State v. Corena Marie Mountain Chief

• Docket Number: DA 21-0030
• Decision Date: 01 August 2023
• Citation: 2023 MT 147
• Parties: STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. CORENA MARIE MOUNTAIN CHIEF, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

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2023 MT 147

STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. CORENA MARIE MOUNTAIN CHIEF, Defendant and Appellant.

No. DA 21-0030

Supreme Court of Montana

August 1, 2023

Submitted on Briefs: May 24, 2023

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, In and For the County of Cascade, Cause No. ADC 18-776 Honorable John W. Larson, Presiding Judge

For Appellant:

Shannon Sweeney, Attorney at Law, Palmer, Puerto Rico

For Appellee:

Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Michael P. Dougherty Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana

Josh Racki, Cascade County Attorney, Carolyn Mattingly, Deputy County Attorney, Great Falls, Montana

OPINION

INGRID GUSTAFSON, JUSTICE

¶1 Corena Marie Mountain Chief (Mountain Chief) appeals from the jury verdict and subsequent November 19, 2020 Judgment of Conviction and Sentencing Order and the September 25, 2020 Opinion and Order Denying Defendant's Motion for a New Trial, issued by the Eighth Judicial District Court, Cascade County. We affirm.

¶2 We restate the issues on appeal as follows:

1. Did the District Court err in excluding evidence pursuant to the Rape Shield statute, that J.L.D. was abused by other men?

2. Did the District Court err in admitting evidence of other uncharged bad acts?

3. Was Mountain Chief denied a fair trial when the State solicited testimony from a witness who vouched for the victim's credibility?

4. Whether the District Court's COVID-19 mask requirement violated Mountain Chief's right to a fair trial?

5. Whether the District Court abused its discretion by limiting the parties respective voir dire times to 45 minutes?

6. Whether the District Court abused its discretion by denying Mountain Chief's motion for a mistrial for failure of the State to disclose an investigative note?

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶3 The State charged Mountain Chief with two felony offenses-Trafficking of Persons and Sexual Abuse of Children. Prior to trial, the trafficking offense was dismissed. At the first trial, the jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict on the remaining charge and the court declared a mistrial. Following retrial, Mountain Chief was convicted of the Sexual Abuse of Children offense. She was sentenced to 100 years at the Montana Women's Prison, with 50 years suspended and given credit for the time she had been incarcerated from arrest to sentencing.

¶4 In relation to the Sexual Abuse of Children offense, the State alleged Mountain Chief knowingly sold her four-year-old daughter, J.L.D., to Eugene Sherbondy (Sherbondy) for sex at his home in Great Falls. Additional facts will be discussed as necessary in discussion of the issues below.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶5 The parties do not dispute the standards of review applicable to this matter. We review evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. City of Missoula v. Duane, 2015 MT 232, ¶ 10, 380 Mont. 290, 355 P.3d 729; State v. Daffin, 2017 MT 76, ¶ 12, 387 Mont. 154, 392 P.3d 150. As a court's decision to exclude evidence pursuant to the Rape Shield statute implicates a defendant's constitutional right to confront witnesses and present a complete defense, we review such decisions de novo. State v. Twardoski, 2021 MT 179, ¶ 26, 405 Mont. 43, 491 P.3d 711; State v. Ragner, 2022 MT 211, ¶ 12, 410 Mont. 361, 521 P.3d 29. We review denials of a motion for a mistrial for an abuse of discretion. State v. Pierce, 2016 MT 308, ¶ 17, 385 Mont. 439, 384 P.3d 1042. We, likewise, review denials of a motion for new trial for an abuse of discretion. State v. Oschmann, 2019 MT 33, ¶ 6, 394 Mont. 237, 434 P.3d 280. We generally do not review issues raised for the first time on appeal, but may do so under the plain error doctrine in situations that implicate a defendant's fundamental constitutional rights and failure to review the asserted error may result in a manifest miscarriage of justice, leave unsettled the question of the fundamental fairness of the proceedings, or compromise the integrity of the judicial process. State v. Hayden, 2008 MT 274, ¶ 17, 345 Mont. 252, 190 P.3d 1091; State v. Akers, 2017 MT 311, ¶ 10, 389 Mont. 531, 408 P.3d 142. Finally, we review issues regarding time limits for voir dire for abuse of discretion. State v. Michaud, 2008 MT 88, ¶ 13, 342 Mont. 244, 180 P.3d 636.

DISCUSSION

¶6 1. Did the District Court err in excluding evidence pursuant to the Rape Shield statute, that J.L.D. was abused by other men?

