State v. Public Service Commission

• Decision Date: 05 March 1918
• Docket Number: No. 20392.,20392.
• Citation: 201 S.W. 1143,273 Mo. 632
• Parties: STATE ex rel. MISSOURI PAC. RY. CO. et al. v. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF MISSOURI.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

201 S.W. 1143

273 Mo. 632

STATE ex rel. MISSOURI PAC. RY. CO. et al. v. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF MISSOURI.

No. 20392.

Supreme Court of Missouri. In Banc.

March 5, 1918.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Cole County; J. G. Slate, Judge.

Certiorari by the State, on the relation of the Missouri Pacific Railway Company and another, against the Public Service Commission of Missouri. From an adverse judgment, the Commission appeals. Affirmed.

This is an appeal by the Public Service Commission from a judgment rendered in the circuit court of Cole county, whereby an order made by the Public Service Commission was modified.

Upon a hearing by the Public Service Commission of a complaint filed by A. B. Cole, as mayor of the city of California, against the Missouri Pacific Railway Company, and Benjamin F. Bush, the receiver thereof, wherein a better and more adequate interstate train service was prayed for, the Public Service Commission (hereinafter referred to as the Commission) made therein, so far as is pertinent to the points involved, the below order, to wit:

"Now after due deliberation it is ordered: That the defendants, the Missouri Pacific Railway Company and B. F. Bush, receiver of the Missouri Pacific Railway Company, be required from and after the effective date of this order and until the further order of this Commission to regularly stop their east-bound passenger train No. 2 at California, Mo., and to stop their west-bound passenger train No. 5 at California, Mo., on flag; that is, to take on passengers for points beyond California, Mo., where stops are made by said trains, or to let off passengers boarding said trains at other points at which such trains stop."

Upon the hearing before the Commission, the defendants therein, who are the relators here (and are hereinafter for brevity so styled), in effect conceded in their testimony the justness of the order of the Commission, as to the stop thereby required to be made at California by relators' east-bound passenger train No. 2, and in the exceptions which relators filed to the finding and order of the Commission no complaint is made of such part of said order as refers to train No. 2.

Upon the entering by the Commission of the order above recited, and following the conventional procedure in that behalf, defendants sued out a writ of certiorari in the circuit court of Cole county; wherein, the regular judge of said court having disqualified himself, Judge A. W. Walker, of the Ninth circuit, was called in and sat upon the trial as special judge, and on a hearing therein de novo, rendered the below judgment, to wit:

"Now at this day this cause comes on for final determination, and the court finds that the order of the Public Service Commission is lawful and reasonable in all respects except that portion requiring train No. 5 to stop on flag to take on passengers for points beyond California, Mo., where stops are made by said trains at other points at which such trains stop as set forth in the latter part of paragraph 1, and that said portion of said order is unreasonable in requiring said train to stop except on flag or request for passengers from St. Louis to California, Mo., as set forth in plaintiff's motion to modify.

"It is therefore ordered and adjudged that this cause be reversed and remanded to the Public Service Commission for further consideration."

From this judgment the Commission, after the usual motions and procedure, has appealed. The evidentiary facts, since they are in our view decisive of all of the questions involved herein, will be found in the discussion of the law, which we think ought to apply to the case.

Alex. Z. Patterson, General Counsel, and James D. Lindsay, Asst. Counsel, both of Jefferson City, for Public Service Commission. James F. Green and H. H. Larimore, both of St. Louis, for respondents.

FARIS, J. (after stating the facts as above).

This case turns wholly upon the facts; for the law, so far at least as concerns its general terms, is well-settled. The rule in such cases has been repeatedly stated; never more clearly and carefully perhaps, certainly never more authoritatively, than by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Mississippi Railroad Corn. v. Illinois Central Railroad, 203 U. S. loc. cit. 344, 27 Sup. Ct. 94, 51 L. Ed. 209, where it was said:

"Upon the principles decided in these cases, a state railroad commission has the right, under a state statute, so far as railroads are concerned, to compel a company to stop its trains under the circumstances already referred to, and it may order the stoppage of such trains if the company does not otherwise furnish proper and adequate accommodation to a particular locality, and in such cases the order may embrace a through interstate train actually running and compel it to stop at a locality named. In such case, in the absence of congressional legislation covering the subject, there is no illegal or improper interference with the interstate commerce right; but if the company has furnished all such proper and reasonable accommodation to the locality as fairly may be demanded, taking into consideration the fact, if it be one, that the locality is a county seat, and the amount and character of the business done, then any interference with the company (either directly by statute, or by a railroad commission acting under authority of a statute), by causing its interstate trains to stop at a particular locality in the state, is an improper and illegal interference with the rights of the railroad company, and a violation of the commerce clause of the Constitution."

The identical general rule is stated in the later case of Herndon v. Railroad, 218 U. S. loc. cit. 153, 30 Sup. Ct. 633, 54 L. Ed. 970, as also in divers other cases decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, which is empowered to speak upon this subject the decisive and authoritative and last word. Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois, 163 U. S. 142, 16 Sup. Ct. 1096, 41 L. Ed. 107; Gladson v. Minnesota, 166 U. S. 427, 17 Sup. Ct. 627, 41 L. Ed. 1064; Lake Shore, etc., Ry. Co. v. Ohio, 173 U. S. 285, 19 Sup. Ct. 465, 43 L. Ed. 702; Cleveland, etc., Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 177 U. S. 514, 20 Sup. Ct. 722, 44 L. Ed. 868; Atlantic Coast Line Co. v. Wharton, 207 U. S. 328, 28 Sup. Ct. 121, 52 L. Ed. 230; Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry. Co. v. Railroad Cora. of Wisconsin, 237 U. S. 220, 35 Sup. Ct. 560, 59 L. Ed. 926; Atlantic Coast Line v. North Carolina Corp. Com., 206 U. S. 1, 27 Sup. Ct. 585, 51 L. Ed. 933, 11 Ann. Cas. 398; Oregon Railroad, etc., Co. v. Fairchild, 224 U. S. 510, 32 Sup. Ct. 535, 56 L. Ed. 863; Railroad v. Vant Santwood, Public Service Com. (D. C.) 216 Fed. 252; Ohage v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 200 Fed. 128, 118 C. C. A. 302.

In the case of Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. Co. v. Railroad Com. of Wisconsin, supra, 237 U. S. at page 226, 35 Sup. Ct. 562, 59 L. Ed. 926, it was said:

"In reviewing the decision we may start with certain principles as established: (1) It is competent for a state to require adequate local facilities, even to the stoppage of interstate trains or the rearrangement of their schedules. (2) Such facilities existing — that is, the local conditions being adequately met — the obligation of the railroad is performed, and the stoppage of interstate trains becomes an improper and illegal interference with interstate commerce. (3) And this, whether the interference be directly by the Legislature or by its command through the orders of an administrative body. (4) The fact of local facilities this court may determine, such fact being necessarily involved in the determination of the federal question whether an order concerning an interstate train does or does not directly regulate interstate commerce, by imposing an arbitrary requirement."

Applying the above rules to the conceded facts of this case, we conclude that the modification ordered to be made by the court nisi in the order of the Commission was a proper one, and that the judgment below ought to be affirmed. This modification, as by reference to the statement of facts will more clearly appear, consisted in relieving the railroad from the necessity of having to stop its west-bound train (No. 5) except to put...