State v. Price

• Decision Date: 18 April 2003
• Docket Number: No. 94-396-C.A., No. 2001-64-C.A.
• Citation: 820 A.2d 956
• Parties: STATE v. Craig C. PRICE.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

820 A.2d 956

STATE v. Craig C. PRICE.

Nos. 2001-64-C.A., 94-396-C.A.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

April 18, 2003.

Present: WILLIAMS, C.J., FLANDERS, and GOLDBERG, JJ., and WEISBERGER, C.J. (Ret.)

Michael Stone, Joseph P. Youngs, III, Aaron L. Weisman, Providence, for Plaintiff.

Robert B. Mann, Providence, for Defendant.

OPINION

WEISBERGER, Chief Justice (Ret.).

This case comes before us on appeal by Craig C. Price (defendant) from a judgment of the Family Court for the County of Providence that held the defendant guilty of criminal contempt. He appeals from an earlier judgment entered by the Chief Judge of the Family Court holding him to be in civil contempt. He also appeals from the sentence imposed on the criminal contempt charge of twenty-five years imprisonment, of which ten years were to be served and fifteen years were suspended. He challenges a later judgment of the Family Court, which determined that the defendant had violated the terms and conditions of the suspended portions of his criminal contempt sentence. We deny and dismiss the defendant's appeal and affirm the judgments of the Family Court that we reviewed. We decline to review the validity and propriety of the sentence at this time. The facts and procedural history of this case insofar as pertinent to the appeal are as follows.

Facts and Procedural History

On September 21, 1989, defendant was fifteen years of age. He had been accused of the brutal murder of Joan M. Heaton and her two small daughters in their home on the night of September 4, 1989. He also had been accused of the murder of Rebecca Spencer in her home on the night of July 27, 1987. On September 21, 1987, he appeared before a justice of the Family Court and admitted sufficient facts to be adjudicated delinquent on the four charges of murder, as well as two charges of burglary by virtue of entry into the Heaton and Spencer dwellings. Pursuant to the statutes then in effect, defendant was ordered to be committed to the Rhode Island Training School (Training School) and there to be held until his twenty-first birthday. This was the maximum penalty that the Family Court could impose. The Family Court justice intended to provide for intensive treatment of defendant during his period of commitment in order to diagnose and treat such psychiatric and/or personality disorders that may have contributed to his unprovoked, unusually brutal conduct,¹ and to make it possible for him to be released into the community when his approximately five-year commitment to the Training School ended. To accomplish this, the Family Court justice arranged, in cooperation with the authorities at the Training School, to obtain the services of two outstanding experts in the field of mental health. These experts were Shervert Frazier, M.D., who formerly had been the director of the National Institute of Mental Health and chief of psychiatry at McLean Hospital, and Wesley Profit, Ph.D., who was deputy director of the Bridgewater State Hospital in Massachusetts and was also director of forensic services at that institution. These experts were instructed toformulate a diagnostic and treatment plan for defendant. They were retained at state expense and were considered by the justice of the Family Court as the best resource persons to prepare defendant for eventual release into the community.

Arrangements were made with the public defender who represented defendant to present him for a psychiatric examination to begin the diagnostic process. Counsel for defendant had no objection at the outset, but at the second meeting, on November 16, 1989, when the doctors indicated their intention to discuss with defendant his recollection of the events surrounding the subject homicides, defendant said that he would be unable to discuss these matters as a result of having talked to his attorney. He also said that he would be unable to continue to participate in the psychiatric and psychological examinations. Further discussions with defendant and with the attorney disclosed that his withdrawal from the diagnostic and treatment process resulted from fear expressed by his attorney that this psychiatric examination might lead to a civil commitment under the Mental Health Law, G.L. 1956 chapter 5 of title 406, that could result in his being placed into a psychiatric facility for commitment beyond his twenty-first birthday.

