State v. Quesnel

• Decision Date: 17 November 2009
• Docket Number: No. DA 09-0197.,DA 09-0197.
• Parties: STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Kodiak QUESNEL, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

220 P.3d 634

2009 MT 388

353 Mont. 317

STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Kodiak QUESNEL, Defendant and Appellant.

No. DA 09-0197.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted on Briefs October 14, 2009.

Decided November 17, 2009.

For Appellant: Edmund F. Sheehy, Jr., Regional Deputy Public Defender; Missoula, Montana.

For Appellee: Hon. Steve Bullock, Montana Attorney General; Sheri K. Sprigg, Assistant Attorney General; Helena, Montana, George Corn, Ravalli County Attorney; T. Geoffrey Mahar, Deputy County Attorney; Hamilton, Montana.

Justice W. WILLIAM LEAPHART delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶ 1 Kodiak Quesnel (Quesnel) appeals the order of the District Court of the Twenty-First Judicial District, Ravalli County, revoking his suspended sentence, committing him to the custody of the Montana Department of Corrections (DOC) for fifteen years, and conditioning his parole eligibility on completion of sex offender treatment. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to the District Court.

¶ 2 We consider the following issues on appeal:

¶ 3 1. Whether the District Court exceeded its authority in sentencing Quesnel to a fifteen-year commitment to DOC.

¶ 4 2. Whether the District Court exceeded its authority in conditioning Quesnel's eligibility for parole on completion of sex offender treatment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶ 5 In September 2002 the State moved for leave to file an information in the District Court charging Quesnel with one count of sexual intercourse without consent and one count of sexual assault, alleging that on one occasion, upon Quesnel's insistence, Quesnel and an eleven-year-old boy engaged in mutual masturbation. The State also alleged that on other occasions Quesnel forced the boy to perform oral sex on him and that Quesnel performed oral sex on the boy. Though Quesnel was fifteen years old at the time of the alleged events, the State sought to charge him as an adult pursuant to § 41-5-206(1), MCA. The District Court granted the State leave to file the charges against Quesnel, as an adult. Quesnel initially pled not guilty to both charges.

¶ 6 Both Quesnel and the State then moved on multiple occasions to continue Quesnel's transfer hearing, required by § 41-5-206(3), MCA. First, on October 21, 2002, Quesnel, through appointed counsel, moved to continue his transfer hearing in the case to November 27, 2002. The District Court granted the continuance. Then in November the State moved, without objection from Quesnel, to continue the transfer hearing. Again the District Court granted the continuance. Quesnel then moved once more to continue the transfer hearing, and the District Court again granted the continuance. Subsequently, in January 2003, Quesnel moved to continue the transfer hearing "without date." The District Court then continued the transfer hearing to April 2004. In March 2004 Quesnel changed his plea to guilty to both charges pursuant to a plea agreement in which the State recommended six-year deferred sentences for each count, to run concurrently. At the change of plea hearing, Quesnel waived the transfer hearing on the record.

¶ 7 The District Court accepted Quesnel's guilty pleas and in August 2004 sentenced him to a six-year deferred imposition of sentence for each count, to run concurrently, subject to numerous conditions. In its judgment, the District Court recognized that Quesnel, himself, had been a victim of sexual abuse, had been orphaned, and had been diagnosed with mental illness—post-traumatic stress disorder and major depressive disorder. The District Court further remarked that the deferred sentence was appropriate to allow for rehabilitation and eventual expungement or, if probation were to fail, to allow for maximum public security.

¶ 8 Following Quesnel's sentencing, the State petitioned five times to revoke the deferred sentence. The District Court's ruling on the State's fifth revocation petition is now at issue. The State filed its fifth petition in October 2008, alleging that Quesnel had violated five conditions of his suspended sentence by not notifying his probation officer (PO) of his residence, traveling outside his assigned district without permission, failing to maintain regular employment, failing to attend appointments with a counselor for sex offender treatment, and having contact with people under age eighteen by being in the residence of the woman who had young children. The State later amended its petition to include an additional alleged violation by Quesnel for using methamphetamine. Quesnel admitted to all violations. The District Court sentenced Quesnel to a fifteen-year commitment to DOC, recommending placement at the Montana State Prison. The District Court further ordered Quesnel's eligibility for parole to be conditioned on his completion of sex offender treatment. Quesnel appealed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 9 We review a sentence in a criminal case for legality, to determine if the sentence is within statutory confines. State v. Burch, 2008 MT 118, ¶ 12, 342 Mont. 499, 182 P.3d 66. Because a district court's sentencing authority is defined by statute, a sentence that strays beyond the bounds of statutory authority is illegal. Burch, ¶ 12.

