State v. Ragner
| Decision Date | 25 October 2022 |
| Docket Number | DA 21-0137 |
| Citation | 410 Mont. 361,521 P.3d 29 |
| Parties | STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Shelby Bryan RAGNER, Defendant and Appellant. |
| Court | Montana Supreme Court |
For Appellant: William Boggs, Attorney at Law, Missoula, Montana
For Appellee: Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Tammy K. Plubell, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana, Marty Lambert, Gallatin County Attorney, Bjorn Boyer, Deputy County Attorney, Bozeman, Montana
¶1 Shelby Bryan Ragner (Ragner) appeals from a January 25, 2021 District Court order sentencing Ragner to 10 years in Montana State Prison, with four years suspended. We affirm.
¶2 We restate the issues on appeal as follows:
¶3 On May 19, 2019, the State charged Ragner with aggravated sexual intercourse without consent (ASIWC). The charges followed an interview on March 18, 2019, between C.M., the victim, and Detective Amy Ross (Ross) of the Montana State University Police Department.
¶4 On March 8, 2019, C.M. and Ragner both joined a group of friends for a night of drinking and dancing. Ragner had previously told members of that group he found C.M. attractive. C.M. did not have romantic feelings toward Ragner. In the course of visiting multiple bars, C.M. and the other women in the group became intoxicated. Ragner had "too much" to drink but comparatively less so than the women. At various points in the evening, Ragner came into unwanted physical contact with C.M. In response, C.M. told one of her friends not to leave her alone with Ragner.
¶5 A designated driver picked up the group up later that night and returned everyone to the same spot to sleep. C.M. and Ragner ended up on different parts of an L-shaped couch. At some point in the night, C.M. woke up with Ragner on her legs and his fingers inside of her vagina. When C.M. attempted to move upon discovering Ragner's penetrative act, she found herself unable to do so and "lost consciousness again."
¶6 In contrast, Ragner recalls the two of them engaging in "sexual talk" prior to any sexual acts. During this conversation, Ragner told C.M. that she was too drunk to consent to any sexual activity. C.M. "kept insisting, kissing, and grabbing him," and generally initiating physical contact. Ragner wanted to say "yes" to C.M.’s sexual advances "but [ ] felt it was the wrong thing to do." The pair then made out and digital and oral intercourse occurred.
¶7 On March 9, 2019, C.M. woke up to her alarm and left for work. Once at work, she noticed soreness, sharp pains in her vaginal area, and bite marks along her thighs. C.M. informed her manager that she had been sexually assaulted. C.M. left work and drove to her mother's home. The pair went to the hospital in Ennis. A sexual assault examination performed by Dr. Davenport of the Madison Valley Health Center detected bruising and pain, bite marks, and vaginal pain. Dr. Davenport also detected injuries to C.M.’s vagina and cervix and attributed those to some sort of forceful penetration.
¶8 Also on March 9, 2019, C.M. texted a friend who had attended the party. The texts referred to fragments of memories from the prior night. C.M. disclaimed any romantic interest in Ragner and stated that even after having had alcohol her feelings toward men do not change. She specified that she did not consent to any sexual activity they engaged in. And C.M. also sent a text that read, During a pretrial interview, C.M. told defense counsel that on the two occasions alluded to in her text string she felt that her boyfriends had been sexually coercive while they were intoxicated. C.M. stated that she was not unconscious during the two occasions. She recalled that her boyfriends took advantage of her use of alcohol, in part, to pressure her to have sex.
¶9 The State filed a motion in limine to exclude the above quoted portion of the text exchange between C.M. and her friend related to the prior incidents of related sexual encounters. At an October 19, 2020 status conference, defense counsel reported that an evidentiary hearing would not be necessary for the court to rule on the motion. On October 20, 2020, the first day of trial, Ragner filed a written objection to the motion, and the District Court heard oral argument. The motion was granted.
¶10 Following the settlement of jury instructions, the District Court declined to use the knowingly definition offered by the defense counsel. The court defined knowingly having sexual intercourse with another as "when the person is aware of his or her conduct," and instructed the jury that "[a] person who knowingly has sexual intercourse with another person without consent commits the offense of sexual intercourse without consent." Ragner did not object to the District Court's consent instructions. Ragner did not request a specific unanimity instruction on "without consent" versus "incapable of consent."
