State v. Ralston, Case No. 16CA9
| Decision Date | 25 July 2017 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 16CA9 |
| Citation | 2017 Ohio 7057 |
| Parties | STATE OF OHIO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOHN RALSTON, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
APPEARANCES:
Timothy Young, Ohio State Public Defender, and Patrick T. Clark, Assistant Ohio State Public Defender, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellant.
Anneka P. Collins, Highland County Prosecutor, Hillsboro, Ohio, for Appellee.
{¶1} John Ralston appeals the judgment entry of conviction entered October 19, 2015 in the Highland County Court of Common Pleas. A Highland County jury returned a guilty verdict on five counts: possession of heroin, possession of methamphetamine, and three counts of receiving stolen property. On appeal, Ralston asserts: (1) the trial court erred in overruling Ralston's motion to suppress the first of four search warrants; (2) he was rendered the ineffective assistance of counsel as to his motion to suppress; and (3) the prosecutor's statements rose to the level of misconduct. Upon review, we find no merit to Ralston's arguments. Accordingly, we overrule his assignments of error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
{¶2} On July 7, 2015, John Ralston was indicted by the Highland County Grand Jury for: (1) possession of heroin, R.C. 2925.11, a felony of the first degree; (2) aggravated possession of methamphetamine, R.C. 2925.11, a felony of the fifth degree; (3) receiving stolen property, R.C. 2913.51 a felony of the fifth degree; (4) receiving stolen property, R.C. 2913.51, a felony of the fifth degree; and, (5) receiving stolen property, R.C. 2913. 51, a felony of the fourth degree. It was also alleged Appellant's vehicle was property subject to forfeiture specification, R.C. 2941.1417. The indictment arose after officers of the Greenfield Police Department executed warrants on or about April 21, 2015 at Appellant's home and business in Greenfield, Ohio. The officers located property reported stolen from three victims: James Stuckey, Rick Priest, and Weastec, a plant located in Highland County.
{¶3} At arraignment, Appellant entered pleas of not guilty. His counsel subsequently filed a motion to suppress evidence directed to the sufficiency of the first three search warrants. At the suppression hearing, the parties stipulated that if the first warrant was found to be based uponsufficient probable cause, then the second two warrants would be deemed to also be valid. The trial court ultimately overruled Appellant's motion to suppress.
{¶4} On October 15, 2015, Appellant proceeded to a jury trial. The State of Ohio called three witnesses from the Ohio Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation (BCI); James Stuckey and Rick Priest; Doug Ernst on behalf of Weastec; and officers of the Greenfield Police Department and Highland County Sheriff's Department. Appellant called Richard Wright and Ronnie Wright, his associates, Alicia Ralston and Jonathon Ralston, Appellant's two adult children, and one law enforcement officer. At the conclusion of trial, Appellant was found guilty on all counts. Appellant was sentenced to a ten-year prison sentence. He was also ordered to pay a fine, given a license suspension, and forfeited his pickup truck used in the commission of the crimes.
{¶5} On March 9, 2016, Appellant filed a motion for leave to file a delayed appeal, which was subsequently granted by this Court. Where relevant, additional facts will be set forth below.
{¶6} "The review of a motion to suppress is a mixed question of law and fact." State v. Kerns, 4th Dist. Highland No. 15CA6, 2016-Ohio-63, ¶15, quoting State v. Castagnola, 145 Ohio St.3d 1, 2015-Ohio-1565, 46 N.E.3d 638, ¶ 32, citing State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d 71. Because the trial court acts as the trier of fact in suppression hearings and is in the best position to resolve factual issues and evaluate the credibility of witnesses, an appellate court must accept the trial court's findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence. Burnside at ¶ 8. Accepting these facts as true, we must then "independently determine, without deference to the conclusion of the trial court, whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard." State v.Hobbs, 133 Ohio St.3d 43, 2012-Ohio-3886, 975 N.E.2d 965, ¶ 8, citing Burnside at ¶ 8; State v. Crocker, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 14CA3640, 2015-Ohio-2528, ¶ 60.
