State v. Quigg

• Decision Date: 06 December 1927
• Citation: 94 Fla. 1056,114 So. 859
• Parties: STATE ex rel. PENNINGTON v. QUIGG, Chief of Police of Miami.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

114 So. 859

94 Fla. 1056

STATE ex rel. PENNINGTON v. QUIGG, Chief of Police of Miami.

Florida Supreme Court

December 6, 1927

En Banc.

Error to Circuit Court, Dade County; Paul D. Barns, Judge.

Proceeding by the State, on the relation of Clayton Pennington, for habeas corpus to be directed to H. Leslie Quigg, Chief of Police of the City of Miami. Judgment remanding the petitioner to custody, and he brings error.

Affirmed.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

Prohibition against deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process of law or denying equal protection of laws is not intended to hamper states in exercise of governmental powers unless substantial private rights are arbitrarily invaded by illegal or palpably unjust actions (Const. Fla. Declaration of Rights, § 12; Const. U.S. Amend. 14). The provisions of the organic law that no person shall be deprived of life liberty, or property without due process of law, nor denied the equal protection of the laws, are not intended to hamper the states in the discretionary exercise of any of their appropriate sovereign governmental powers, unless substantial private rights are arbitrarily invaded by illegal or palpably unjust, hostile, and oppressive exactions, burdens discriminations, or deprivations.

Property rights are subject to fair exercise of state's police power. All property rights are held and enjoyed subject to the fair exercise of the state's police power to establish regulations that are reasonably necessary to secure the general welfare of the state.

Rule requiring classifications by statutes to be reasonable refers to those affected by regulation and not merely to subject requlated; in statute affecting alike all similarly situated with reference to subject regulated, Legislature has wide discretion in selecting subjects for regulation; subject of legislative regulation may be comprehensive or restrictive where constitutional provisions are not violated. The rule requiring classifications made by statutes to be reasonable has reference to those who are affected by a regulation and not merely to the subject regulated. Where a regulation affects alike all similarly situated with reference to the subject regulated a wide discretion is accorded to the Legislature in selecting subjects for a regulation. A subject of legislative regulation may be comprehensive or restrictive where constitutional provisions are not violated.

Rights of common carriage on highways by drays, omnibusses, and taxicabs are lower in legal dignity than rights of ordinary use. All rights of common carriage on highways such as those conducted by means of drays, omnibusses, hackney coaches, and taxicabs are legislative grants or concessions, much lower in legal quality and dignity than the rights of ordinary use to which highways are incidentally subjected by citizens in travel and the prosecution of their business.

Right to use streets for conducting private business is not inherent or vested and can only be acquired by permission from city. The ordinary use of a city's streets by a citizen is an inherent right which cannot be taken from him by the city, and may only be controlled by reasonable regulation, but the right to use the streets for conducting thereon a private business is not inherent or vested, and can only be acquired by permission or license from the city whose power to withhold such premission or license is an essential and necessary prerogative of municipal government.

Legislature has wide discretion in classifying subjects of police regulation; legislative classification for police regulation will not be annulled unless wholly without reasonable or practical basis; unless statute applies to some and not to others under essentially similar conditions, making classification arbitrary and unjust, equal protection of laws is not denied. The Legislature has a wide discretion in classifying the subjects of police regulation; and a legislative classification will not be annulled by the courts unless it is wholly without a reasonable or practical basis. Unless a legislative regulation is applicable to some persons and not to others under essentially similar conditions so as to make the classification an arbitrary exercise of the powers of government that in material substance and effect unjustly discriminates between persons similarly conditioned with reference to the subject regulated, there is no denial of the equal protection of the laws.

Right to travel on highway may be regulated, but running omnibus may be wholly denied or permitted to some. The right of a citizen to travel upon the highway and transport his property thereon, in the ordinary course of life and business, differs radically and obviously from that of one who makes the highways his place of business and uses it for private gain, in the running of a stagecoach or omnibus. The former is the usual and ordinary right of a citizen, a common right, a right common to all, while the latter is special, unusual, and extraordinary. As to the former, the extent of legislative power is that of regulation; but, as to the latter, its power is broader. The right may be wholly denied, or it may be permitted to some and denied to others, because of its extraordinary nature.

