State v. Ragan, 22157.

• Decision Date: 27 May 1930
• Docket Number: 22157.
• Citation: 157 Wash. 130,288 P. 218
• Parties: STATE v. RAGAN.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

288 P. 218

157 Wash. 130

STATE v. RAGAN.

No. 22157.

Supreme Court of Washington

May 27, 1930

Department 2.

Appeal from Superior Court, Whatcom County; Ed. E. Harden, Judge.

Clyde Ragan was convicted of bootlegging, and he appeals.

Affirmed.

A. C Durham and Abrams, Healy & McCush, all of Bellingham, and Paul Carrigan, of Seattle, for appellant.

Frank M. Allyn and Lawrence M. Keplinger, both of Bellingham, for the State.

FULLERTON J.

The appellant, Ragan, was informed against by the prosecuting attorney of Whatcom county for the crime of bootlegging. On a trial before a jury he was found guilty of the crime charged adjudged guilty by the court, and sentenced to a term in the penitentiary. For a reversal of the judgment and sentence the appellant makes a number of contentions which we shall notice in the order in which he presents them.

The appellant, as the evidence on the part of the state tended to show, lives in the northern part of Whatcom county, near the international boundary line. He was suspected by the sheriff of the county to be engaged in the illicit traffic in intoxicating liquors. One Hubbard, who had had a long experience as an undercover man in the federal prohibition service, was employed as a deputy sheriff and sent to inquire into his conduct. He went to the appellant's home, and meeting the appellant, represented to him that he was a bootlegger engaged in the liquor trade at Aberdeen, and desired to obtain liquor from a source where he could avoid the profits of the middleman. By these and other representations he disarmed the appellant of any suspicions he may have had and entered into an agreement with him to purchase six cases of intoxicating liquors at a stipulated price to be delivered that evening at a place to be selected when Hubbard returned to the house for the liquor. Hubbard then left the house and returned again in the evening, driving to the place in an automobile. As he reached the appellant's house, the appellant came out and got into his car, when they began to discuss the possibilities of future deliveries; Hubbard telling the appellant that he could use about one hundred cases a week, and wanted the appellant to furnish it. While they were talking over the matter, a man came along and made an enigmatical remark to the appellant, leaving somewhat abruptly. After the man had gone, the appellant told Hubbard that he could not make the delivery that evening, as 'the law was on the road.' Hubbard then increased his order to twenty-six cases, and an agreement was made for its delivery at a garage in Blaine at 7 o'clock on the following morning. Hubbard appeared at the place directed, and was there directed to drive to another garage, where he found the appellant with the liquor he had agreed to deliver. In the process of delivering it, the appellant was arrested by Hubbard and shortly thereafter turned over to the other deputies from the sheriff's office.

The appellant told an entirely different story. In substance, he testified that he had never before engaged in the liquor traffic; that Hubbard approached him, and solicited him to join in the business of running intoxicating liquors across the border line; that Hubbard represented himself to be a deputy sheriff, and that he could by means of his office protect him from interference by the sheriff's office, the federal officials, and the border patrol; that he at first refused the offer, but after much persuasion consented to join with him. He further testified that Hubbard came to his place on the next day, and told him he was going to have some liquor brought across the line that night and asked him to meet the person who would bring it at a place named, transfer the load to his own car, and haul it to a garage in Blaine; that he met the man at the place, took his load of whisky, and drove it to the garage in Blaine to which he was directed by Hubbard, and was there arrested by Hubbard.

It was shown that Hubbard had for a long time been engaged in ferreting out dealers in intoxicating liquors as an agent of the federal government. Much of the detail of his activities in this respect was brought out at the trial on his cross-examination, and in addition thereto a number of witnesses were sworn who testified to his bad reputation for truth and veracity.

It is the appellant's first contention that there is no evidence in the record worthy of belief on which the judgment of conviction can rest. It is argued that the state's case rests principally on the testimony of its witness Hubbard, and that this witness was so successfully impeached as to render it unworthy of belief, and to require its withdrawal from the consideration of the jury. But we think the contention hardly merits serious argument. Whether the...