State v. Pulley
| Decision Date | 24 April 1950 |
| Docket Number | 16347. |
| Citation | 59 S.E.2d 155,216 S.C. 552 |
| Parties | STATE v. PULLEY. |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
W. T. Bolt, Laurens, Hobart F. Atkins, Knoxville, Tenn for appellant.
Hugh Beasley, Sol., Greenwood, for respondent.
The appellant Grover Tojo Pulley, was indicted for a violation of section 1165 of the Code, which makes it unlawful for any one to have in possession certain named articles, or other implements or things adapted or commonly used for the commission of burglary, larceny, safe cracking, or other crime, under circumstances evincing an intent to use them in the commission of a crime. He was tried at the June, 1949 term of the Court of General Sessions for Laurens County. He was found guilty by the jury, and was sentenced to ten years imprisonment.
The evidence shows that he had in his possession, among other things, dynamite fuses and caps, a large and a small crowbar, an auger and bit, a small keyhole flashlight, tweezers, a cord described as a 'strangle cord', a rubber syringe, a quantity of cotton, a large flashlight, an all metal screw driver, two metal punches, a pair of cotton gloves, adhesive tape, and a number of keys of various kinds.
Some of these articles are specifically named in the criminal statute. The testimony of the law enforcement officers was that all of them were adapted to use in various activities connected with housebreaking and safe cracking. They need not have been originally designed for a burglarious purpose, if they are suitable for breaking and entering. 12 C.J.S., Burglary, § 69, page 753; 9 Am.Jur. 282.
There was a reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the evidence that the appellant had an intent to use these articles in the commission of crime. It is true that many of these things could be put to a lawful use, but it is not reasonable to suppose that a person, without criminal intent, would be driving about with such an assorted and rather complete collection of things, all of which are commonly used by a burglar or safe blower. The defendant had his automobile equipped with two carburetors, and especially adjusted for quick starting and great speed. He picked up a man named Earl Jackson near Spartanburg and tried to persuade him to help him 'on a job.' He told him that his name was James C. Perkins. He spoke to him of certain old persons in Tennessee whom he intended to rob. He drove Jackson to Clinton and sent him into a hardware store to buy some dynamite and a fuse. Instead, Jackson called the police. The appellant fled from the officers in his high-powered automobile, driving almost one hundred miles an hour for several miles in an effort to elude them. No doubt he would have escaped but for having to slow down upon meeting other cars near a bridge. This enabled the officers to overtake him. He was found to have in his automobile, in addition to the articles which have been mentioned, a handcuff key, a pair of metal knucks, a Belgian automatic pistol with magazine holding fifteen cartridges, and a sawed-off shotgun loaded with buckshot. He also had quite a number of large-scald maps of many counties in North Carolina, extra 1948 license tags of Georgia and Tennessee, and a first aid kit for the treatment of gunshot wounds.
The defendant offered no testimony at all.
In view of the evidence, we think that the trial Judge properly refused to direct a verdict of not guilty, and that he wisely exercised his discretion in overruling the motion for a new trial.
The appellant next contends that there was error on the part of the Circuit Judge in failing to tell the jury the maximum sentence which could be imposed. Judge Griffith did inform the jury that the sentence was within the discretion of the court. In charging the law as to this offense we do not think that it was necessary for the Judge to tell the jury what the limits of punishment were. No request was made by the defendant for a more detailed charge. The function of the jury was to say whether the defendant was guilty or not guilty. The jurors were not concerned with the punishment fixed by the law, nor with the discretion of the Court in deciding upon the sentence.
Another exception alleges that the Circuit Judge erred in his charge made to the jury, after they reported that they were unable to agree by telling them that 'a mistrial is always bad, it is a miscarriage of justice.' If these words stood alone they would not be the most appropriate ones, but here they were only a part of...
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