State v. Prince

• Decision Date: 30 June 1869
• Citation: 63 N.C. 529
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: THE STATE v. WILLIAM PRINCE, GEORGE PRINCE and JOHN MCKINLEY.

63 N.C. 529

THE STATE

v.WILLIAM PRINCE, GEORGE PRINCE and JOHN MCKINLEY.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

June Term, 1869.

Where, upon trials for capital offences, questions arise as to the propriety of discharging the jury without a verdict: whether a necessity exists for such discharge is a matter to be decided by the Judge presiding at such trial; and it is his duty to ascertain the facts which constitute such necessity.

The exercise of such discretion in any particular case of discharge may be appealed from, and in such case the finding of the facts in the Court below is conclusive, leaving the law as deduced from such facts, to be reviewed.

In a case where three persons were upon trial for murder, the prisoners proposed that they should be examined as witnesses for each other. The State objected, but the Court allowed the motion; thereupon the Solicitor appealed, and the Court, to allow him such appeal, against the objection of the prisoners withdrew a juror and made a mistrial; Held, to have been an erroneous exercise of discretion, and that thereupon the prisoners were entitled to a discharge.

( State v. Rose, Phil. 406, cited and approved; State v. Garrigues, 1 Hay. 241, Spier's case, 1 Dev. 491, State v. Ephraim, 1 D. & B. 162, considered, and doubted.)

MURDER, tried before Cannon, J., at Spring Term, 1869, of the Superior Court of CHEROKEE.

The facts appear sufficiently stated in the Opinion.

Attorney General, for the State .

No counsel contra.

RODMAN, J.

This was an indictment found at Spring Term 1869 of the Superior Court of Cherokee, against William Prince, for murder, and against two other prisoners, as being present aiding and abetting. The prisoners pleaded not guilty; the jury were sworn and empanelled; the witnesses for the prosecution and the defence were sworn. Before any of them had been examined, “the prisoners' counsel proposed that they should be examined as witnesses for each other;” the Solicitor objected, but the Judge decided that each was entitled to be examined for or against the others. From this decision the Solicitor for the State appealed, and his appeal was allowed. On motion of the Solicitor and against objections by the prisoners, the Judge ordered the withdrawal of a juror and a mistrial, and that the jury be discharged. Thereupon the counsel for the prisoners moved for their discharge, which was refused; and the prisoners appealed.

The record makes it necessary to consider what is the effect of the discharge of a jury charged with a capital case, without their having rendered a verdict. At the outset we are met by four decisions of this Court, or of the Judges of this Court, all made after full argument and deliberation, and all substantially coinciding.

The cases alluded to are: State v. Garrigues, 1 Hay. 241, In the matter of Spier, 1 Dev. 491, State v. Ephraim, 1 Dev. & Bat. 162, and the case of Slaughter, cited in that case.

Our great respect for the eminent Judges who decided those cases should not prevent us from reviewing with freedom their opinions on so important a question; and we do so the more readily, because in a more recent case in England, the whole subject has been ably and thoroughly examined, and a conclusion come to materially different from that asserted by our Court. We by no means propose to trace the doctrine on this subject, or to refer to the authorities any farther than may be necessary; all the English are cited in Newton's case, 13 A. & E. N. S. 717, (66 E. C. L. R. 716); and the most important American are referred to in the note to that case in the American edition, and in the cases in our own reports cited above.

That no person for the same offence can be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb, is a sacred principle of the common law. As a consequence of this principle, it was held in England at an early period, that “a jury, sworn and charged in case of life or member cannot be discharged by the Court or any other, but they ought to give a verdict.” Coke Litt. 227-6, and 3 Inst. 110. If in such a case the jury should be discharged, and separate, as the prisoner could not be tried again, he was entitled to be at liberty. But it was soon seen to be necessary to make exceptions to the general rule: cases occurred in which the benefit of the prisoner required the rigor of the rule to be departed from; and others in which an inflexible adherence to it would have resulted in a palpable and discreditable failure of justice. Some of the exceptions will be found discussed in the Kinlochs' case, Foster??, 22. The question first came before this Court in State v. Garrigues in 1795, and for the second time in the matter of Spier, in 1828. In this last case in which the jury separated by reason of the expiration of the term of the Court, Hall, J., limits the exceptions to “such as are under no human control, but are the offspring of necessity; as where a juror is...