State v. Quattlebaum

• Decision Date: 21 July 1903
• Citation: 45 S.E. 162,67 S.C. 203
• Parties: STATE v. QUATTLEBAUM.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

45 S.E. 162

67 S.C. 203

STATE v. QUATTLEBAUM.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

July 21, 1903

Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Richland County; Hudson Judge.

Action by the state against J. M. Quattlebaum on recognizance. From a judgment in favor of defendant, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Thomas & Gibbes, for appellant. Lyles & McMahan and Jno. T. Duncan for appellee.

WOODS J.

This action was brought in the court of common pleas for Richland county on a bond for $200, signed by the defendant conditioned for the appearance for trial in the court of general sessions of one Edward Cornell, arrested for assault and attempt to rob. The defendant demurred to the complaint. The grounds on which the demurrer was sustained are: "The complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, in that the complaint does not allege that the principal signed the recognizance. That the court of common pleas is without jurisdiction of the subject of the action, which is a forfeiture on an appearance recognizance, specially reserved to the court of general sessions by section 85 of the Criminal Code." The appeal involves these two propositions. It concerns in the highest degree the administration of public justice in the punishment of crime that recognizances should not be declared invalid on close technical grounds. They are taken by officers not learned in the law, and there is no obligation the meaning of which is more fully and clearly understood by even the most ignorant. Every man knows, when he signs he has agreed, if the accused does not appear for trial, he will be liable for the amount stated in the recognizance. The surety need not sign until the principal has done so. If he voluntarily assumes the obligation without the signature of the accused we perceive no ground upon which he can ask to be released. At common law no signature was necessary. The obligation assumed was merely entered by the officer. It seems clear therefore, that, unless our statute imperatively requires the signature of the accused to make the recognizance valid, those who undertake for his appearance will be bound without such signature. The statute of 1883 (section 84, Cr. Code) provides: ""In all recognizances by any person for keeping the peace or good behavior or for appearing as a party, surety, or witness at any court of criminal jurisdiction within the state, the sum or sums of money in which any such person shall be bound shall be made payable to the state; and every such recognizance shall be good and effectual in law, provided it be signed by every party thereto, in the presence of a judge, clerk of a Court of Common Pleas, magistrate or notary public, who shall sign the same as witness." The statute in force before 1883 was in substantially the same words, except that it contained the words "otherwise such recognizance shall be void." The omission of these words from the statute would imply that the General Assembly intended the law should be regarded less mandatory and more directory than formerly. An obligation--especially one voluntarily assumed for the protection of the public--will not be regarded void because not taken in precise accordance with the statute, unless the statute expressly so provides. Treasurers v. Bates, 2 Bailey, 376. There are numerous decisions in the several states bearing on the validity of a recognizance not signed by the accused, but many of them rest upon statute law, and hence no extended discussion of them would be of value. The weight of authority is to the effect that unless the statute, either expressly or by necessary implication, provides otherwise, such obligation is valid. Minor v. State, 1 Blackf. 236; People v. Dennis (Mich.) 69 Am. Dec. 349; People v. Huggins, 10 Wend. 465; Tillson v. State, 29 Kan. 452; People v. Love, 19 Cal. 677; State v. Peyton, 32 Mo.App. 522; Brandt on Suretyship and...