¶7 Prior to trial, the State brought a motion to preclude, pursuant to Montana's Rape Shield statute, evidence of any sexual conduct or reports of sexual abuse of J.L.D., the victim, other than that related to the offense being tried. The District Court granted the motion. Mountain Chief argues it was reversible error for the District Court, pursuant to the Rape Shield statute, to preclude admission of alternate sources of the J.L.D.'s sexual knowledge-namely, she was abused by other men. As J.L.D. was 4 years old at the time of the abuse, Mountain Chief asserts that being precluded from presenting evidence of sexual abuse by other men, she was unable to rebut this presumption. Mountain Chief also asserts the preclusion of evidence pursuant to the Rape Shield statute precluded her from fully offering evidence of J.L.D.'s motive to fabricate the allegations. According to Mountain Chief, her defense "theory was that J.L.D. had a motive to fabricate accusations against her mother because she [Mountain Chief] was supplied and used drugs with Sherbondy, and that because her mother neglected her and had assets that would benefit the family, she should be in jail." Mountain Chief asserts this case to be similar to Twardoski, where this Court determined the lower court's preclusion of evidence of sexual abuse perpetrated by another on the victim prevented the defendant from receiving a fair trial.

¶8 The State asserts Mountain Chief's defense did not depend on showing J.L.D. made up Sherbondy's sexual assault as her defense was not that the abuse did not occur, but rather that she did not knowingly cause it. During her law enforcement interview, Mountain Chief admitted she brought J.L.D. to Sherbondy's home and witnessed him engaging in sexual conduct with J.L.D., but she did not cause the sexual abuse. The State also asserts Twardoski is distinguishable as, in that case, the conduct of the other abuse was so unique and nearly identical-a particular game of "truth or dare"-it resulted in a straight-line connection between the prior act and the charged offense which is not present in this case. From our review of the record, we agree with the State.

¶9 In 1975, Montana joined most other states by adopting a rape shield law precluding admission of evidence related to the sexual conduct of the victim. State v. Awbery, 2016 MT 48, ¶ 17, 382 Mont. 334, 367 P.3d 346 (citing 1975 Mont. Laws ch. 129, § 1). Although rape shield legislation originally focused on adult rape victims, most jurisdictions include child victims of sexual abuse within the statute's protections. In 1985, Montana broadened the applicability of the Rape Shield statute to include all types of sexual abuse. Awbery, ¶ 18 (citing 1985 Mont. Laws ch. 172, § 3).

¶10 Montana's Rape Shield statute, § 45-5-511(2), MCA, precludes evidence "concerning the sexual conduct of the victim[.]" The law is designed to prevent the trial of the charge against the defendant from becoming a trial of the victim's prior sexual conduct. State v. Colburn, 2016 MT 41, ¶ 22, 382 Mont. 223, 366 P.3d 258 (Colburn I). The statute provides two narrow exceptions: (1) evidence of the victim's past sexual conduct with the offender, or (2) evidence of specific instances of the victim's sexual activity to show the origin of semen, pregnancy, or disease that is at issue in the prosecution. State v. McCaulou, 2022 MT 197, ¶ 23, 410 Mont. 291, 518 P.3d 862. Neither exception is at issue here.

¶11 Rape shield statutes eliminate the need for victims to defend incidents in their past and minimize the trauma of testifying. Awbery, ¶ 18. However, the policy of protecting against the trial becoming a trial of the victim "is not violated or circumvented if the offered evidence can be narrowed to the issue of the complaining witness' veracity." State v. Anderson, 211 Mont. 272, 284, 686 P.2d 193, 200 (1984). Conflict can arise between rape shield statutes and a defendant's right, arising from the Sixth Amendment and Article II, Section 24, of the Montana Constitution, to confront his accusers and present evidence in his defense. Awbery, ¶ 19. "Neither the Rape Shield Law nor the defendant's right to confront and to present evidence are absolute. The Rape Shield Law cannot be applied to exclude evidence arbitrarily or mechanistically and it is the trial court's responsibility to strike a balance between the defendant's right to present a defense and a victim's rights under the statute." Awbery, ¶ 20 (internal citations omitted).

Under the rape shield statute, a court balancing the interests of the defendant with those protected by the Rape Shield Law should require that the defendant's proffered evidence is not merely speculative or unsupported. The court should also consider whether the proffered evidence is relevant and probative under M. R. Evid. 401 and 402, whether the evidence is merely cumulative of other admissible evidence, and whether the probative value of the evidence is outweighed by its prejudicial effect under M. R. Evid. 403. The court must balance these considerations to ensure a fair trial for the defendant while also upholding the compelling interest of the Rape Shield Law in preserving the integrity of the trial and keeping it from becoming a trial of the victim.

Twardoski, ¶ 27 (internal quotation marks and...