State v. Pruitt
| Decision Date | 23 April 1984 |
| Docket Number | No. 46601,46601 |
| Citation | 480 N.E.2d 499,18 Ohio App.3d 50,18 OBR 163 |
| Parties | , 18 O.B.R. 163 The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. PRUITT, Appellant. * |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court
1. For the statute of limitations to toll, the record of the trial court must in some manner affirmatively demonstrate that a sua sponte continuance by the court was reasonable in light of its necessity or purpose. Mere entries by the trial court will suffice only where the reasonableness of the continuance cannot be seriously questioned. (State v. Lee, 48 Ohio St.2d 208, 357 N.E.2d 1095 , applied.)
2. Failure to honor defendant's timely, good faith request for substitution of counsel amounts to a denial of effective assistance of counsel where communication and cooperation have so deteriorated as to obviate any attorney-client relationship.
3. While mere proof of defendant's presence in the vicinity of illicit drugs is insufficient to show possession, drugs (in a form ready for injection) found within a foot of defendant will support the conclusion that drugs were in defendant's constructive possession.
4. The trial court has a mandatory duty to advise defendant of his right to request conditional probation under R.C. 2951.04(A) if the court has reason to believe that defendant is or may become drug dependent. That the evidence giving rise to a reasonable belief was adduced during the competency hearing is immaterial. The statute places no limit on the way a reasonable belief may be engendered.
5. Pursuant to R.C. 2945.37 a trial court may constitutionally require a defendant to prove his incompetence to stand trial by a preponderance of the evidence. (Day, J., dissenting.)
John T. Corrigan, Pros. Atty., for appellee.
Kathleen Aynes, for appellant.
In this case, Kyle Pruitt (defendant) appeals his conviction under R.C. 2925.11 for possession of Preludin, a narcotic. For the reasons adduced below the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
In response to a report of a prior robbery, two Cleveland policemen went to 1675 Ansel Road, a CMHA housing project. The policemen were directed to apartment No. 1033, the residence of Alfred Bryant. He allowed them to enter. The apartment was only one room and the police were able to see into the open bathroom. They saw the defendant sitting on the closed toilet seat, and a woman kneeling in front of him. On the floor were a paper bag, pill bottles, and syringes. A metal cap with a powdery residue and matches were on the sink. The residue was later analyzed and determined to be Preludin.
The defendant was represented at the preliminary hearing by the public defender. Later, for some unknown reason, new counsel was assigned. From the outset, there was a failure of communication and cooperation between counsel and the defendant. Twice before trial the defendant requested the public defender be reappointed. These requests were in writing and were among thirty-three nearly unintelligible documents and motions the defendant filed pro se. Counsel joined in the defendant's request, because, as he told the court, communication had broken down to the point that it was impossible for him to obtain information to fulfill his duties. What conversation counsel did get from the defendant he found incomprehensible, indicating the defendant did not understand the nature of his defense. The motion for new counsel was denied, but recognizing the suggestion that the defendant might not be competent to stand trial, the court referred the defendant to the court psychiatric clinic.
Two weeks after a hearing at which the defendant was found competent, the defendant renewed his motion for new counsel; this time for the appointment of any counsel, not the public defender in particular. The court overruled the motion and presented the defendant with two alternatives: either accept his appointed counsel or represent himself. No explanation of the charges against the defendant, or risks upon conviction, or the relative merits and dangers of the choices was attempted. The defendant opted to try his own case.
His appointed counsel was assigned to sit at the trial table as a representative of the court, but the defendant chose not to accept his offers of assistance. In a trial to the court, the defendant was found guilty and sentenced. Six errors are assigned.
R.C. 2945.71 provides in part:
Under Section (E) of the statute, each day spent in jail is counted as three. There is no question that from the day of his arrest to the day of trial the defendant was jailed. Thus subject to any exception that may apply, the statute mandated a ninety-day period within which the defendant should have been tried. The record reveals the important dates and the tolling or nontolling status of intervals between them:
August 18, 1982 Defendant arrested
October 15, 1982 Defendant filed affidavit of prejudice.
November 3, 1982 Defendant withdraws affidavit of prejudice 1 November 19, 1982 Motion to discharge 2
November 29, 1982 Defendant referred for psychiatric examination
January 4, 1983 Second motion to discharge 3
January 19, 1983 Motion to discharge denied
January 20, 1983 Defendant found competent to stand trial
Trial continued on court's motion
February 9, 1983 Trial on one hundred seventy-fifth day after arrest
R.C. 2945.72(B) and (E) 4 tolled the statute for the delays occasioned by the affidavit of prejudice (nineteen days), motions to discharge and psychiatric referral (sixty-two days), respectively. Thus, the one hundred seventy-five days were reduced by eighty-one to ninety-four days, or four days over the limit. 5
The state seeks to offset this by tolling the statute for the twenty-day sua sponte continuance from January 20 to February 9 under the provenance of R.C. 2945.72(H). That section provides the speedy trial period may be extended by:
"The period of any continuance granted on the accused's own motion, and the period of any reasonable continuance granted other than upon the accused's own motion;" (Emphasis added.)
The cases have repeatedly made it clear that the speedy trial statutes are to be strictly enforced. State v. Pachay (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 218, 221, 416 N.E.2d 589 , and cases cited there. Otherwise, an overbroad construction of R.C. 2945.72(H) "would render meaningless, and thwart the direction of the speedy-trial statutes." State v. Lee (1976), 48 Ohio St.2d 208, 209, 357 N.E.2d 1095 . To ensure that only reasonable court-initiated continuances toll the statute:
Id. (Emphasis added.)
The entry setting the trial date in this case stated only:
If the record in this case did not reflect some extraordinary features, the quoted entry would be faulted by the "mere entry" teaching in Lee. However, the record does reflect some extraordinary features with respect to defense motions. There were more than thirty motions filed and all of them may or may not have been determined by the trial court. The record does not reflect the dispositions clearly or at all on many of the motions. It is defendant's duty through counsel to establish the clarity of record necessary to exemplify the claimed errors. This was not done because the dispositions or lack of them were insufficiently established. Therefore, it is assumed that the processing of the multiplicity of motions not reaching a resolution on the record reasonably consumed as many or more than four days. With the record in this condition the four days can logically be charged off under either the defendant's action or the "reasonable continuance" provisions of R.C. 2945.72(H). Thus, the trial date was not out of rule and the entry setting it was not flawed. The record does not show the defendant pressed for rulings or did not get them within a reasonable time. Under these special circumstances it cannot be presumed that the presumption of the regularity of trial court actions has been overcome.
Assignment of Error No. I is without merit.
The defendant makes two arguments under this assignment of error: first, that the court applied the standard for insanity rather than incompetency; and second, that the court failed to order the production of relevant evidence. The arguments are interrelated as posed. But the interrelation is not immediately apparent. For the first proposition clearly cannot be demonstrated. The court did not announce its standard and the references in the record to the defendant's lack of mental disease or defect do not require the conclusion that the court necessarily included such defects as elements of incompetency. The real question is whether, applying the proper standard, the evidence supports the ultimate finding. With the first argument recast in these terms, the second argument inevitably raises the question of who bears the burden of persuasion...
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