State v. Pyles
| Decision Date | 14 September 1920 |
| Docket Number | (No. 3884.) |
| Citation | 104 S.E. 100 |
| Parties | STATE. v. PYLES. |
| Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
(Syllabus by the Court.)
[Ed. Note.—For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, House of I11 Fame.]
Error to Circuit Court, Wetzel County.
Margaret Pyles was convicted of keeping and maintaining a house of ill fame, and she brings error. Reversed, verdict set aside, and new trial awarded.
Thayer M. McIntire, of New Martinsville, for plaintiff in error.
E. T. England, Atty. Gen., and Chas. Ritchie, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
The judgment here complained of imposed a jail sentence of 6 months, suspended except as to 45 days thereof on condition of good behavior, and a fine of $25, on a conviction of guilt of keeping and maintaining a certain house of ill fame.
The accused permanently resided in the house alone, but, according to the evidence, men singly there visited her so often, in such number, and under such circumstances as, aided by her own conduct, tended very strongly to prove that she there indulged in acts of prostitution with them. But there is no proof, nor sufficiently probative evidence, that any other woman resorted to the house for purposes of prostitution.
Our statute does not define a house of ill fame, wherefore it is necessary to go to the common law for its definition. Houston v. Com., 87 Va. 257, 12 S. E. 385. Under the common law, a house kept by one woman, who there indulges in prostitution with nu merous men, and not resorted to by any other lewd woman for the like purpose, is not a house of ill fame. State v. Evans, 27 N. C. 603; People v. Buchanan, 1 Idaho, 681; State v. Galley, 104 N. C. 858, 10 S. E. 455, 17 Am. St. Rep. 7; Pierson's Case, 1 Salk. 382, 2 Lord Raymond, 1197; Singleton v. Ellison, 1 Q. B. (1895) 607; Caldwell v. Leech, 23 Cox's Cr. L. Cas. 510. As stated in State v. Evans, cited, the reason for the holding is that the house must possess an element of danger to the public peace, and it does not exist unless there is a tendency to bring together crowds or assemblages of dissolute, debauched, and quarrelsome persons. The common-law penalty had, for its principal purpose, preservation of the peace, not maintenance of morality. Morality was encouraged and vindicated by the spiritual tribunals, and the common law ordinarily left an unmixed question of morality or offense against morality within their cognizance.
Some of the American cases are classed as having liberalized the definition, but, in almost all instances, they are found, upon analysis, to rest upon statutes, ordinances of cities, or differentiating circumstances. In People v. Mallette, 79 Mich. 600, 44 N. W. 962, it is distinctly held that one female occupant of a house not resorted to by other lewd women suffices in this respect, but neither a precedent nor any demonstrative reasoning is...
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State Of West Va. v. Crummitt
...and this Court in dealing with the statute held that resort must be had to the common law for a definition of such house. State v. Pyles, 88 W. Va. 636, 104 S. E. 100; State v. Badda, 97 W. Va. 417, 125 S. E. 159. The present statute defines one kind of house of ill fame, but, being penal, ......
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State v. Ball
...S.E.2d 849 (1977); State v. Riley, W.Va., 215 S.E.2d 460 (1975); Dials v. Blair, 144 W.Va. 764, 111 S.E.2d 17 (1959); State v. Pyles, 86 W.Va. 636, 104 S.E. 100 (1920).8 It is the general rule in our sister states that a provision proscribing driving while intoxicated without specifying the......
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Conley v. Dingess
...ex rel. Carson v. Wood, 154 W.Va. 397, 175 S.E.2d 482 (1970); Dials v. Blair, 144 W.Va. 764, 111 S.E.2d 17 (1959); State v. Pyles, 86 W.Va. 636, 104 S.E. 100 (1920). Equally elementary is the line of cases requiring that a remedial statute, such as our bail act, should be liberally construe......
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State v. Cole
...ex rel. Carson v. Wood, 154 W.Va. 397, 175 S.E.2d 482 (1970); Dials v. Blair, 144 W.Va. 764, 111 S.E.2d 17 (1959); State v. Pyles, 86 W.Va. 636, 104 S.E. 100 (1920). We believe that the statute (17C-5-2) is plain and unambiguous and, under State v. Riley, supra, should be applied, not const......