DISCUSSION

¶ 10 Issue 1: Whether the District Court had authority to sentence Quesnel to a fifteen-year commitment to DOC.

¶ 11 Quesnel contends that the District Court lacked authority to sentence him to a fifteen-year commitment with DOC with none suspended because § 46-18-201(3)(d)(i), MCA (2001), requires all but the first five years of any commitment to DOC to be suspended.¹ The State submits that the District Court was authorized to sentence Quesnel as it did, pursuant to § 46-18-201(3)(d)(ii), MCA (2001), which does not require suspension of any portion of a commitment to DOC.² Resolution of this dispute turns on the interactions between subsection (3)(d)(i), subsection (3)(d)(ii), and § 41-5-206, MCA.

¶ 12 Subsection (3)(d)(i) authorizes a district court to impose a sentence that includes "a commitment of ... an offender not referred to in subsection (3)(d)(ii) to the department of corrections, with a recommendation for placement in an appropriate correctional facility or program; however, all but the first 5 years of the commitment to the department of corrections must be suspended." Subsection (3)(d)(ii), however, authorizes a district court to impose a sentence that includes commitment of "a youth transferred to district court under 41-5-206 and found guilty in the district court of an offense enumerated in 41-5-206 to the department of corrections for a period determined by the court for placement in an appropriate correctional facility or program." The exemption provided by subsection (3)(d)(ii) gives a district court the flexibility to sentence a youth offender to a long term of supervision without necessarily incarcerating the youth in a state prison. State v. Strong, 2009 MT 65, ¶¶ 22-24, 349 Mont. 417, 203 P.3d 848.

¶ 13 Section 41-5-206(1), MCA, provides a procedure for a county attorney to file charges directly in district court against a youth alleged to have committed any of certain enumerated crimes. Section 41-5-206(1)(a)(i), MCA, allows a county attorney to seek leave to file an information in district court if "the youth charged was 12 years of age or older at the time of the conduct alleged to be unlawful and the unlawful act would if it had been committed by an adult constitute ... sexual intercourse without consent as defined in 45-5-503." Section 41-5-206(5)(b), MCA, allows "an offense not enumerated in § 41-5-206(1), MCA that arises during the commission of a crime enumerated in § 41-5-206(1), MCA" to be "transferred to district court with an offense enumerated in § 41-5-206(1), MCA upon motion of the county attorney and order of the district court."

¶ 14 Here, the State, in its motion for leave to file an information, declared its intention to try Quesnel, a minor at the time, as an adult in District Court under § 41-5-206(1)(a), MCA, for sexual intercourse without consent and, apparently, under § 41-5-206(5)(b), MCA, for sexual assault. Quesnel eventually pled guilty to both charges, and the District Court sentenced him to a fifteen-year commitment to DOC with no time suspended. The question before the Court is whether the District Court had authority to sentence Quesnel under subsection (3)(d)(ii), or whether, as Quesnel contends, the District Court was required to sentence him pursuant to subsection (3)(d)(i).

¶ 15 Quesnel maintains that subsection (3)(d)(i) should control (and thus that all but the first five years of his commitment to DOC should have been suspended) because he was not "transferred" to the District Court under § 41-5-206, MCA. Relying heavily on the rule of statutory interpretation that a court must give effect to the plain language of a statute, Quesnel correctly points out that subsection (3)(d)(ii) applies to "a youth transferred to district court under 41-5-206." "Transfer" denotes movement from one location to another. Black's Law Dictionary 1536 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 8th ed., West 2004). Here, however, the State filed the charges against Quesnel directly in the District Court pursuant to § 41-5-206(1), (5)(b), MCA. Accordingly, Quesnel reasons, he was not transferred (i.e., from youth court) to the District Court, so subsection (3)(d)(ii) does not apply. Therefore, subsection (3)(d)(i) applies as the default provision, and the District Court was required to suspend all save the first five years of Quesnel's commitment to DOC.

¶ 16 The flaw in Quesnel's argument is that while statutory interpretation necessarily begins with the text of the statute, it does not necessarily end there. Our ultimate goal in interpreting a statute is "to ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent." Shelby Distributors, LLC v. Mont. Dept. of Revenue, 2009 MT 80, ¶ 18, 349 Mont. 489, 206 P.3d 899. To do so, we not only...