisiana , 552 U.S. 472, 128 S.Ct. 1203, 170 L.Ed.2d 175 (2008), or (2) if it could not reconstruct the record, vacate Porter's conviction and retry the case. State v. Porter , 248 Ariz. 392, 394 ¶ 1, 460 P.3d 1276, 1278 (App. 2020). The majority reasoned that although the trial court concluded that the proffered justifications were race-neutral, it did not expressly determine whether those justifications were credible, particularly in light of the pattern of strikes against minority jurors. Id. The dissent concluded that neither Snyder nor Arizona law require trial courts to make express findings concerning demeanor-based explanations. Id. at 403–04 ¶¶ 37–40, 460 P.3d at 1287–88 (McMurdie, J., dissenting).
¶4 We granted review to determine whether federal or state Batson jurisprudence requires a trial court to expressly address a demeanor-based justification when two race-neutral reasons are offered, the nondemeanor-based one is explicitly deemed credible, and there is no finding that the remaining demeanor-based justification is pretextual. This is a recurring issue of statewide importance. We have jurisdiction under article 6, section 5(3) of the Arizona Constitution.
¶5 As an initial matter, we note that the court of appeals resolved this appeal on the basis that the trial court failed to make specific findings regarding the demeanor-based explanation even though Porter did not raise this issue in the trial court or on appeal, and even though the parties did not brief or argue this issue. We remind our appellate court that, "[a]lthough [they] may choose to address issues the parties fail to address in the briefs, they should heed the principles underlying the waiver doctrine intended ‘to prevent the court from deciding cases with no research assistance or analytical input from the parties.’ " State v. Robertson , 249 Ariz. 256, 258–59 ¶ 9, 468 P.3d 1217, 1219–20 (2020) (internal citation omitted) (quoting Meiners v. Indus. Comm'n , 213 Ariz. 536, 538–39 ¶ 8 n.2, 145 P.3d 633, 635–36 (App. 2006) ). "Although we do not ordinarily consider issues not raised in the trial court or court of appeals, if good reason exists, this court may and will entertain such questions as the rule is jurisprudential rather than substantive." State v. Hernandez , 244 Ariz. 1, 3–4 ¶ 10, 417 P.3d 207, 209–10 (2018) (quoting Jimenez v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. , 183 Ariz. 399, 406 n.9, 904 P.2d 861, 868 n.9 (1995) ). Here, good reason exists to address the identified issue in order to clarify whether, when a Batson challenge is raised, our trial courts are required to make express findings concerning a demeanor-based justification for a peremptory strike.
¶6 We will not reverse a court's ruling on a Batson challenge unless it is clearly erroneous, State v. Escalante-Orozco , 241 Ariz. 254, 271 ¶ 35, 386 P.3d 798, 815 (2017), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Escalante , 245 Ariz. 135, 425 P.3d 1078 (2018), and we afford great deference to trial court findings in this context, see Miller-El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 340, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003) ; Batson , 476 U.S. at 98 n.21, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (); State v. Smith , 250 Ariz. 69, 86 ¶ 62, 475 P.3d 558, 575 (2020) (to similar effect).
¶7 We first consider whether federal Batson jurisprudence requires express findings that the prosecutor's race-neutral reasons were credible and non-pretextual.
¶8 The court of appeals here determined that "[t]he trial court denied the Batson challenge without expressly addressing either the demeanor-based explanation or the racially disproportionate impact of the strikes" and held that Snyder required the court "to make explicit findings on those two points." Porter , 248 Ariz. at 394 ¶ 1, 460 P.3d at 1278. We disagree with the court of appeals’ interpretation of Snyder .
¶9 We begin with a brief review of Batson ’s analytical framework. The state may exercise peremptory challenges to "assur[e] the selection of a qualified and unbiased jury," Batson , 476 U.S. at 91, 106 S.Ct. 1712, subject to the commands of the Equal Protection Clause, U.S. Const. amend. XIV. Thus, the state may not consider race in jury selection, and it engages in unconstitutional discrimination when it denies a citizen participation in jury service on account of race. Batson , 476 U.S. at 91, 106 S.Ct. 1712.
¶10 A Batson challenge involves three steps:
[O]nce the opponent of a peremptory challenge has made out a prima facie case of racial discrimination (step one), the burden of production shifts to the proponent of the strike to come forward with a race-neutral explanation (step two). If a race-neutral explanation is tendered, the trial court must then decide (step three) whether the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful racial discrimination.
Purkett v. Elem , 514 U.S. 765, 767, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995) ; see also State v. Medina , 232 Ariz. 391, 404 ¶ 44, 306 P.3d 48, 61 (2013) (same).
¶11 Step one of the Batson framework—establishing a case of prima facie racial discrimination—may be satisfied by a pattern of strikes against minority jurors. Batson , 476 U.S. at 97, 106 S.Ct. 1712. Step two—proffering a race-neutral explanation—may be satisfied by an offer of any facially race-neutral explanation for the strikes. Purkett , 514 U.S. at 768, 115 S.Ct. 1769. At step three, the trial court must evaluate the credibility of the striking party's proffered explanation to determine whether the reasons are pretexts for purposeful discrimination. See Snyder , 552 U.S. at 484–85, 128 S.Ct. 1203 ; State v. Gay , 214 Ariz. 214, 220 ¶ 17, 150 P.3d 787, 793 (App. 2007). To make this determination at step three, the court may consider the prosecutor's demeanor, the juror's demeanor, the reasonableness or improbability of the explanations, and whether the proffered rationale has some basis in accepted trial strategy. Gay , 214 Ariz. at 220–21 ¶¶ 17, 19, 150 P.3d at 793–94 (citing Cockrell , 537 U.S. at 339, 123 S.Ct. 1029 ); see also Snyder , 552 U.S. at 477, 128 S.Ct. 1203 (). "Comparison of stricken and non-stricken jurors’ characteristics, as well as comparison of how the prosecutor questioned those jurors, may [also] be relevant." Porter , 248 Ariz. at 397 ¶ 14, 460 P.3d at 1281 (citing Flowers v. Mississippi , ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S. Ct. 2228, 2244, 2246–51, 204 L.Ed.2d 638 (2019) ).
¶12 The crux of this case concerns whether Snyder requires trial courts to make express...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Reaves
...1712 ; see also Purkett v. Elem , 514 U.S. 765, 769, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995) ; State v. Porter , 251 Ariz. 293, ¶ 11, 491 P.3d 1100 (2021). Because this analysis "is fact intensive," generally "the trial court is in a better position to assess" credibility than is an appellat......