State v. Ralston

• Decision Date: 07 July 1908
• Citation: 116 N.W. 1058,139 Iowa 44
• Parties: STATE v. RALSTON.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

139 Iowa 44

116 N.W. 1058

STATE

v.RALSTON.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

July 7, 1908.

Appeal from District Court, Monroe County; F. W. Eichelberger, Judge.

The defendant was convicted of the crime of rape and he appeals. Affirmed.D. W. Bates and E. D. Everett, for appellant.

H. W. Byers, Atty. Gen., and C. W. Lyon, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

SHERWIN, J.

The indictment charged the defendant with the crime of raping his sister, Lucy Ralston, an unmarried woman about 45 years old. The mother died in 1906 and thereafter the crime was committed. The defendant and his sister lived together on a farm six miles from Albia. The sister testified that the crime was committed about 9 o'clock at night in her own room; that she had gone to her room and was partly undressed when the defendant opened the door and entered the room; that he immediately took hold of her and told her to take off her clothes; that she refused to do so, whereupon he forcibly removed all of her clothing, threw her upon the bed, and consummated his purpose. The sister also testified that as soon as she was released she ran from the house to the house of Mr. Estlock, who was their nearest neighbor, about 40 rods away. The evidence conclusively shows that the crime of rape was committed at that time, but the defendant insists that the corroborating evidence required by section 5488 of the Code was not furnished by the state. The statute requires only that the prosecutrix be corroborated by other evidence tending to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense. The fact that the crime has been committed by some one may be established by the testimony of the injured person alone; and the corroborating evidence is sufficient if it tends to strengthen and corroborate the prosecutrix in connecting the defendant with the commission of the crime. State v. French, 96 Iowa, 255, 65 N. W. 156;State v. Baker, 106 Iowa, 99, 76 N. W. 509. The prosecutrix testified that the defendant removed all of her clothing, and that she was entirely nude when the crime was committed, and when she fled to the Estlock home, and the evidence is conclusive that she was in that condition when she reached Estlock's. After the defendant's arrest he told one of the state's witnesses that “he was in one room, and his sister slept out in another room, and that he came out to get a drink of water, and she was taking a bath and was naked, * * * and when he came in she said: ‘It is a pity a person cannot be let alone;’ and she commenced to scream and went to the door and went out and ran across the field that way screaming.” It is undisputed that the house in which they lived had but two rooms, a kitchen and another room, and that the prosecutrix slept in the kitchen and the defendant in the other room. The jury may well have found from the defendant's statement that he went into his sister's sleeping room and there found her naked. That he was in a room with her when she was in that condition, and that she immediately left the house naked and ran screaming towards Estlock's, he admitted. When she reached the home of Estlock, she was still naked and had been raped. And we are of the opinion that the facts stated to the witness by the defendant tend to connect him with the commission of the crime, and hence furnish some corroborating evidence. There was also evidence tending to show that the defendant fled soon after his sister left the house, and that he remained away a day and a half, when he returned and was at once arrested. It is a well-settled rule that the jury may consider evidence of flight as tending to show guilt. State v. Poe, 123 Iowa, 118, 98 N. W. 587, 101 Am. St. Rep. 307. And as the corroboration required by the statute may be furnished by facts and circumstances as well as by direct testimony, anything in the facts and circumstances that tends to show guilt necessarily tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime. It may be that flight alone should not be held to be sufficient corroboration. Indeed, it is quite apparent that it should not be so held in all cases, but that its weight must be determined by the other facts and circumstances proven. Where there is other evidence tending to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime, and evidence of flight which tends to show guilt is also furnished, we think the latter may be considered by the jury as furnishing additional corroboration. Generally speaking, the sufficiency of the corroborating evidence is properly a question for the jury, and if it be of a substantial character, the court will not interfere with the finding. State v. Stevens, 133 Iowa, 684, 110 N. W. 1037;State v. Norris, 127 Iowa, 683, 104 N. W. 282.

A juror was called after the defendant had exhausted his peremptory challenges, and, after his examination as to qualification, the defendant challenged him for cause. The challenge was overruled, and the ruling is presented as error demanding a reversal. The juror testified that he had known the defendantfor some time; that he heard about the case the day after the transaction was alleged to have taken place and read an account of it in the Albia Republican, which “attempted to state the facts relating to it.” He said that he read the article carefully at home and discussed it there; that he there and then expressed an opinion to his wife as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant based upon the article. He was then asked a question as follows: “Of course you still have that opinion that you formed then from the article that you read and that you expressed to your wife?” To which he answered: “Yes, sir; I suppose I have.” The challenge followed the answer. On his examination by the state and by the court, he testified in substance that the opinion formed and expressed to his wife was based solely on the facts stated in the article that he had read; that it was not an unqualified opinion, and that he thought he could lay it entirely aside and hear the evidence on the trial, and render a verdict on such evidence...