State v. R.I. Bhd. of Corr. Officers, 2011–99–Appeal.

• Decision Date: 25 April 2013
• Docket Number: No. 2011–99–Appeal.,2011–99–Appeal.
• Citation: 64 A.3d 734
• Parties: STATE of Rhode Island, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS v. RHODE ISLAND BROTHERHOOD OF CORRECTIONAL OFFICERS.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

64 A.3d 734

STATE of Rhode Island, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

v.RHODE ISLAND BROTHERHOOD OF CORRECTIONAL OFFICERS.

No. 2011–99–Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

April 25, 2013.

Kathleen M. Kelly, Office of Legal Counsel Department of Corrections, for Plaintiff.

Carly Beauvais Iafrate, Esq., for Defendant.

Present: SUTTELL, C.J., GOLDBERG, FLAHERTY, ROBINSON, and INDEGLIA, JJ.

OPINION

Justice INDEGLIA, for the Court.

The Rhode Island Department of Corrections (the DOC) is charged with “the custody, care, discipline, training, treatment, and study of persons committed to state correctional institutions or on probation or parole * * *.” SeeG.L.1956 § 42–56–1(b). The Rhode Island Brotherhood of Correctional Officers (the union) is the certified bargaining unit for correctional officers and certain other DOC employees. The parties' dispute stems from the DOC's proposal to modify the weapons qualification component of the training program for correctional officers. The union filed a grievance, arguing that the training program could not be modified without the approval of a training committee that had been created under the parties' collective bargaining agreement (the CBA). An arbitrator agreed and ruled in the union's favor. After the Superior Court confirmed the arbitration award, the DOC sought redress before this Court. For the reasons stated below, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.

IFacts and Travel

The CBA, which was in effect at all times relevant to this appeal, contains several provisions that are central to the parties' dispute. One of those provisions is Article XXXI, section 31.1, which requires the DOC to “offer a minimum of forty (40) hours per year of training to all uniformed Correctional Officers.” Section 31.2 creates a training committee. Composed of two representatives of the DOC and two representatives of the union, it is charged with “submit[ting] a comprehensive program pertinent to the training of Correctional Officers * * *.”

Another key provision of the CBA relates to weapons qualification.¹ Section 31.3 states that “[e]mployees who are required to engage in a weapons qualification shall do so on [s]tate time.” Furthermore, it provides that “[t]he time frame for qualifying shall be one (1) year from the date of the officer's last qualification * * *.” This litigation, and the arbitration that preceded it, centers on the DOC's statutory and contractual obligations regarding weapons qualification.

In 1959, the General Assembly enacted a statute that required law enforcement officers in Rhode Island to undergo weapons qualification prior to their appointment. G.L.1956 § 11–47–17, as enacted by P.L. 1959, ch. 75, § 1. The statute also required law enforcement officers to “repeat this qualification at periods of not more than one year.” Id. In 2007, § 11–47–17 was amended to provide that “correctional officers * * * must repeat [weapons] qualification every two (2) years.” ² P.L.2007, ch. 73, art. 3, § 15.

After the Legislature amended § 11–47–17, the DOC intended to conduct live, on-range weapons qualification every two years, instead of annually, as it had done in the past. For the years in which it would not conduct live weapons training, the DOC purchased a computer system, known as Prism, for simulated weapons training. It then sought the training committee's approval to implement this system. At a meeting of the training committee held on March 12, 2008, one of the union's representatives stated that the union was opposed to the use of the Prism system. Two days later, at another training committee meeting, the same union representative reiterated this stance. The meeting minutes from March 14, 2008, reflect that both the DOC and the union intended to consult with counsel regarding the impasse on this issue.³ The matter then proceeded to arbitration.

An arbitrator heard the grievance on May 28, 2008; both parties were represented by counsel. In a written decision submitted on June 13, 2008, the arbitrator ruled in the union's favor. He framed the issue before him as follows: “Would it violate the [CBA] for the [DOC] to change the weapons qualification component of the * * * in-service training program if a majority of the [t]raining [c]ommittee has not adopted that change?”

