State v. Quinn

Decision Date07 January 2005
Docket NumberNo. 03-1643.,03-1643.
Citation691 N.W.2d 403
PartiesSTATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Ryan Patrick QUINN, Appellant.
CourtIowa Supreme Court

J.E. Tobey III, Davenport, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Sharon K. Hall, Assistant Attorney General, William E. Davis, County Attorney, and Alan R. Havercamp, Julie A. Walton, and Marc Gellerman, Assistant County Attorneys, for appellee.

LAVORATO, Chief Justice.

The defendant, Ryan Patrick Quinn, appeals from a judgment of conviction and sentence in a bench trial for attempting to entice away a minor in violation of Iowa Code section 710.10(3) (2003). He contends, among other things, that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. He also contends that the inference permitted in Iowa Code section 710.10(4) violates free speech as guaranteed by the First Amendment. We conclude there was sufficient evidence to support his conviction. However, because the district court, in reaching its verdict, applied a statutory inference that is unconstitutional, we must reverse the judgment of conviction and sentence and remand the case for further proceedings.

I. Background Facts.

Sometime late in the afternoon of April 22, 2003, Karis Agnew, an eight-year-old second-grader, was riding her bike on the sidewalk across from her house. Karis lived in a residential neighborhood with her mother and father. Her father, Ron Agnew, gave Karis permission to ride her bike that day while he was working on his motorcycle in his garage. He had the garage door open so he could keep an eye on Karis.

Shortly after Karis began riding her bike, she saw a brown car with a dark brown stripe drive by. The driver said "hi" to her. The driver turned the car around and then pulled into a driveway, blocking Karis's path on the sidewalk. The driver spoke to Karis through his open window, but did not open the car door. He said to her, "come over here" and gestured with his index finger to come over. Karis thought the driver indicated that he wanted her to "come over in the car — into the car, go into the car." The driver did not offer anything to Karis. Karis then screamed, "Dad."

Ron heard the scream, and father and daughter ran to each other. Ron saw a brown hatchback pull out of the driveway and drive away. Karis "was in hysterics, screaming and crying." She tried to tell her father what had happened, but he could not understand her because she was crying so much and was scared.

Helen, Karis's mother and Ron's wife, arrived home shortly after the incident at which point Ron called the police. Police Chief David Kopatich of the city of Walcott arrived on the scene within minutes of the call. Ron and Karis described what had happened.

At the request of Chief Kopatich, Police Officer Kevin Takacs also responded to Ron's call; Officer Takacs searched the area, looking for a car that matched the Agnews' description but did not find it in the area. Approximately forty-five minutes after the incident, the police had a suspect — Ryan Patrick Quinn. Officer Takacs went to Quinn's home in Davenport and waited for him. Quinn arrived about thirty minutes later. Officer Takacs spoke with Quinn and then contacted Chief Kopatich, who came to Quinn's residence. Chief Kopatich photographed Quinn's vehicle, which matched the Agnews' description.

Quinn told the officers that he had been in Walcott earlier, he turned around in a residential neighborhood, and said "hi" to a little girl. Quinn agreed to speak with the officers at the Walcott police department where Chief Kopatich took photographs of him.

At the police department, Quinn described his activities for the day. He went to a dental appointment and played golf in Iowa City. On his way home, he stopped in Durant for cigarettes. As he was driving, he threw a cigarette out the window, feared it blew into the backseat, so he stopped in Walcott to check on it. He said "hi" to a little girl, backed out of a driveway, and left the area. He heard a girl scream, but did not know what was going on.

Chief Kopatich told Quinn he did not believe the story at which point Quinn became defiant, insisting that he had told the truth. Chief Kopatich then had Quinn put in writing what he had just told the officer. After he signed the written statement, Quinn signed a Miranda rights waiver. Following that, Chief Kopatich left Quinn with Officer Takacs and an officer from the Durant police department.

The latter three again discussed what had happened. At trial, Officer Takacs testified that after Chief Kopatich left the room, he and Quinn had more conversation. He further testified that Quinn said the little girl was smiling and looked to be having a good time, that as soon as he made eye contact, she became scared, and "the look on her face was like she could read my mind like she knew what I wanted to do to her later."

