State v. Prestia, 74103
| Decision Date | 11 May 1987 |
| Docket Number | No. 74103,74103 |
| Citation | 183 Ga.App. 24,357 S.E.2d 829 |
| Parties | The STATE v. PRESTIA. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Patrick H. Head, Sol., Amy H. McChesney, Melodie H. Clayton, Asst. Solicitors, for appellant.
Alan C. Manheim, Marietta, for appellee.
The State brings this appeal from the trial court's August 15, 1986 order granting defendant's motion for acquittal pursuant to OCGA § 17-7-170 (b).
1. In its first challenge to the trial court's order, the State argues the letter filed by defendant in which his demand for trial pursuant to OCGA § 17-7-170 was stated was insufficient to perfect defendant's statutory demand for speedy trial. Specifically, defendant relies on Rule 36.3 of the Uniform Rules, which provides that documents or pleadings presented for filing must set out "the exact nature of the pleading or the type of complaint."
The record shows that on February 20, 1986 defendant's attorney filed a letter with the Clerk of the State Court of Cobb County which, in addition to notifying the clerk of counsel's representation of defendant, also contained a general Brady motion, a demand for copies of all warrants, accusations or indictments pending against the defendant, a list of all witnesses and "trial by jury at this or the next succeeding term of court pursuant to OCGA § 17-7-170."
"In State v. Adamczyk, 162 Ga.App. 288, 290 S.E.2d 149 (1982), we held that to invoke the extreme sanction of acquittal, a demand for trial must be couched in language which may reasonably be construed as referencing the provisions of OCGA § 17-7-170 (former Code § 27-1901)." Edwards v. State, 177 Ga.App. 557, 340 S.E.2d 229 (1986). Thus, under Adamczyk, supra, and its progeny, a demand which merely requests a trial by jury is insufficient; to invoke the extreme sanctions of OCGA § 17-7-170 the demand must provide a reasonable reference to the provisions of that section, or otherwise clearly indicate that it is a demand for speedy trial. See, e.g., Edwards v. State, supra at 557, 340 S.E.2d 229; Malpass v. State, 173 Ga.App. 690(1), 327 S.E.2d 753 (1985); Ferris v. State, 172 Ga.App. 729(1), 324 S.E.2d 762 (1984). However, in Adamczyk we also held "[t]his ruling does not affect our previous rulings regarding placing the demand on the minutes of the court or delivery of the demand to certain officials; nor is any particular form required so long as the demand can reasonably be construed as a demand for trial under the provisions of [OCGA § 17-7-170]." (Emphasis supplied). Adamczyk, supra 192 Ga.App. at 290, 290 S.E.2d 149.
In Ferris v. State, supra, we again considered whether defendant's demand for speedy trial, which was also contained in a letter filed with the clerk of court, was sufficient to invoke the sanction of acquittal. In that case we found that defendant's demand clearly sought a speedy trial, but nevertheless found the demand insufficient because it did not identify the charges pending against the defendant by name, date, term of court, or case number and thus could not "reasonably be construed as sufficient to put the authorities on notice of a defendant's intention to invoke the extreme sanction of former Code § 27-1901 (now OCGA § 17-7-170, ...)." Id. at 731. Again, however, we imposed no requirement that a demand for a speedy trial be presented in any particular form.
Applying these considerations to the case sub judice, we note first that defendant's letter contained both a specific request to be tried "at this or the next succeeding term of court" and a specific reference to OCGA § 17-7-170. Moreover, defendant's letter clearly referenced the charges pending against him and the term of court during which defendant was scheduled to appear. Hence, we find that under the guidelines enunciated in both Adamczyk and Ferris defendant's demand for speedy trial was clearly sufficient to invoke the extreme sanction of acquittal as provided in OCGA § 17-7-170.
2. The State also challenges the trial court's finding that jurors were impaneled and qualified during the February 1986 term of court (when defendant's demand was made) and argues defendant failed to carry his burden...
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Bennett v. State, A00A0898.
...Allen, 192 Ga.App. 730, 732(2), 386 S.E.2d 394 (1989); Verscharen v. State, 188 Ga.App. 746, 374 S.E.2d 349 (1988); State v. Prestia, 183 Ga.App. 24(1), 357 S.E.2d 829 (1987); Edwards v. State, 177 Ga.App. 557(1), 340 S.E.2d 229 (1986); State v. Adamczyk, 162 Ga.App. 288, 289-290, 290 S.E.2......
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...identified by placement of the indictment numbers within the heading of the demand notice." (Emphasis supplied.) In State v. Prestia, 183 Ga.App. 24(1), 357 S.E.2d 829, we concluded that a demand was sufficient which stated " 'trial by jury at this or the next succeeding term of court pursu......
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...192 Ga.App. 730, 732(2), 386 S.E.2d 394 (1989). In particular, it refers expressly to the operational Code section. State v. Prestia, 183 Ga.App. 24(1), 357 S.E.2d 829 (1987). Cf. Grier v. State, 198 Ga.App. 840(1), 403 S.E.2d 857 (1991). The pleading served the important purpose of notifyi......