{¶7} Between April 21 and April 23, 2015, the Greenfield County Court judge issued four search warrants. Appellant asserts the facts contained in the affidavit in support of the first search warrant are insufficient to support a finding or probable cause necessary to issue the warrant. The first, issued on April 21, 2015 at 12:05 p.m. upon application by Patrolman Jennifer Lowe of the Greenfield Police Department, authorized the search of Appellant's residence at 760 Jefferson Street in Greenfield for:
{¶8} Patrolman Lowe executed the first search warrant, seizing:
{¶9} "The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Ohio Constitution, Article I, Section 14, prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures." State v. Kerns, 4th Dist. Highland No. 15CA6, 2016-Ohio-63, at ¶ 16, quoting State v. Emerson, 134 Ohio St.3d 191, 2012-Ohio-5047, 981 N.E.2d 787, ¶ 15. This constitutional guarantee is protected by the exclusionary rule, which mandates exclusion from trial of the evidence obtained from the unreasonable search and seizure. Id.
{¶10} "The Supreme Court of the United States has provided that in determining whether a search warrant was issued upon a proper showing of probable cause, reviewing courts must examine the totality of the circumstances." State v. Jones, 143 Ohio St.3d 266, 2015-Ohio-483, 37 N.E.3d 123, ¶ 13, citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, (1983). Kerns, supra, at ¶ 17. To determine whether the affidavit submitted in support of a search warrant established probable cause, a magistrate must make a practical, commonsense decision based upon all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit, including the "veracity" and "basis of knowledge" of persons supplying hearsay information, that there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. Kerns, supra, at ¶ 18. See State v. George, 45 Ohio St.3d 325, 544 N.E.2d 640 (1989), paragraph one of the syllabus, quoting Gates at 238-239.
{¶11} A magistrate must make a practical determination, upon all circumstances set forth in the warrant, whether there is a fair probability that evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. State v. Vaughters, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 2086, 1993 WL 63464, (Mar. 2, 1993), citing Gates, supra; United States v. Berisford (C.A.10, 1984), 750 F.2d 57. To establish probable cause to search a residence, the facts must be sufficient to justify a conclusion that the property which is the object of the search is probably on the premises to be searched at the time the warrant is issued. United States v. Hendricks (C.A.9, 1984), 743 F.2d 653; Travisano, supra, citing United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 91 S.Ct. 2075 (1971). In United States v. Lucarz (C.A.9, 1970), 430 F.2d 1051, 1055, the court wrote:
"To establish the nexus between the place and objects sought, the court may look to the type of crime, the nature of the missing items, the extent of the suspect's opportunity for concealment, and normal inferences as to where a criminal would be likely to hide stolen property." See also Hendricks, supra; United States v. Freeman (C.A.5, 1982), 685 F.2d 942.
{¶12} The duty of a reviewing court is more limited-neither the trial court nor an appellate court should substitute its judgment for that of the magistrate by conducting a de novo determination. Kerns, supra, at ¶ 19; George at paragraph two of the syllabus. The duty of the reviewing court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed, after according great deference to themagistrate's determination and resolving doubtful or marginal cases in favor of upholding the warrant. Id., following Gates; see also Jones at ¶ 13-14.
{¶13} In this case, we must review Patrolman Lowe's affidavit to determine whether the magistrate had "a substantial basis to conclude there was a fair probability the items mentioned in the affidavit would be found at Appellant's residence. The affidavit provides that Patrolman Lowe took a report that on April 21, 2015, Weastec, a business located in Greenfield, had been broken into after the alarm system and electrical supply to the building were disabled.
{¶14} The affidavit also contained information that copper piping, spools of copper "moto wire," and a large spoil of 480V cable electric wire were removed from the business. Shoe prints inside and outside Weastec resembled a tennis shoe type print. After taking...
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