¶11 On the charge of ASIWC, the jury found Ragner not guilty. On the lesser included charge of sexual intercourse without consent, the jury found Ragner guilty. The District Court sentenced Ragner to ten years in prison with four years suspended.
¶12 We review evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion, which occurs "when a district court acts arbitrarily without conscientious judgment or exceeds the bounds of reason, resulting in substantial injustice." State v. Daffin , 2017 MT 76, ¶ 12, 387 Mont. 154, 392 P.3d 150. To the extent a court's evidentiary ruling is based on an interpretation of a constitutional right, our review is de novo. State v. Hoff , 2016 MT 244, ¶ 11, 385 Mont. 85, 385 P.3d 945 (citing State v. Patterson , 2012 MT 282, ¶ 10, 367 Mont. 186, 291 P.3d 556 ).
¶13 A review of a district court's jury instructions in a criminal case assesses whether the instructions, when considered as a whole, fully and fairly instructed the jury on the law applicable to the case. State v. Daniels , 2019 MT 214, ¶ 26, 397 Mont. 204, 448 P.3d 511. Even if an instruction error did occur, this Court will not reverse on such a claim unless it also finds that the district court abused its discretion in a way that prejudicially affected a defendant's substantial rights. State v. Kaarma , 2017 MT 24, ¶ 7, 386 Mont. 243, 390 P.3d 609.
¶14 The occurrence of substantial injustice resulting from a court acting arbitrarily without employment of conscientious judgment or beyond the bounds of reason means that the court abused its discretion. State v. Weldele , 2003 MT 117, ¶ 72, 315 Mont. 452, 69 P.3d 1162 (citation omitted).
¶15 Claims of errors implicating a criminal defendant's fundamental constitutional rights may receive plain error review, even if no contemporaneous objection was made. State v. Lackman , 2017 MT 127, ¶ 9, 387 Mont. 459, 395 P.3d 477. This Court will exercise plain error review in cases where failing to review the claimed error may result in a manifest miscarriage of justice, may leave questions of fundamental fairness unsettled, or may compromise the integrity of the judicial process. Lackman , ¶ 9.
¶16 Issue One: Whether the District Court properly applied Montana's rape shield statute in excluding evidence concerning the victim's sexual conduct.
¶17 Ragner contends that the District Court improperly applied Montana's rape shield statute to exclude a portion of C.M.’s text messages. He relies on State v. Colburn , 2016 MT 41, ¶ 25, 382 Mont. 223, 366 P.3d 258, to argue that the District Court had a legal obligation to perform a balancing test between the defendant's constitutional right to present a defense and a victim's rights under the statute.
¶18 Montana's rape shield statute calls for the exclusion of evidence concerning the sexual conduct of the victim, with few exceptions. Section 45-5-511(2), MCA. The first statutory exception applies where the victim's past sexual conduct with the offender is at issue. Section 45-5-511(2), MCA. The second statutory exception applies where evidence of specific instances of the victim's sexual activity to show the semen, pregnancy, or disease is at issue. Section 45-5-511(2), MCA. This Court has identified two other exceptions: evidence related to a victim's prior false accusations of sexual assault if the offered evidence can be narrowed to the issue of the complaining witness’ veracity; and, evidence of the victim's sexual conduct if it is probative of the witness’ state of mind, motive, or biases with respect to making the more current accusations. State v. Hansen , 2022 MT 163, ¶ 14, 409 Mont. 495, 515 P.3d 799.
¶19 In Colburn , we acknowledged that prior to a district court applying the rape shield statute to exclude evidence, the court should consider whether the evidence is relevant and probative; whether the evidence is merely cumulative of other admissible evidence; and, whether the probative value of the evidence is outweighed by its prejudicial effect. Colburn , ¶ 25. These factors prevent the automatic exclusion of evidence that can be narrowed to the issue of the complaining witness’ veracity. Notably, this list is entirely devoid of mandated weights that a district court must apply and lacks any mention of explicit triggers that would prevent the application of the rape shield statute.
¶20 Our subsequent decisions have...
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...such decisions de novo. State v. Twardoski, 2021 MT 179, ¶ 26, 405 Mont. 43, 491 P.3d 711; State v. Ragner, 2022 MT 211, ¶ 12, 410 Mont. 361, 521 P.3d 29. We review denials of a motion a mistrial for an abuse of discretion. State v. Pierce, 2016 MT 308, ¶ 17, 385 Mont. 439, 384 P.3d 1042. W......