Relying on previous arbitration decisions, he first decided that the grievance was arbitrable. He characterized the dispute before him as one “involv[ing] the interpretation and application of [section] 31.2”—the training committee provision of the CBA. In his view, the dispute “[fell] squarely within the definition of an arbitrable grievance under [s]ection 18.3 [of Article XVIII] of the [CBA].” ⁴ He also rejected the DOC's argument that § 42–56–10(14) gave its director the non-delegable (and therefore non-arbitrable) right to control training.⁵ Additionally, he found that a recent amendment to that statute supported his conclusion that the dispute was arbitrable. ⁶

The arbitrator then considered the merits of the union's grievance. He explained that the effect of a deadlock among the members of the training committee had already been settled by prior arbitration awards between the parties. Quoting a 2004 decision of Arbitrator Boulanger, he stated that “[i]f the [t]raining [c]ommittee deadlocks * * * the disputed training component does not change.” He dismissed the DOC's contention that it was statutorily obligated to discontinue annual weapons qualification and therefore had to implement the Prism system to meet its contractual obligation to provide forty annual hours of training to correctional officers. The arbitrator found that, although the amendment to § 11–47–17 eliminated the DOC's obligation to conduct annual weapons qualification, it did not preclude the DOC from doing so.

The arbitrator also considered the DOC's claimed fiscal inability to pay for live, on-range weapons qualification. He found that, “under the reasoning of [Arbitrator Boulanger's 2004 decision], the [DOC] was aware [that] it was contractually obligated to continue the existing weapons qualification component of the in-service training program until the [t]raining [c]ommittee adopted an alternative * * *.” The DOC, he wrote, “could have planned for the contingency that a majority of the [t]raining [c]ommittee would be unable to agree to an alternative.” The arbitrator concluded that, despite the DOC's “difficult fiscal picture,” he could not ignore the plain language of the CBA, which required annual on-range weapons qualification.

Finally, the arbitrator rejected the DOC's assertion that it would be unable to satisfy the CBA's requirement that it offer forty hours of annual training to correctional officers (per section 31.1) unless it were allowed to implement the Prism system in lieu of on-range weapons qualification. Because Arbitrator Boulanger's 2004 decision (which the DOC did not appeal) had made it clear that the status quo would be preserved if the training committee deadlocked, he “conclude[d] that the [DOC could] not change the content of the in-service training program, including the weapons qualification component, unless a majority of the [t]raining [c]ommittee first adopt[ed] that change.” The DOC, he found, could meet the forty-hour requirement by conducting annual on-range weapons qualification, as it had in previous years.

On August 20, 2008, the DOC filed a petition in the Superior Court seeking to vacate, or, in the alternative, modify, the arbitration award, pursuant to G.L.1956 §§ 28–9–18(a) and 28–9–20. The union responded on September 8, 2008, by filing a motion to confirm the arbitration award, pursuant to § 28–9–17. The parties then filed memoranda in support of their respective positions.

The DOC characterized the parties' dispute as “outside the purview of the arbitrator's jurisdiction.” In the DOC's view, § 11–47–17 set forth a clear employment requirement that correctional officers undergo weapons qualification every two years. Citing to a prior decision of this Court, it asserted that this statutory requirement directly conflicted with the CBA provision regarding weapons qualification and, therefore, could not be arbitrated. See State (Department of Administration) v. Rhode Island Council 94, A.F.S.C.M.E., AFL–CIO, Local 2409, 925 A.2d 939, 945 (R.I.2007) (“[A] valid employment requirement prescribed by state law cannot be negotiated and is not a proper subject for arbitration.” quoting Town of West Warwick v. Local 2045, Council 94, 714 A.2d 611, 612 (R.I.1998) (mem.)). The DOC also claimed that its director had a statutory duty to train correctional officers that was non-delegable and therefore non-arbitrable. Furthermore, it contended that § 42–56–10(24) did not preclude the court from vacating the arbitration award. It argued that the union's interpretation of that statute violated the principle of separation of powers and was therefore unconstitutional.

In opposition, the union cited § 42–56–10(24) in support of its argument that the grievance was indeed arbitrable. It also asserted that the grievance was not rendered inarbitrable by virtue of any provision of § 42–56–10 or the management rights clause of the CBA.⁷ It argued that § 11–47–17 did not directly conflict with the CBA provision regarding weapons qualification. Finally, it urged the court to confirm the arbitration award, as it represented a rational interpretation of the CBA based on the decisions of previous arbitrators.

After reviewing the parties' memoranda, a justice of the Superior Court issued a written decision on August 18, 2010. Rejecting the DOC's argument that § 42–56–10(14) prevented the arbitration of the dispute, he first concluded that the dispute was arbitrable. He noted that § 42–56–10(24) specifically states that “[no] * * * arbitration award [shall] be vacated, remanded, or set aside on the basis of an alleged conflict with this section or with any other provision of the [G]eneral [L]aws...