After these events, defendant was brought before the justice of the Family Court, who prescribed the course of treatment on several occasions. On each of these occasions, the justice ordered him to cooperate in the psychiatric evaluation and sought to persuade him that it would be in defendant's best interests to do so. He assured defendant that it was not his intention to use the psychiatric treatment program to detain defendant beyond his twenty-first birthday. As an additional step, the justice appointed a guardian ad litem to advise defendant concerning the advantages of psychiatric treatment. The justice also sought to obtain intercession of defendant's parents to this end. Although the Family Court justice spoke in terms of defendant's best interests in a manner consistent with the parens patriae function of the Family Court, in thecourse of defendant's appearances, he admonished defendant that he had no Fifth Amendment right to refuse psychiatric consultation and that he was ordering defendant to participate in the evaluation and treatment program. During a review of defendant's case on February 15, 1990, the justice was advised that treatment could not occur without a full assessment by the two experts of defendant's recollections of the crimes that he had committed and his mental reactions to the reasons why he was at the Training School. Counsel for the state emphatically requested that the court "make whatever order it feels appropriate to accomplish this and obtain his cooperation in the examination." At that point, an assistant public defender argued to the court that the state would try to use such information in a later proceeding to commit defendant past his twenty-first birthday. The colloquy clearly indicated that defense counsel was referring to a civil mental health commitment. Doctor Profit, at the hearing, expressed his opinion that it was essential for defendant to get on with the healing process. He further expressed the opinion that if defendant did not receive treatment and was released into the community, there would be a danger of repeating crimes similar to those to which he had admitted his guilt.

In response to a report of the doctor's opinion, the justice said that he did not know of any Fifth Amendment right that defendant had at this time. He added that if defendant should sit at the Training School for five years and do nothing, then at the end of the five years, he would more likely be subject to civil commitment than if he cooperated now in his treatment. It was at this juncture that he appointed a guardian ad litem and sought the aid of defendant's parents.

Two months later, on April 18, 1990, representatives of the Division of Juvenile Correctional Services (DJCS) reported that defendant was still refusing to participate in the court-ordered evaluation. On April 26, 1990, the guardian ad litem presented his report. This report disclosed that after two meetings with defendant, the guardian ad litem was unable topersuade defendant to participate in the evaluation and treatment program. The reason was defendant's concern that information given to the therapists would be used by the state to seek an involuntary civil commitment to a mental health facility beyond his twenty-first birthday. The guardian ad litem concluded his report with the following:

"[I]n [defendant's] analysis and based upon remarks attributable to the prosecutor regarding civil commitment, inspite [sic] of my recommendation to him that he cooperate, Craig believes his cooperation and participation in this evaluative and treatment process is not in his best interest and, thus, he will decline to participate in such a process at this point in time."

After this report, the justice asserted unequivocally in the presence of defendant that he "would order him to cooperate" and further suggested that Dr. Profit's opinion was that his mental condition would deteriorate during his stay at the Training School without outside help or the help of his expert therapists.

On May 15, 1990, representatives of the DJCS again reported that defendant did not want to answer any questions by anyone and had no interest in treatment at that time. On October 23, 1990, the Family Court justice again was informed by DJCS representatives that defendant would not participate in the evaluation process because of his concern relating to possible civil commitment. The report indicated that defendant had no interest in treatment and wanted simply to forget about his crimes, complete his stay at the Training School, and leave. However, Dr. Profit also filed a report at the request of the DJCS that set forth an extremely foreboding prognosis in the event that defendant should continue to refuse to participate in evaluation and treatment:

"First, there can be no doubt that Craig Price is a murderer of the serial type. At this point as you well know, Craig, on advice of counsel, is unwilling to discuss his state of mind at the time of the murders. I suspect from all that I have seen and know of these murders that Craig was in a psychotic rage at the time of theseevents and that he should probably be classified as a serial murderer, disorganized type. At this point and without great cooperation and assistance from Craig, it cannot be determined what are the psychodynamic underpinnings of Craig's behavior. Without an accurate formulation as to why these things occurred, it is virtually certain that Craig Price will not be able to demonstrate significant improvement or get well on his own. Without the assistance of a...