W. Warwick Hous. Auth. v. RI Council 94, AFSCME, AFL-CIO
| Decision Date | 01 July 2022 |
| Docket Number | 2020-21-Appeal.,KM 16-747 |
| Parties | WEST WARWICK HOUSING AUTHORITY v. RI COUNCIL 94, AFSCME, AFL-CIO. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
Timothy C. Cavazza, Esq., for Plaintiff.
Carly Beauvais Iafrate, Esq., for Defendant.
Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ.
Justice Long, for the Court.
The plaintiff, West Warwick Housing Authority (plaintiff or the housing authority), appeals from a Superior Court judgment in favor of the defendant, Rhode Island Council 94, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (defendant or the union), denying the plaintiff's motion to vacate an arbitration award, granting the defendant's motion to confirm the award, and awarding attorneys’ fees to the defendant as the prevailing party. On appeal, the plaintiff argues that the trial justice committed reversible error in denying its motion to vacate because, the plaintiff contends, the defendant failed to prove at arbitration that an enforceable agreement to arbitrate existed at the time of the termination that gave rise to the grievance at issue in this case. Conversely, the union maintains that, because the trial justice correctly denied the plaintiff's motion to vacate, this Court should deny the instant appeal and remand the matter to the Superior Court for determination of an award of attorneys’ fees and costs to the defendant relating to this appeal.
For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.
The housing authority is a governmental agency that operates public housing for the Town of West Warwick. The union represents certain municipal employees employed by the housing authority.
On July 27, 2012, the housing authority and the union executed a collective bargaining agreement governing the terms of employment for certain housing authority employees (the CBA). The CBA's effective dates were July 24, 2012, through December 31, 2014. By the terms of Section 40.1 of the CBA, the CBA would automatically renew every year thereafter for a one-year term, unless either party provided written notice prior to 120 days before the CBA's expiration date of a desire to renegotiate the CBA. The CBA also contained a provision titled "Supplement" (the HUD ratification provision), which stated:
On April 29, 2015, the housing authority suspended the employment of Deborah Tellier (the grievant) as a Senior Housing Specialist, and the grievant was ultimately terminated. The union grieved her termination pursuant to the relevant provisions of the CBA. After the parties failed to resolve the grievance, the union duly requested arbitration on June 30, 2015, pursuant to a provision of the CBA that mandated arbitration if timely requested.
Arbitration proceedings commenced on March 1, 2016. The parties submitted the CBA as a joint exhibit, but the housing authority challenged the substantive arbitrability of the grievance; according to the housing authority, the parties did not have a valid agreement to arbitrate. Specifically, the housing authority argued before the arbitrator that the CBA was invalid because it had not been ratified by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), pursuant to the HUD ratification provision of the CBA. The housing authority argued in the alternative that, assuming that a valid CBA between the parties had existed, it nevertheless expired before the union filed the grievance at issue in this case; therefore, the housing authority contended that the grievance was not substantively arbitrable due to the lack of a valid agreement by the parties to arbitrate. Importantly, there is no evidence in the record that the housing authority had, prior to the commencement of the arbitration, sought resolution of the issue of the existence of a valid agreement to arbitrate.
For its part, the union countered that there was no evidence in the record before the arbitrator that HUD was statutorily required to ratify the CBA. The union further argued that the housing authority had complied with the CBA both during the initial term of the contract and in the months after the last effective date of December 31, 2014. The union maintained that it had reasonably relied on the housing authority's prior compliance with the CBA in support of the union's belief that an enforceable contract indeed existed between the parties.
In his written award and decision, the arbitrator made the following findings. On the issue of substantive arbitrability, he found that the CBA did not expressly allocate to either party the obligation to submit the CBA to HUD. However, he found that the evidence demonstrated that it was the housing authority that had a financial and operational relationship with HUD, and conversely that there was no evidence that the union had a relationship with HUD. Consequently, the arbitrator found that it was the housing authority that was responsible for submitting the CBA to HUD for approval.
