State v. Pyle

Decision Date08 July 1955
Docket NumberCr. 260
Citation71 N.W.2d 342
PartiesSTATE of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Kenneth K. PYLE, Defendant and Appellant.
CourtNorth Dakota Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court.

1. Members of boards of township supervisors are public officers within the meaning of Section 12-1006, and where one of such supervisors voluntarily enters into a contract with the township in which he is personally interested he is guilty of a misdemeanor under said Section 12-1006.

2. Although Section 58-0512 applies specifically to township officers, they are nevertheless public officers within the meaning of Section 12-1006 and subject to its provisions.

3. The Legislature in exercising the police power may prohibit a specific act under criminal penalty, and the commission of the prohibited act constitutes the crime; the purity of the motive prompting the act and the knowledge or ignorance of its criminal character is immaterial.

4. For reasons stated in the opinion it is held that the trial court correctly instructed the jury as to the meaning of the word 'voluntarily' as used in Section 12-1006.

Francis Murphy, George E. Duis, Fargo, for defendant and appellant.

Paul Benson, Atty. Gen., of North Dakota, Lee F. Brooks, State's Atty. of Cass County, Fargo, for plaintiff and respondent.

SATHRE, Judge.

This is an appeal from a judgment rendered by the county court of Cass County, the same having increased civil and criminal jurisdiction, finding the defendant guilty of violating Section 12-1006 NDRC 1943, which reads as follows:

'Every public officer authorized to sell or lease any property, or make any contract in his official capacity, who voluntarily becomes interested individually in such sale, lease, or contract, directly or indirectly, is guilty of a misdemeanor.'

The charging part of the information is as follows:

'That heretofore, to-wit: On or about the 20th day of July 1953, in Barnes Township in the county of Cass and State of North Dakota the said defendant Kenneth K. Pyle being then and there a public officer, to-wit: A member of the township board of Barnes Township, Cass County, North Dakota, and in such capacity authorized to make contracts for said township in his said official capacity, did wilfully, and voluntarily become interested directly in a contract of said township, in that at said time and place the said defendant received payment in the sum of three hundred thirty-seven and no/100 dollars ($337.00) from said township for mowing, blading, and bulldozing work upon the highways of said township;

'This against the Peace and Dignity of the State of North Dakota, and contrary to the form of the Statutes in such case made and provided.'

The defendant was tried to the court and a jury. The jury returned a verdict of guilty and judgment was entered thereon and a fine imposed upon the defendant. Thereafter the defendant made a motion for a new trial. The motion for a new trial was heard before the county court on June 10, 1954 and after such hearing the motion was denied.

The defendant appealed from the order denying a new trial and from the judgment.

The specifications of error may be stated as follows and were argued together in defendant's brief.

'1. That the Court erred in denying the Defendant's motion to quash the information before the trial of this case.

'2. That the Court erred in overruling and denying the motion by the Defendant in arrest of judgment.

'3. That the Court erred in denying the Defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal at the close of all of the evidence.

'4. That the Defendant was not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict of guilty.

'5. That the evidence fails to show that the Defendant did voluntarily enter into any contract as the Statute requires.

'6. That the Court erred in instructing the jury as to the meaning of the word voluntary.'

We will consider the specifications in the order argued in defendant's brief.

The first contention of the defendant is that the information does not allege facts sufficient to constitute a public offense under Section 12-1006 for reason that the language used in said section is in the singular form; that under the statute he cannot enter into a contract as an individual officer and that at least a majority of the board is necessary to make a contract. We see no merit in his contention. The defendant was a member of the board and as such member he was a public officer and while such officer he entered into a contract with the majority of the board of supervisors of Barnes Township on behalf of the partnership of which he was a member. Clearly the contract was in violation of Section 12-1006 NDRC 1943.

The next contention of the defendant is that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict.

There is no dispute as to the facts in this case. The defendant had been a member of the board of supervisors of Barnes Township, North Dakota for a period of twelve years, and was Chairman of the Board at the time of the alleged offense charged in the information.

State's exhibit 'A' shows that K. K. Pyle and Son performed labor on the highways of Barnes Township between June 26th, 1953 and July 10, 1953 for which they were paid the sum of $337. It is admitted the K. K. Pyle or Kenneth K. Pyle the defendant herein and his son are partners and that the partnership performed the work as shown by state's exhibit 'A' and received the payment therefor. State's exhibit 'B' is the warrant issued by the clerk of Barnes Township in the sum of $337 payable to K. K. Pyle and Son and approved by Kenneth K. Pyle as Chairman of the Board of Supervisors. State's exhibit 'C' is a check drawn by M. J. Nelson, treasurer of Barnes Township in the sum of $337 payable to K. K. Pyle and Son, dated July 20, 1953 and endorsed Pyle & Son, by Kenneth Pyle. It is admitted that state's exhibits 'A', 'B' and 'C' all relate to the same transaction and constitutes a statement of the services rendered by Kenneth K. Pyle & Sons and the payment therefor by Barnes Township.

It is claimed by the defendant that the services performed were not his voluntary act, but were performed at the insistence of the other members of the board and that therefore he was not guilty under the statute.

There is no evidence in the record that the other members of the board exerted any coercion upon the defendant, nor is there any evidence that the defendant offered any resistance to accepting the contract involved here. His testimony in this respect is: 'I have told them (members of the board) many times that I would just as soon...

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4 cases
  • State v. Thorstad
    • United States
    • North Dakota Supreme Court
    • January 19, 1978
    ...of counsel, such advice would become paramount to the law." Hopkins v. State, 193 Md. 489, 69 A.2d 456, 460 (Md.1949). In State v. Pyle, 71 N.W.2d 342, 346 (N.D.1955), this Court ". . . it is a well-established rule that ignorance of the law excuses no one . . .." and quoted approvingly fro......
  • Berg v. Hogan, 10169
    • United States
    • North Dakota Supreme Court
    • July 15, 1982
    ...of the law is no excuse has been firmly embedded in our legal proceedings. State v. Thorstad, 261 N.W.2d 899 (N.D.1978); State v. Pyle, 71 N.W.2d 342 (N.D.1955). This principle and concept applies in criminal cases and we see no valid reason why the same should not apply to civil matters. C......
  • Lumpkin v. Streifel, 9941
    • United States
    • North Dakota Supreme Court
    • August 4, 1981
    ...of the law is no excuse has been firmly embedded in our legal proceedings. State v. Thorstad, 261 N.W.2d 899 (N.D.1978); State v. Pyle, 71 N.W.2d 342 (N.D.1955). This principle and concept applies in criminal cases and we see no valid reason why the same should not apply to civil matters. C......
  • State v. Sundquist, Cr. N
    • United States
    • North Dakota Supreme Court
    • January 9, 1996
    ...that the principle that "ignorance of the law is no excuse" is "firmly embedded" in legal proceedings]; see also State v. Pyle, 71 N.W.2d 342, 346 (N.D.1955) [recognizing the rule that ignorance of the law is not an excuse for violating a criminal statute]. Thus, we look to the legislative ......

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