State v. Quick

• Decision Date: 05 December 1932
• Docket Number: 13531.
• Citation: 167 S.E. 19,168 S.C. 76
• Parties: STATE v. QUICK.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

167 S.E. 19

168 S.C. 76

STATE v. QUICK.

No. 13531.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

December 5, 1932

Appeal from General Sessions Circuit Court of Marlboro County; T. S Sease, Judge.

May Quick was convicted of involuntary manslaughter, and she appeals.

Affirmed.

J. K Owens and J. J. Evans, both of Bennettsville, for appellant.

M. J Hough, Sol., of Chesterfield, and Tison & Miller, of Bennettsville, for the State.

STABLER J.

Under an indictment for the murder of one Alton Stanton, the defendant, May Quick, was found guilty of involuntary manslaughter and sentenced to imprisonment for three years.

It appears from the record that the husband of the defendant ran a small country store and filling station, a few miles south of Bennettsville, in Marlboro county. To the rear of the storeroom were two or three other rooms that were used by the Quicks as a residence. On the afternoon of March 12, 1931 the defendant and her husband visited a Mr. and Mrs. McManus in Darlington county, near Society Hill, leaving the store and filling station in charge of a young man by the name of George Moore. While at Society Hill, Quick became so intoxicated that he was unable to travel, and Mrs. McManus agreed to ride home with the defendant, who desired to return to the store and filling station that evening for the purpose of closing them for the day. On the way the McManus woman began drinking, and by the time she arrived at the Quick home was well under the influence of whisky.

Bruce Atkinson, a witness for the state, testified that about 10 or 11 o'clock on the evening in question, he, with Alton Stanton and Coke Brown, drove out from Bennettsville to the Quick filling station, where he found George Moore and a few colored people; that after he was there for a short while, the defendant, accompanied by Mrs. McManus and a man, came into the storeroom from the rear; that the McManus woman, who appeared to be drunk, became noisy and began to curse, and that the defendant told her two or three times to be quiet, but she continued to use profane language; that at the time Stanton was sitting on an ale crate, and the others were standing around and about in the storeroom; that as the McManus woman refused to quiet down, the defendant walked up to George Moore and asked him if he had a pistol; that "when she asked for the gun, I turned to Stanton and said, 'Let's go.' I didn't see her pull the gun out, but I heard a shot, and, naturally, we all tore out for the door"; that several shots were fired in rapid succession, and that when Stanton was about twenty feet from the door, he "keeled over" from a wound in his hip, which proved to be mortal; that the defendant, after those in the storeroom had gotten out, shot twice through the open door; and that the witness and Brown also received wounds. Other witnesses for the state testified, substantially, to the same effect.

The defendant, while admitting that she fired the shot that killed Stanton, testified that she did not mean to hurt any one; that she was trying to quiet the McManus woman, who was drunk, very boisterous, and using profane language; that she asked her to be quiet and to go into the rear room and lie down, but she would not do so; that defendant merely intended to shoot through the floor to scare her, but that the bullet went at such an angle through the counter as to strike Stanton and mortally wound him. Defendant also admitted that, after everybody had fled from the room except the McManus woman, she fired several shots through the open door, but testified that by doing so she did not intend to hit any one, but only to scare the McManus woman.

In response to this defense of accidental killing, the trial judge charged the jury as follows: "Where one is guilty of the want of slight care in the handling of a deadly instrumentality, that would be gross negligence, and if death result as the direct, proximate cause from that gross negligence, that would be manslaughter, involuntary manslaughter; and the law is, that while it is an unintentional killing, yet the theory of the law is that such gross negligence implies intent; and gross negligence, as I have indicated, and as it is defined to be, is the want of slight care under all of the circumstances surrounding the person whose conduct you have under investigation."

The expression, "the want of slight care is gross negligence," was used by the court several times; and after charging the appellant's tenth request, having to do with the law relating to unintentional, accidental, and excusable killing, the trial judge again used the same language; and he also charged the following in connection with the eleventh request: "I charge you that, gentlemen. I think that means that want of due care in the ordinary language of the law is not sufficient to base a verdict of involuntary manslaughter upon; there must be something more than want of ordinary care, that is, there must be want of slight care, that is, it must be gross negligence."

The appellant contends that the words, "the want of slight care is gross negligence," were misleading and "nullified the force and effect of the law providing that ordinary negligence upon the part of the defendant would not constitute manslaughter." It is urged that this expression is susceptible of two meanings; one being, upon close analysis, that a person who fails to exercise some care is guilty of gross negligence; the other, as understood by laymen and those from whom a jury is selected, that slight carelessness is gross negligence.

We are not impressed with appellant's contention. Assuming, as we must, that jurors are men of intelligence and of fair understanding, it is highly improbable that they would, as contended, construe "the want of slight care" to mean "slight carelessness," as the two expressions are directly opposed in meaning. But if appellant's contention were conceded to be true, which is not the case she has no good cause to complain, as the charge as made was more favorable to her than she was entitled to. She admitted that she shot the deceased with a pistol, a deadly weapon, but pleaded accidental homicide. The trial judge charged that, in these...