State v. Prescott
Decision Date | 26 May 1923 |
Docket Number | 11240. |
Parties | STATE v. PRESCOTT ET AL. |
Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Appeal from General Sessions Circuit Court of Richland County; W. H Townsend, Judge.
George Prescott and another were convicted of a violation of the prohibition law, and they appeal. Affirmed.
Watts and Cothran, JJ., and Memminger, Wilson, and De Vore, Circuit Judges, dissenting.
C. T Graydon and C. N. Sapp, both of Columbia, for appellants.
A. F Spigner, Sol., of Columbia, for the State.
The record shows:
The testimony was objected to on three grounds, to wit:
The search warrant was insufficient, the house searched was a dwelling house, and the search was in the night, all in violation of the law.
The recent case of State v. Green (S. C.) 114 S.E. 317, shows that the point cannot be sustained. That case holds:
That is the law of this state and a republication of statements of that case would be unprofitable.
Affirmed.
I concur under the authority of State v. Green, which I think was correctly decided. Unlawful seizures and searches by officers of the law are not to be approved or encouraged by the courts; but the remedy for official misconduct in that regard does not lie in saying that what is in fact evidence is not evidence, but in the pursuit by the injured party of such remedies as are now provided by law or as should be provided by the lawmaking power.
The defendant was convicted and sentenced for violation of the prohibition law at Richland County, on May 24, 1922, and by six exceptions alleges error.
The first question complains that the warrant was illegal on its face, having failed to state the sources of information and the grounds of belief. Section 836, Criminal Code 1912: Affidavits may be on information and belief whenever in this chapter it is provided that process shall issue upon an affidavit based on information and belief, the affidavit shall contain a statement setting forth the sources of information, the facts and grounds of belief. Provided that it shall not be necessary to set forth the sources of information, the facts and grounds of belief in the affidavit upon which a warrant of arrest shall issue, but it shall be only necessary in cases of search warrant.
The exceptions raising this question should be sustained as the warrant is fatally defective, and, further, the officers had no right to search a dwelling house in the nighttime. Section 830, Criminal Code 1912, says, "provided that no dwelling house shall be searched in the nighttime." The warrant was served by a constable who swore out the warrant and expressly violated sections 44 and 45 of the Criminal Code of 1912.
All laws ought to be enforced, but in enforcing the same the officers charged with the enforcement ought to be careful not to violate the laws of the land, and be themselves guilty of an infraction of the law while attempting to enforce the law.
The prohibition law should be enforced the same as any other law, but the officers charged with the enforcement have no rights higher than the enforcement of other laws. The same rules of enforcement must govern them.
We are aware that in the enforcement of the prohibition law they meet with many obstacles and difficulties, yet they should be governed by the same rules of enforcement. It is a fact that will not be seriously questioned that in Richland county, under the dispensary law, one dispensary probably sold more liquor in one month than all of the blind tigers in Richland county sold in twelve months. The law can be enforced and illegal sales of liquors suppressed under the same rules or regulations, and the same laws as employed in the suppression of all other violations of law, and it will not do to allow officers, in their zeal to enforce law, to violate, however innocently, the wise statutes that protect the citizens.
There was no evidence in this case to convict the appellant, except as to that which was illegally obtained, and under the cases of Blacksburg v. Beam, 104 S.C. 147, 88 S.E. 441, L. R. A. 1916E, 714; State v. Zaglin, 114 S.C. 265, 103 S.E. 510; State v. Wagstaff, 115 S.C. 198, 105 S.E. 283.
I think the exceptions should be sustained and judgment reversed.
I concur in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice WATTS and wish to add a few observations of my own in support of his conclusions.
I think that the constitutional guaranty of immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures conferred by article 1, § 16, of our Constitution--"the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated"--extends not only to the fact of search and seizure, but to every incident of such unlawful act. To hold that the citizen shall enjoy such immunity, and yet when it is flagrantly violated his person shall be subjected to punishment and his property confiscated, upon the strength of evidence thus unlawfully obtained, is but to "keep the promise to the ear and break it to the hope."
It seems to me that the very words of the Constitution render it impossible to offer in evidence "papers or effects" thus unlawfully obtained. Can it be said that his "person" was rendered secure from such search while the evidence thus obtained is used to place that "person" behind the bars or made to crack rock on the public highways? Can it be said that his "papers or effects" were rendered secure when they are abstracted from his possession and used as evidence against him?
It is contended that whatever may be evidence is evidence however obtained, and that the defendant's remedy is an action for damages against the trespasser or a criminal prosecution against him whenever the Legislature sees fit to make such trespass a crime. I do not think that this meets the question of the defendant's rights under the Constitution. They are that his person, house, papers, and effects shall be secure from unreasonable search; that security should extend to every incident of such search; otherwise the immunity is but a mockery.
The state is the fountain of law and justice. It is the last one to condone or seek to obtain an advantage by the infraction of the law. It is beneath the dignity of the state to juggle with the constitutional rights of a citizen and by refined reasoning to employ tainted evidence to convict him. As the Supreme Court of the United States has said in the Silverthorn Case, 251 U.S. 385, 40 S.Ct. 182, 64 L.Ed. 319:
"If knowledge of them is gained from an independent source, they may be proved like any others; but the knowledge gained by the government's own wrong cannot be used by it in the way proposed."
The state cannot afford to be the receiver of stolen goods.
I think it is against public policy to admit such evidence. Once lay down the law that, however unlawful the search may have been, the fruits of that search are admissible evidence, those engaged in the enforcement of a particular law, who themselves should be the strongest advocates of respect for the law, will trample it under their feet in eagerness to reach their quarry; houses will be entered at night, citizens will be held up on the street, automobiles carrying women will be shot into on the highways, in defiance of the law and with supreme indifference for their personal accountability. If such a holding induces such conduct, the law should remove the inducing cause.
It is bound to lead to bloodshed. If the officers persist in an admittedly unlawful procedure, they may expect justifiable resistance, and it is a question which side of the...
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