State v. Rambo, 57287

• Decision Date: 16 May 1985
• Docket Number: No. 57287,57287
• Citation: 10 Kan.App.2d 418,699 P.2d 542
• Parties: STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Bruce A. RAMBO, Appellant.
• Court: Kansas Court of Appeals

Page 542

699 P.2d 542

10 Kan.App.2d 418

STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Bruce A. RAMBO, Appellant.

No. 57287.

Supreme Court of Kansas.

May 16, 1985.

Review Denied June 28, 1985

Syllabus by the Court

1. A trial court's decision not to impose an insanity defense sua sponte over defendant's objection will not be overturned in the absence of the trial court's abuse of discretion.

2. Where a sufficient question is raised as to a defendant's mental responsibility at the time of the crime, it is the duty of the trial court to make that issue part of the case. However, the trial court is not required to impose the insanity defense sua sponte every time there is enough evidence in a case to make that defense tenable. Whalem v. United States, 346 F.2d 812 (D.C.Cir.1965); United States v. Robertson, 430 F.Supp. 444, 446 (D.D.C.1977).

3. Factors relevant to the trial court's decision to impose an insanity defense sua sponte include the quality of the evidence supporting the insanity defense, the defendant's wish in the matter, the quality of defendant's decision not to raise the defense, the reasonableness of defendant's motives in opposing presentation of the defense, and the court's personal observations of the defendant throughout the course of the proceedings against him. United States v. Robertson, 430 F.Supp. 444, 446 (D.D.C.1977).

4. In a criminal action wherein the defendant was convicted of aggravated battery, the record is examined and it is held: The trial court did not err in (1) not imposing an insanity defense sua sponte over defendant's objection; (2) admitting cross-examination concerning defendant's previous psychiatric treatment; and (3) giving and refusing to give certain jury instructions on self-defense.

Steven C. Sherwood, Wichita, for appellant.

Geary N. Gorup, Asst. Dist. Atty., Robert T. Stephan, Atty. Gen., and Clark V. Owens, Dist. Atty., for appellee.

Before FOTH, C.J., SWINEHART, J., and FREDERICK WOLESLAGEL, District Judge Retired, assigned.

SWINEHART, Judge:

Defendant Bruce A. Rambo appeals from a jury verdict finding him guilty of aggravated battery.

On June 26, 1983, defendant Bruce A. Rambo and his roommate, Moses D. Bowen, returned from a club to find defendant's house burglarized. The following day, after contemplating who might have committed the burglary, defendant decided Bowen knew who had stolen defendant's household goods. Defendant had known Bowen for approximately one month and believed Bowen's friends had burglarized his home. Defendant confronted Bowen with these beliefs and an argument ensued between the two. Both parties apparently became upset, and Bowen slammed a bar stool down on the floor. As Bowen took hold of a second bar stool, defendant got a rifle and pointed it at him. Bowen threw the second bar stool, and defendant shot him in the abdomen. Soon thereafter, defendant helped Bowen into defendant's van and drove him to a hospital. Defendant told Bowen to tell the authorities at the hospital that the shooting was accidental. Bowen did so until defendant left his presence, then told a police officer the shooting was not accidental.

Defendant was subsequently arrested and confessed to shooting Bowen. Defendant was charged with aggravated battery and Kent Wirth was appointed as his counsel. Wirth filed a Motion for Examination to Determine Defendant's Competency. After receiving the doctor's reports, the district court entered an order of defendant's incompetency to stand trial. Two months later defendant was returned to the court from Larned State Hospital and was found competent to stand trial. After defendant's preliminary examination, Wirth filed a Notice of Intention of Insanity Defense. Defendant underwent a mental examination and Wirth filed a second motion for an order to determine incompetency. The district court again found defendant incompetent to stand trial. Defendant wrote a letter to Wirth asking him to withdraw as counsel. Wirth then filed a motion to do so, which the court granted. Thereafter, defendant was represented by the public defender. Three months after the defendant had last been found incompetent, the court examined his medical reports and found him competent to stand trial. Defendant's trial began approximately one month later.