According to Officer Takacs, the conversation continued during which Quinn said he would go out, drive around at random, and make some kind of eye contact with a female and such contact was enough stimulation for him to go home, take a nice hot shower, and masturbate. Officer Takacs further testified that Quinn said he usually preferred girls fourteen and sixteen years of age because girls his age made fun of him and that he had had only two sex partners in his life.

At Chief Kopatich's request, Quinn signed a second written statement. In this statement, Quinn stated that he would never try to pick up a girl, never has, and never wanted to. He craves only eye contact from girls; he thinks about the eye contact when he takes a shower and masturbates.

The next day Ron identified Quinn's car from photographs taken by the police. Karis identified both Quinn's car and Quinn from the photographs. At trial, Ron testified that he did not know Quinn, and Quinn did not have permission to talk to his daughter.

II. Proceedings.

The State charged Quinn with attempting to entice away a minor under sixteen years of age, an aggravated misdemeanor, in violation of Iowa Code section 710.10(3). Later, Quinn filed a motion for a bill of particulars and a motion to dismiss, contending that the minutes of testimony lacked evidence to support the statutory requirement that he was attempting to entice away or attempting to commit an illegal act upon a minor. The district court denied the motions.

Shortly before trial, Quinn filed a motion for adjudication of law points and objection to application of evidentiary instruction. In the motion, Quinn contended that the inference permitted by Iowa Code section 710.10(4) (providing that an intent to commit a violation of section 710.10 "may be inferred when the person is not known to the person being enticed away and the person does not have the permission of the parent, guardian, or custodian to contact the person being enticed away") violated his constitutional rights. More specifically, Quinn alleged that the language of section 710.10(4) violated his "rights as incorporated under due process within the context of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, to-wit: Freedom of Speech and Assembly." He also contended that the language of section 710.10(4) was overbroad on its face and as applied because the inference establishes all elements of the offense charged.

The court indicated that it would rule on the motion in its written ruling following the bench trial. Before this, Quinn had waived his right to trial by jury. Quinn also renewed his motion for bill of particulars and motion to dismiss, motions the court noted had been previously denied.

At trial, the court heard testimony from Ron, Karis, Chief Kopatich, and Officer Takacs. At the end of the State's case, Quinn moved for judgment of acquittal and renewed his motion for bill of particulars and motion to dismiss. The court denied the motions. Quinn rested without presenting any evidence.

Later, the district court issued its findings of fact and conclusions of law, finding Quinn guilty as charged. In its ruling, the court concluded:

The defendant has objected to the application of [Iowa Code section 710.10(4)] on the basis that it violates the due process clause of the constitution because it permits a finding of guilt without the facts to support such a finding.
The Court disagrees with the defendant's argument in this regard, so long as the inference is limited to defendant's specific intent to commit the crime. What a person intends is seldom capable of direct proof. Therefore, an inference of specific intent would be appropriate after considering all the facts and circumstances surrounding the incident.

The court then made this significant finding:

The deciding factor in this case is the uncontroverted statement given to Officer Kevin Takacs by the defendant describing the victim's smiling face that quickly changed as if she knew what he wanted to do to her later. To the Court in this case it can be inferred that he had in mind taking her in furtherance of his sexual attraction to young girls.

Following this ruling, Quinn filed a motion for new trial on several grounds, one of which is most significant here: The verdict is contrary to law or evidence. See Iowa R.Crim. P. 2.24(2)(b)(6). Among other things, Quinn argued in his motion that the inference the court used was improper and the court failed to properly address his constitutional arguments. The court denied the motion, stating, among other things, that it did not agree with the constitutional arguments made. Later, the court sentenced Quinn following which Quinn appealed.

III. Issues.

Among the issues Quinn raises, we consider two: (1) Was the evidence sufficient to sustain the guilty verdict? (2) Does the provision for inference of guilt in Iowa Code section 710.10(4) impermissibly infringe upon Quinn's First Amendment rights?

IV. Scope of Review.

We review sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims for correction of errors at law....

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