Title of act, fairly giving notice of subject reasonably leading to inquiry into body of bill, is sufficient; title of statute need not be index to its contents. If the title to the act fairly gives notice of the subject of the act, so as reasonably to lead to an inquiry into the body of the bill, it is all that is necessary. The title need not be an index to the contents of the bill or act.

'Jitney bus' is common carrier subject to governmental regulation. 'Jitney bus' is motor-driven trackless vehicle operated over certain routes between two or more particular points or places, carring passengers for hire and reward to and from terminal points and intermediate points, and such vehicles are common carriers subject to appropriate governmental regulations.

Ordinance prohibiting granting permits for operation of motorbusses in congested district held valid exercise of police power (Sp. Acts 1925, c. 10847, § 3, subpar. [hh]). City ordinance, prohibiting granting permits for operation of motorbusses in congested district, enacted pursuant to Sp. Acts 1925, c. 10847, § 3, subpar. (hh), held valid exercise of city's police power.

Title of ordinance mentioning regulating may also include power to prohibit use of regulated instrumentality. City ordinance, title of which mentions regulating, may include power to prohibit use of regulated instrumentality within stated limits.

Legislature could delegate power to city of Miami to license and regulate traffic on streets (Const. art. 8, § 8; Sp. Acts 1925, c. 10847, § 3, subpar. [hh]). Under Const. art. 8, § 8, Legislature had power to enact Sp. Acts 1925, c. 10847, § 3, subpar. (hh), delegating to city of Miami power to license and regulate traffic on streets.

COUNSEL A. Aronovitz and A. H. Furr, both of Miami, for plaintiff in error.

Fred H. Davis, Atty. Gen., and Roy Campbell, Asst. Atty. Gen., John W. Watson, Jr., and Loftin, Stokes & Calkins, all of Miami, for defendant in error.

OPINION

BUFORD J.

This is a writ of error to a judgment pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus remanding the petitioner in the court below, the plaintiff in error here, to the custody of the chief of police of the city of Miami, Fla.

Pennington was charged with violation of city ordinance No. 700, and especially with having violated the provisions of section 5 of the said ordinance.

Section 5 of this ordinance is as follows:

'Sec. 5. That there is hereby designated as a congested area that portion of the downtown zone as defined in article 1, section 4, of Traffic Regulations of the City of Miami, Florida, established April 1st, 1926, bounded on the south by Southwest Third street and Southeast Third street, on the north by Northwest Fifth street and Northeast Fifth street, on the West by Northwest Second avenue and Southwest Second avenue and on the east by Northeast Second avenue and Southeast Second Avenue, which congested area includes the above-mentioned streets and avenues. No permit shall be issued for a motor vehicle commonly known as a 'jitney' or for any motor vehicle having a rated seating capacity of less than fifteen passengers to operate within said congested area or upon any street within said congested area.'

The ordinance was enacted under authority of the provisions of the City Charter as contained in section 3, subparagraph (hh) of chapter 10847, Laws of Florida, Special Acts of the Legislature of 1925, which is as follows:

Section 3.

'The city of Miami shall have power:

* * *

'To license, control, tax and regulate traffic and sales upon the streets, sidewalks and public places within the city and the use of space in such places and to regulate, suppress and prohibit hawkers and peddlers and beggars upon such streets sidewalks and public places; and to license, and cause to be registered and control, tax, regulate, or to prohibit in designated streets, or parts of streets, carriages, omnibusses, motorbusses, cars, wagons, drays, jitney busses and other vehicles; and to license, tax, and cause to be registered and control the drivers thereof and to fix the rate to be charged for the carriage of persons and property within the city and to the public works beyond the limits of said city; and to authorize the city manager, or the chief of police to make and promulgate regulations for traffic on the streets, or parts of the streets, during such hours as may be necessary or convenient, and to provide for parking spaces on the streets, and to at any time discontinue the right...