On the day of trial, the prosecution informed the court in chambers that although examining physicians were of the opinion defendant was insane at the time of the commission of the crime, the public defender had sent a letter to the prosecutor's office indicating that no insanity defense would be raised. Upon inquiry by the court, the public defender confirmed that information, expressed his decision to waive any defense upon the ground of insanity, and stated he would object to the presentation of any psychological or insanity evidence at trial. The public defender noted that defendant did not wish to raise the insanity defense and had asked his previous counsel to withdraw primarily for having filed the notice of insanity defense.

Defendant testified he shot Bowen in self-defense. He stated that approximately eleven months prior to the shooting he had sustained multiple injuries in an airplane crash and that Herrington rods had been surgically implanted in his back. Those rods were still his back at the time of the shooting and impaired defendant's physical mobility.

The jury found defendant guilty of aggravated battery.

Defendant first argues that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to inquire into the defendant's mental condition at trial, by allowing the public defender to waive the insanity defense, and by failing to grant a new trial on its own motion after learning of a psychiatrist's opinion that defendant was insane on the date of the crime. Defendant makes no claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

The basic principles here involved are not in dispute.

"The question of the competency of any defendant tried for a felony is a most vital matter. It is the policy of the law of this state not to try persons while they are insane. Our statute, G.S.1949, 62-1531, and our decisions, State v. Ossweiler, 111 Kan. 358, 207 Pac. 832; State v. Brotherton, 131 Kan. 295, 302, 291 Pac. 954; State v. Lammers, 171 Kan. 668, 237 P.2d 410, and State v. Severns, 184 Kan. 213, 336 P.2d 447, contemplate that when an accused is afflicted with any of the types of insanity or mental disability specified in the statute, or any claim is made in his behalf that he is so afflicted, either before, or during the trial and before the verdict is rendered, it becomes the duty of the court and counsel of record to ascertain by one of the statutory methods whether he is in a fit mental condition to be proceeded against. It is a basic requirement of our law that a proper determination of the competency of the defendant should be made in every case where a real doubt is raised as to his competency." State v. Kelly, 192 Kan. 641, 643, 391 P.2d 123 (1964).

Both our statutory scheme and our decisional law place a duty upon the trial court to, under certain circumstances, ascertain whether a defendant is competent to stand trial. See K.S.A.1984 Supp. 22-3302; Outland v. State, 219 Kan. 547, 548, 548 P.2d 725 (1976); State v. Kelly, 192 Kan. at 644-45, 391 P.2d 123. The law is less clear concerning the duty of a trial court to ascertain, on its own motion, whether a defendant was insane at the date of the offense.

Although this issue has not been squarely addressed in Kansas, cases outside our jurisdiction have examined the court's duty to impose the insanity defense upon a defendant over his objections. It is generally recognized that when there is a "sufficient question" as to a defendant's mental responsibility at the time of the crime, that issue must become a part of the case. Whalem v. United States, 346 F.2d 812 (D.C.Cir.1965). See United States v. Robertson, 430 F.Supp. 444, 446, (D.D.C.1977)- . In holding that the court should not sua sponte impose an insanity defense in Robertson, the court listed the following factors as relevant to that decision:

"[T]he quality of the evidence supporting the insanity defense; the defendant's wish in the matter; the quality of defendant's decision not to raise the defense; the reasonableness of defendant's motives in opposing presentation of the defense; and the Court's personal observations of the defendant throughout the course of the proceedings against him." United States v. Robertson, 430 F.Supp. at 446.

In examining the first of those factors, the Robertson court stated:

"There is evidence in the record which could be used to argue that the defendant was suffering from a mental disease or defect at the time of the offense. However, there is also substantial evidence leading to a contrary conclusion. The Whalem case requires a trial judge to refuse 'to allow the conviction of an obviously mentally irresponsible defendant.' 346 F.2d at 818. That decision does not require sua sponte imposition of the insanity defense every time there is enough evidence in a case to make the defense tenable." 430 F.Supp. at 446.

The court noted that defendant's wish not to invoke the insanity defense was "highly relevant," and found that decision to have been made rationally and with an awareness of its consequences.

Similarly, United States v. Wright, 627 F.2d 1300 (D.C.Cir.1980), held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to raise an insanity defense sua sponte over defendant's objection. There, although defendant's capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was doubtful, sound reasons existed for the decision not to raise the defense.

In reaching that conclusion, the court stated:

" 'No rigid standard exists to control the District Court in deciding whether it should require the insanity issue to be submitted. As a matter within the sound discretion of the district court, this question must be resolved on a case by case...