State v. Quilling
| Decision Date | 09 March 1953 |
| Docket Number | No. 43317,43317 |
| Citation | 363 Mo. 1016,256 S.W.2d 751 |
| Parties | STATE v. QUILLING. |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Kenneth K. Simon, Kansas City, for appellant.
J. E. Taylor, Atty. Gen., John S. Phillips, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.
Ulas Quilling was tried for the murder of Lauvenia Julia Webb, convicted, and sentenced to the extreme penalty in accordance with the verdict. He has appealed, assigning as errors: (1) That the court should have directed a verdict of not guilty 'by reason of insanity;' (2) Improper admission of evidence; (3) Failure to instruct upon all questions of law arising in the case; (4) Prejudicial argument by the prosecutor; (5) Improper consideration by the jury of parole practices; and (6) Arbitrary rejection by the jury of opinion evidence. Under these assignments it is unnecessary to make an extended statement of the facts, their sufficiency to support the verdict not being challenged otherwise than under point (1). As will presently be seen, the latter is limited to the question of whether, on the issue of insanity, the opinion of a psychiatrist (called on the part of Quilling, and the sole expert on that issue) was binding and conclusive so as to require that the court direct a verdict of acquittal, as requested.
Appellant (to whom we shall refer as defendant) together with the other principals and most of the witnesses (police officers and physicians excepted) were Negroes. Lauvenia, the deceased, whom defendant admitted having shot and killed, was his paramour. The killing occurred in the early morning hours of May 19, 1951, and climaxed a night of drinking, in which defendant, deceased and a number of others participated at the apartment of Roy Johnson at 1100 Paseo in Kansas City. Among those present at the drinking party was Lauvenia's friend and associate, Irene Bragg. The evidence showed that defendant went to the Johnson apartment about 9 p. m., May 18, and, after first showing some reluctance 'to join the party' (apparently because Lauvenia had somewhat 'slacked off' their relationship, to his displeasure), did later begin drinking, and by his own admission bought nine quarts of beer while there. He sought to persuade Lauvenia to go to their home (they had been living together), but she declined, and suggested the next evening as an alternative. From defendant's confession it appears that while still at the party, and at about 2:30 a. m., he She had told him she was going in a cab. It is not clear whether, upon returning about 5 minutes later, defendant re-entered the Johnson apartment, or whether he waited outside until Lauvenia and Irene came out onto the sidewalk, as they did, in answer to the honking of a car or taxi driven by the state's witness Hudspeth in which Carl Dobbs was a passenger, which car had just driven up and double-parked in front of 1100 Paseo. Irene got into the car, but defendant took hold of Lauvenia's arm and told her not to, but 'to come on home.' She started to comply, then apparently changed her mind and started back to the car, and when she did so, defendant shot her in the abdomen, from the effects of which she died shortly after arrival at the hospital to which she was immediately taken. It was developed, as a part of the res gestae, that defendant also shot and killed both Irene Bragg and Carl Dobbs at the same time and place. His defenses were self-defense and insanity. Other facts will be stated in connection with the points to which they relate.
The contention that the court should have directed a verdict of not guilty 'by reason of insanity' grows out of the testimony of an admittedly qualified psychiatrist (called by defendant), who gave it as his opinion, based upon a psychiatric examination (the details of which were enumerated), that defendant was of the mental age of between 6 and 9 years, and that because of his psychosis, defendant did not understand right from wrong. The essence of the contention is that in the absence of countervailing expert testimony (and admittedly there was none), the opinion evidence of the psychiatrist was conclusive on the insanity issue, and entitled defendant to a directed verdict of not guilty. We have been cited to no authorities so holding, either here or elsewhere, nor have we been able to find any. The rules governing opinion and expert testimony are the same in criminal cases as in civil. And the settled doctrine is that 'the testimony of experts is to be considered like any other testimony, is to be tried by the same tests, and receive just so much weight and credit as the jury may deem it entitled to when viewed in connection with all the circumstances * * *.' Scanlon v. Kansas City, 325 Mo. 125, 150, 28 S.W.2d 84, 95. The rule is not different even though expert evidence be uncontradicted. For example, see State v. Stapp, 246 Mo. 338, 340, 151 S.W. 971, 972-973, an abortion case, where it was said: ' (Emphasis supplied.) See, also, State v. Recke, 311 Mo. 581, 595, 278 S.W. 995, 999; State v. Liolios, 285 Mo. 1, 225 S.W. 941; Hall v. Mercantile Trust Co., 332 Mo. 802, 820, 59 S.W.2d 664, 672; 32 C.J.S., Evidence, Sec. 569(h); 20 Am.Jur., Evidence Sec. 1208.
On the related point that the jury arbitrarily rejected the opinion evidence in question, for which reason the court should have granted a new trial, it is sufficient to add this to what has already been said: That the court and jurors had an opportunity to observe defendant's conduct and demeanor throughout a two-day trial. The transcript of his examination covers more than 40 pages, thus indicating he was on the witness stand for perhaps an hour and a half. In addition to the defendant's 5-page written confession, made at 9 a. m., May 19, a wire recording of a statement made by him to the police about 2 p. m., on the same day was 'played back.' These were matters having a marked tendency to throw light on the insanity issue, and so the jury had a right to consider them in determining that issue; and if found to outweigh the opinion evidence, it was within the jury's province to reject the latter. In this situation, it cannot be said that the error complained of has been made to appear.
The assignments complaining of the improper admission of evidence are directed principally to defendant's written...
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