State v. Quiroz
| Decision Date | 06 March 1980 |
| Docket Number | No. 4464,4464 |
| Citation | 94 N.M. 517,1980 NMCA 39,612 P.2d 1328 |
| Parties | STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Ralph QUIROZ, aka, Juan Rafael Carrasco Quiroz, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of New Mexico |
On January 19, 1977, the grand jury of Chaves County returned an indictment against the defendant charging trafficking in a controlled substance heroin. Prior to the return of that indictment, defendant was convicted of an unrelated federal offense and was incarcerated in the Federal Correctional Center at La Tuna, Texas.
Subsequently, the State of New Mexico filed a detainer against the defendant. At no time did the defendant exercise his right to request final disposition as is provided for in Article 3(A) of the Agreement on Detainers, § 31-5-12, N.M.S.A.1978, which states in part:
Article 3 Prisoner's Request for Final Disposition
A. Whenever a person has entered upon a term of imprisonment in a penal or correctional institution of a party state, and whenever during the continuance of the term of imprisonment there is pending in any other party state any untried indictment, information or complaint on the basis of which a detainer has been lodged against the prisoner, he shall be brought to trial within one hundred eighty days after he has caused to be delivered to prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of the prosecuting officer's jurisdiction written notice of the place of his imprisonment and his request for a final disposition . . . . On March 15, 1979, the State of New Mexico filed a request for temporary custody pursuant to the Agreement on Detainers to have the defendant tried in Chaves County. After a hearing at the Federal Correctional facility at La Tuna, the federal authorities honored the requests for temporary custody and the defendant arrived in Chaves County on June 19, 1979. On July 3, 1979, the federal authorities at La Tuna informed New Mexico authorities that the Bureau of Prisons would not want the defendant after September 24, 1979. On September 27, 1979, New Mexico set bail for the defendant at $5,000.00.
Trial was set for December 19, 1979, which date would have been timely under New Mexico's six-month rule (N.M.R. Crim. P. 37, N.M.S.A. 1978), but not within the time required by the Agreement on Detainers. On the day scheduled for trial defendant moved for dismissal of the indictment under N.M.R. Crim. P. 37 for the district courts in New Mexico, under Article 4(C) of the Agreement on Detainers and under his federal speedy trial right. Article 4(C) states in part:
Article 4 Prosecutor's Request for Final Disposition
C. In respect of any proceeding made possible by this article, trial shall be commenced within one hundred twenty days of the arrival of the prisoner in the receiving state, but for good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance.
The motion to dismiss was granted. The State appeals and we reverse.
The defendant concedes that the provisions of the Agreement on Detainers do not specifically address the facts in this case. This case presents issues of first impression in New Mexico. Furthermore, we have found no case with identical facts in other jurisdictions. Commonwealth v. Merlo, 364 A.2d 391 (Pa.Super.1976) is the most similar case uncovered by our research. In Merlo the defendant was in federal custody when a request for temporary custody was lodged and honored on August 28, 1974. Trials scheduled in Philadelphia for September were postponed and, because the defendant's federal sentence was due to expire in October, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania decided to return the defendant to the federal authorities and proceed with trials after his release from federal custody.
The defendant was released from federal custody on October 24, 1974, and voluntarily returned to Philadelphia for trial. His claims that the indictments against him should be dismissed were denied at the trial court. The lower court concluded that because the defendant was released from federal custody before one hundred twenty days of his original arrival in the receiving state, the Agreement on Detainers was no longer applicable.
On appeal, however, the Superior Court agreed that once defendant was released from federal custody the Agreement on Detainers was no longer pertinent, but held that the violation occurred prior to defendant's release when defendant was returned to the federal correctional facility untried on the indictments after Philadelphia had obtained temporary custody under the Agreement on Detainers.
The holding in Commonwealth v. Merlo, supra, is simply a holding that the Agreement on Detainers requires the indictments in the receiving state be dismissed when the prisoner charged is returned untried to the sending state. Accord, Hughes v. District Court in and for City, etc., 593 P.2d 702 (Colo.1979). Nevertheless, in Merlo we likewise find verbalization of the sound principle that when a sending state absolutely releases a prisoner within the one hundred twenty days of his arrival in the receiving state, provisions of the Agreement on Detainers cease to be pertinent.
We recognize that the remedial nature of the Agreement on Detainers required that it should be construed liberally in favor of the detainee. See Nelms v. State, 532 S.W.2d 923 (Tenn.1976). However, the Agreement has as its objective the eradication of "uncertainties which obstruct programs of prisoner treatment and rehabilitation." Agreement on Detainers, Article 1; United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 98 S.Ct. 1834, 56 L.Ed.2d 329 (1978); Commonwealth v. Fisher, 451 Pa. 102, 301 A.2d 605 (1973). But when a prisoner is discharged by a sending state, his treatment and rehabilitation in that state is ended and the purpose of the Agreement loses significance. Thus, a rule cannot be justified when the reason for that rule is no longer valid. See Flores v. Flores, 84 N.M. 601, 506 P.2d 345 (1973).
When the defendant in this case was discharged by the federal authorities before he was required to be tried under the terms of the Agreement on Detainers, defendant could...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Marshall v. Superior Court
...from serving the balance of their sentences....' " (Hearn v. State (Utah 1982) 642 P.2d 757, 759; see also State v. Quiroz (N.M.App.1980) 612 P.2d 1328, 1331, 94 N.M. 517.) The courts, mindful of the purposes of the Agreement, have refused to extend the Agreement's sanction of dismissal to ......
-
State v. Tarango
...by a sending state, the purpose of the IAD loses significance and defendant can no longer rely on its provisions. State v. Quiroz, 94 N.M. 517, 612 P.2d 1328 (Ct.App.1980). The IAD only applies to individuals while they are serving a prison term. State v. Thompson, 19 Ohio App.3d 261, 483 N......
-
State v. Smith, 13422
...v. Wolff, supra. The agreement is to be construed in favor of the prisoner. State ex rel. Hammett v. McKenzie, supra; State v. Quiroz, 94 N.M. 517, 612 P.2d 1328 (1980); Commonwealth v. Gregg, 470 Pa. 323, 368 A.2d 651 (1977). The agreement is to be construed in harmony with the Uniform Man......
-
State v. Holley
... ... loses significance. Hence, the I.A.D. cannot be justified when the reason for it ... is no longer valid. Oxendine, 58 Md.App. at 598, 473 A.2d 1311, quoting State v. Quiroz, 94 N.M. 517, 612 P.2d 1328, 1331 (Ct.App.1980). When appellee was released from prison upon the expiration of his term, "he stepped out from under the protective umbrella" of the I.A.D. and "stood in the same position as any other accused." Oxendine, 58 Md.App. at 597, 473 A.2d 1311 ... ...