State v. Powell

• Decision Date: 12 February 1924
• Docket Number: 18229
• Parties: The State, Ex Rel. Stanton, Pros. Atty., v. Powell
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

142 N.E. 401

109 Ohio St. 383

The State, Ex Rel. Stanton, Pros. Atty., v. Powell

No. 18229

Supreme Court of Ohio

February 12, 1924

Constitutional law - Uniform operation of laws - Chief justice of common pleas court - Section 1558, General Code (110 O. L., 52) - New office not created, when.

1.Section 1558, General Code, as amended (110 O. L., 52), is a law of a general nature and has uniform operation throughout the state and does not therefore contravene section 26 of Article II of the Ohio Constitution.

2.The Imposition of additional duties upon an existing office, to be performed under a different title, does not constitute the creation of a new office.

The its are stated in the opinion.

Mr Edward C. Stanton, prosecuting attorney, and Mr. H. E Parsons, assistant prosecuting attorney, for plaintiff. Mr Paul Howland; Mr. Homer H. McKeehan and Mr. Louis H. Winch for defendant. MARSHALL, C. J.

This is an original action in this court, in quo warranto, to inquire by what warrant the defendant exercises and enjoys the office of chief justice of the court of common pleas of Cuyahoga county, and praying that this court adjudge that he be not entitled thereto, and that he be ousted therefrom. The defendant demurs to the petition, and the petition and the demurrer thereto present for the consideration of this court three legal questions:

(1) Whether the amendment to Section 1558; General Code, enacted March 13, 1923 (110 O. L., 52), is a law of a general nature, and, if so, whether it has uniform operation throughout the state, and whether it contravenes the provisions of Section 26, Art. II of the Ohio Constitution.

(2) Whether that amendment creates an "office" and provides for filling the office otherwise than by election and therefore contravenes the provisions of Section 2, Art. X, and Section 10, Art. IV, of the Ohio Constitution, and also whether it is such "other office" as a judge of the common pleas court cannot hold by reason of the provisions of Section 14, Art. IV of the Constitution.

(3) Whether it contravenes the provisions of Section 14, Art. IV, which forbid diminishing the compensation of a judge of the court of common pleas during his term of office.

The first of these questions will receive first consideration.

The question whether any law is of a general nature is not easily answered by any rule, but each law is necessarily in a measure sui generis. Counsel on both sides apparently agree that this law is of a general nature. Without attempting to lay down a rule for guidance of future cases we are content to observe that the subject-matter of this law is general, inasmuch as it relates to the administrative functions of courts of justice. It has specific application to judges of courts of common Pleas, and all counties of the state have common pleas courts and common pleas judges. We entertain no doubt that this act is of a general nature. The only question on this branch of the case which challenges our serious consideration is whether or not it has uniform operation throughout the state.

By its terms it applies only to those counties having two or more common pleas judges, and inferentially and necessarily applies to all counties which may hereafter have more than one common pleas judge. The fact that the majority of the counties of the state have only one common pleas judge, and that there is therefore nothing upon which the act can operate in those counties, is not by any means conclusive of this inquiry. Section 26, Art. II of the Constitution, was not intended to render invalid every law which does not operate upon all persons, property or political subdivisions within the state. It is sufficient if a law operates upon every person included within its operative provisions, provided such operative provisions are not arbitrarily and unnecessarily restricted. And the law is equally valid if it contains provisions which permit it to operate upon every locality where certain specified conditions prevail. A law operates as an unreasonable classification where it seeks to create artificial distinctions where no real distinction exists. It is true that in some counties of the state there is only one judge while in other counties there are two or more judges. This is a condition which has prevailed for many years, and this act which is now before us for construction has nothing to do with creating those unequal conditions. The act in question merely recognizes existing conditions and makes provision for dealing with those unequal conditions in a rational way rather than attempt to compel its application to conditions where the rule could have no possible operative effect.

In Cuyahoga county there are 12 resident judge, and a number of other judges from other counties are constantly sitting by designation. Many thousands of cases are filed, heard, and decided each year in that county. Each judge has authority to hear and decide causes independently of the action and concurrence of all other judges, and in each instance the decision becomes the judgment of the court. Manifestly there could be no efficiency without system and elaborate administrative machinery. In 78 counties of the state there is a single resident judge, and in many counties a single judge is able to dispose of all business with little system or administrative machinery. In some counties an entire term transpires without the trial of a single jury cause. There is no economy or sound policy in installing a machine where it is not needed, or in providing one not designed to render the character of service required. Robinson Crusoe bad no need of an elaborate machine shop to manufacture umbrellas in quantities, because he needed only a single umbrella. The trip hammer or the punch press cannot be employed in the manufacture of cloth, and the weaver's loom cannot be utilized in a steel mill. Without submitting any rule is a sure and final test of "uniform operation" it may be stated that a law should be capable of having force and operation in every part of the state upon every person and thing in the state. If a law is sufficiently general in its terms to comprehend all localities, persons, and things, it is not defeated and rendered void because there are certain localities in the state where conditions are such that there is no person or thing to which the law can be applied.

If this law were to be nullified upon such a theory, it would logically result that all laws relating to mines and mining are also...