The arbitrator also found that the housing authority had acted as if the CBA was valid at least until May 26, 2015, when, in connection with this case, the housing authority notified the union of its repudiation of the grievance and arbitration provisions of the CBA. In finding that the union had relied on the housing authority's performance of its obligations under the CBA until that time, the arbitrator acknowledged in particular that there was evidence that the housing authority had been paying contractually obligated salaries pursuant to the CBA.
The arbitrator further found that there was no evidence that either party had sought modification of the CBA pursuant to the renewal provisions in Section 40.1 and that, in fact, both parties had negotiated the renewal of the CBA after December 31, 2014, the expiration date for the contract's initial term, as provided in Section 40.1. The arbitrator inferred from this evidence that the housing authority had believed that the CBA was viable until at least May 26, 2015, when the housing authority repudiated the grievance and arbitration provisions in connection with the grievance at issue in this case.
As to the merits of the grievance, the arbitrator decided in the grievant's favor, determining that the housing authority did not have just cause to terminate her.
Thereafter, the housing authority filed a complaint in Kent County Superior Court seeking to vacate the arbitration award pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 28-9-18. Before the trial justice, the housing authority conceded that it had the responsibility to obtain HUD ratification of the CBA. However, the housing authority again maintained that the grievance was not substantively arbitrable because the CBA was invalid, and also argued that the arbitrator's decision was irrational and exceeded the arbitrator's authority. In response, the union moved to confirm the award.
After a hearing, the trial justice issued a written decision denying the housing authority's motion to vacate the arbitration award and granting the union's motion to confirm the award. First, the trial justice concluded that the CBA was valid and that therefore the grievance was substantively arbitrable. The trial justice also confirmed the arbitrator's award on the merits of the grievance. The trial justice then awarded attorneys’ fees to the union, as the prevailing party, pursuant to § 28-9-18(c). The trial justice entered final judgment in favor of the union, and the housing authority timely appealed.
Before this Court, the housing authority argues that the trial justice committed reversible error in denying the motion to vacate the arbitration award pursuant to § 28-9-18. The housing authority does not challenge the trial justice's decision with respect to the merits of the arbitrator's award in favor of the grievant. Rather, the housing authority assigns multiple errors to the trial justice's determination that the CBA was an enforceable agreement and that the presumption of substantive arbitrability applied.
For its part, the union maintains that the record establishes that the parties had a valid agreement to arbitrate and that, thus, the grievance was substantively arbitrable. The union highlights the procedural travel of the dispute in support of its argument that the trial justice correctly denied the housing authority's motion to vacate, granted the union's motion to confirm, and awarded attorneys’ fees to the union as the prevailing party. The union asks us to affirm the judgment and remand the case to the Superior Court for the determination of an award of attorneys’ fees and costs to the union for defending this matter on appeal before this Court.
"Public policy favors the finality of arbitration awards, and such awards enjoy a presumption of validity." State, Department of Corrections v. Rhode Island Brotherhood of Correctional Officers , 64 A.3d 734, 739 (R.I. 2013) (quoting Cumberland Teachers Association v. Cumberland School Committee , 45 A.3d 1188, 1191 (R.I. 2012) ); see School Committee of City of Pawtucket v. Pawtucket Teachers Alliance AFT Local 930 , 120 R.I. 810, 815, 390 A.2d 386, 389 (1978) ; see also AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers of America , 475 U.S. 643, 650, 106 S.Ct. 1415, 89 L.Ed.2d 648 (1986) ; United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Company , 363 U.S. 574, 582-83, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960) ; School Committee of Town of North Kingstown v. Crouch , 808 A.2d 1074, 1078 (R.I. 2002). It is therefore "well settled that, in the typical case, the judiciary's role in the arbitration process is limited." Providence Teachers’ Union Local 958, AFT, AFL-CIO v. Hemond , 227...
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