State v. Quinsanna D., No. 02-1919
Decision Date | 26 November 2002 |
Docket Number | No. 02-1919, No. 02-1920. |
Citation | 259 Wis.2d 429,655 N.W.2d 752,2002 WI App 318 |
Parties | IN RE the TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS TO TEYON D., a Person Under the Age of 18: STATE of Wisconsin, Petitioner-Respondent, v. QUINSANNA D., Respondent-Appellant. IN RE the TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS TO KEYON D., a Person Under the Age of 18: STATE of Wisconsin, Petitioner-Respondent, v. QUINSANNA D., Respondent-Appellant. |
Court | Wisconsin Court of Appeals |
On behalf of the respondent-appellant, the cause was submitted on the briefs of Carl W. Chesshir, of Milwaukee.
On behalf of the petitioner-respondent, the cause was submitted on the brief of Thomas Binger, assistant district attorney, and E. Michael McCann, district attorney, of Milwaukee.
Before Fine, Schudson and Curley, JJ.
¶ 1.
Quinsanna D. appeals from the order for termination of her parental rights under WIS. STAT. § 48.415(6)2 for failure to assume parental responsibility for her twin sons, Keyon and Teyon, following a jury trial and a dispositional hearing. She argues that at her trial, where the issue was whether she had failed to establish a substantial parental relationship with her twins, the trial court erred in: (1) admitting evidence of her criminal offenses and sentences; and (2) entering a finding, based on the jury verdicts, that she had failed to assume parental responsibility for Keyon and Teyon where, she contends, the verdicts were perverse because undisputed evidence established that she had had a substantial relationship with the twins during their first two years of life.
¶ 2. Quinsanna also argues that the trial court lost competency to conduct the dispositional hearing because it adjourned the hearing for more than forty-five days following the verdicts without finding good cause for the continuance. She contends that the adjournment violated WIS. STAT. §§ 48.424(4) and 48.315(2).3
¶ 3. We conclude that the court correctly exercised discretion in determining that Quinsanna's criminal offenses and sentences were relevant to whether she had failed to establish a substantial parental relationship with Keyon and Teyon. We also conclude that the verdicts were not perverse and, therefore, that the trial court correctly entered the finding that Quinsanna failed to assume parental responsibility for the twins, based on the jury verdicts. Finally, we conclude that although the trial court did not explicitly find good cause to adjourn disposition for more than forty-five days following the verdicts, the parties' agreement to do so, together with the circumstances reflected in the record, established good cause for the continuance. Accordingly, we affirm.
¶ 4. On October 23, 1992, Quinsanna gave birth to Keyon and Teyon. On November 1, 1994, the twins were removed from Quinsanna's care following a police raid at her residence where, in the bedroom with Quinsanna and the twins, police found marijuana, ammunition, a large amount of cash, and other drug-dealing paraphernalia. Elsewhere in the residence, which Quinsanna shared with her boyfriend, police also found cocaine and additional drug-dealing materials. Quinsanna later admitted that she was a marijuana user and that she knew her boyfriend was a drug dealer.
¶ 5. As a result of the November 1 raid, Quinsanna was arrested and ultimately convicted of possession of marijuana, possession of cocaine, and keeping a drug house. She was placed on probation.
¶ 6. On February 20, 1995, the twins were found to be in need of protection or services and were placed outside the parental home; they have continued under juvenile court jurisdiction, living in foster care ever since.
¶ 7. On November 12, 1995, approximately one year after the raid on her residence and while she was on probation for the drug offenses, Quinsanna was arrested for altering customers' checks and stealing money from the grocery store where she worked. She admitted that she had done so to support her drug use and, on January 5, 1996, she pled guilty to theft. She was sentenced to thirty days in the House of Corrections.
¶ 8. About five months later, on June 3, 1996, Quinsanna was arrested again. She gave police a false name because she knew of a warrant for her arrest for a probation violation. She was convicted of obstructing an officer and sentenced to sixty days, concurrent with six months she received following revocation of her probation. Thus, from approximately June to December, 1996, Quinsanna was incarcerated.
¶ 9. On January 23, 2001, the State petitioned for termination of Quinsanna's parental rights to Keyon and Teyon and, in an amended petition filed seven months later, alleged that Quinsanna had failed to assume parental responsibility for them, under WIS. STAT. § 48.415(6).
¶ 10. At a pre-trial hearing, the State indicated its intention to introduce evidence of Quinsanna's criminal record—for possession of marijuana, possession of cocaine, keeping a drug house, theft, and obstructing an officer, between 1994 and 1996. The State specified that it was not seeking to introduce the mere fact and number of convictions for purposes of credibility-impeachment, see WIS. STAT. § 906.09,4 but rather, that it intended to offer "the substance" of her offenses and sentences as "direct evidence of [Quinsanna's] failure to assume parental responsibility." At the pre-trial hearing, the prosecutor argued:
¶ 11. Defense counsel objected, arguing both that the evidence was irrelevant to whether Quinsanna had failed to assume parental responsibility, and that, even if relevant, the evidence was "too prejudicial" or "just too highly prejudicial" because of "a danger . . . that a jury . . . sees somebody as a convicted felon . . . and will want to punish her . . . instead of . . . seeing what kind of mother she was overall to these kids."
¶ 12. The trial court, agreeing that the substance of Quinsanna's convictions was not being offered "in regard to [Quinsanna's] credibility," concluded that the admissibility of the evidence was not governed by WIS. STAT. § 906.09. See WIS. STAT. § 906.09(1) ( ). The court also concluded that the evidence was not governed by WIS. STAT. § 904.04,5 because, the court said, it was not being offered "to establish bad character and acting in conformity with that bad character." ¶ 13. Instead, the trial court concluded that the evidence was governed by WIS. STAT. §§ 904.01, 904.02, and 904.03.6 Reasoning that the information "clearly" was relevant, the court first commented that "[t]he drug-related offense[s] establish[] that [Quinsanna] wasn't fulfilling her daily parental responsibilities to these children during that period of time that she was incarcerated and it establishes why she was not doing it." The court concluded that, under what it viewed as the "strongly suggestive" language of L.K. v. B.B., 113 Wis. 2d 429, 335 N.W.2d 846 (1983), and Ann M.M. v. Rob S., 176 Wis. 2d 673, 500 N.W.2d 649 (1993), "not only [is] the fact that the parent is not fulfilling . . . parental responsibility on a day-to-day basis" relevant, but "the whys of why" the parent is not doing so is germane. Further, the court explained:
¶ 14. The trial court then struggled with the issue of whether the probative value of the evidence would be substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, under WIS. STAT. § 904.03. While acknowledging that a jury could be inflamed by information of "all of this...
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