State v. Rambold
| Decision Date | 30 April 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. DA 13–0584.,DA 13–0584. |
| Citation | 375 Mont. 30,325 P.3d 686 |
| Parties | STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Stacey Dean RAMBOLD, Defendant and Appellee. |
| Court | Montana Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
For Appellant: Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General, Tammy K. Plubell, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana, Scott Twito, Yellowstone County Attorney, Rod Souza, Deputy County Attorney, Billings, Montana.
For Appellee: Jay F. Lansing, Moses and Lansing, P.C., Nancy G. Schwartz, NG Schwartz Law, P.L.L.C., Billings, Montana.
For Amicus Legal Voice, Legal Momentum, Montana Now, Pennsylvania Now, Women's Law Project, and Sexual Violence Law Center: Vanessa Soriano Power, Stoel Rives LLP, Seattle, Washington.
¶ 1 The State of Montana appeals the judgment of the Thirteenth Judicial District Court sentencing the Defendant Stacey Dean Rambold (Rambold) to 15 years for sexual intercourse without consent with all but 31 days suspended.
¶ 2 The following issues are presented for review:
¶ 3 Is this appeal precluded by the State's failure to object to the sentence?
¶ 4 Did the District Court impose an illegal sentence?
¶ 5 We reverse.
¶ 6 Rambold was charged by Information with three counts of Sexual Intercourse Without Consent in violation of § 45–5–503, MCA (2007),1 and the State gave notice of its intent to seek a penalty enhancement under § 45–5–503(3)(a), MCA. Rambold was accused of multiple instances of sexual activity with C.M., a fourteen year-old student at Billings Senior High School, where Rambold was employed as a teacher. After several continuances were granted, the District Court scheduled a jury trial for April 6, 2010. Before trial, C.M. tragically took her own life. The State and Rambold entered into a deferred prosecution agreement on July 16, 2010. In the agreement, the State agreed to forego prosecution, and Rambold agreed to enter a Sexual Offender Treatment Program and comply with its conditions, including avoiding contact with minor children unless expressly approved by his Sexual Offender Program Treatment Provider.
¶ 7 Rambold failed to comply with the terms of his deferred prosecution agreement. Rambold's treatment provider, Michael Sullivan, notified the State that Rambold would be terminated from the Sexual Offender Treatment Program due to his diminishing attendance at meetings, engaging in sexual activity with consenting adults without informing his therapist, and unapproved contact with minor-aged family members.
¶ 8 The State gave notice of its intent to prosecute Rambold on December 31, 2012, and moved the District Court to set the matter for trial. The parties executed a Binding Plea Agreement pursuant to § 46–12–211(1), MCA, on April 15, 2013, which allowed Rambold the opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea if the court rejected the plea agreement. Under the agreement, Rambold agreed to plead guilty to one charge of Sexual Intercourse Without Consent as alleged in Count II of the Information, and the State agreed to dismiss other counts in the Information and to recommend a sentence of 20 years with 10 of those years suspended. Rambold pled guilty to the charge of Sexual Intercourse Without Consent. At sentencing, counsel for Rambold argued for a sentence of 15 years with all but 30 days suspended. The State's sentencing memorandum recommended a prison sentence of 20 years with 10 suspended, and highlighted Rambold's role in the offense as a person in a position of trust who had maintained his relationship with C.M. for months, and who had been warned about inappropriate contact with students in the past.
¶ 9 The District Court sentenced Rambold to 15 years' incarceration with all but 31 days suspended. The court found that Rambold's violations of the Sexual Offender Treatment Program were not substantial or serious violations justifying the sentence urged by the State. The court also took notice of information it gleaned from interviews with C.M.:
In some respects, the Defendant took advantage of a troubled youth. I've looked at those interviews. And it's easy enough to say the Defendant should have been aware, should not, obviously, have engaged in the conduct that he did. And it was a troubled youth, but a youth that was probably as much in control of the situation as was the Defendant, one that was seemingly, although troubled, older than her chronological age.
After significant public outcry, the District Court apologized, scheduled resentencing, and published an order acknowledging the illegality of Rambold's sentence under § 46–18–205, MCA.2
¶ 10 We review a criminal sentence for its legality to determine whether the sentence is within statutory parameters. State v. Ruiz, 2005 MT 117, ¶ 8, 327 Mont. 109, 112 P.3d 1001 (citing State v. Webb, 2005 MT 5, ¶ 8, 325 Mont. 317, 106 P.3d 521).
¶ 11 Is this appeal precluded by the State's failure to object to the sentence?
¶ 12 The scope of appeal by the State is prescribed by § 46–20–103, MCA. The State may appeal “from any court order or judgment the substantive effect of which results in: (h) imposing a sentence that is contrary to law.” Section 46–20–103(2)(h), MCA. This provision clearly allows the State to proceed with an appeal of Rambold's sentence, which the State maintains is contrary to the law.
¶ 13 Rambold argues that his sentence was not imposed contrary to the law because the provisions of § 46–18–222(5), MCA, and § 46–18–205(1), MCA, allow for the specific sentence imposed by the District Court. Rambold therefore argues that the State has waived the issue of the legality of his sentence because it failed to object at the sentencing hearing. Section 46–20–103(2), MCA, however, does not require the State to formally object in order to preserve an appeal to this Court when the State has recommended to the court a lawful sentence and contested imposition of the sentence actually imposed. Section 46–20–103(2)(h), MCA, allows an appeal by the State when the substantive effect of a judgment is the imposition of an illegal sentence.
¶ 14 The parties discuss application of State v. Lenihan, 184 Mont. 338, 602 P.2d 997 (1979), to the instant facts. It is not necessary, however, to invoke the exception provided in Lenihan when the State is raising the illegality of a sentence. We held in Lenihan that an appellate court may review sentences imposed in a criminal case if it is alleged that such a sentence is illegal. Lenihan, 184 Mont. at 343, 602 P.2d at 1000. A sentence is legal when it falls within the statutory parameters for that sentence, and is illegal when the court acts without statutory authority for a sentence. State v. Kotwicki, 2007 MT 17, ¶ 13, 335 Mont. 344, 151 P.3d 892;Lenihan, 184 Mont. at 342, 602 P.2d at 1000. The Lenihan exception is triggered when a challenged sentence is plausibly illegal, and not just objectionable. State v. Makarchuk, 2009 MT 82, ¶¶ 29–30, 349 Mont. 507, 204 P.3d 1213 (citing Kotwicki, ¶¶¶ 16–18). As we observed in Lenihan,
The sentencing authority of a court exists solely by virtue of a statutory grant of power and therefore cannot be exercised in any manner not specifically authorized.... Where, as in this case, it is alleged that a sentencing court has exceeded its statutory authority in imposing a specific sentence, an objection below is not a prerequisite to the challenging of the sentencing order alleged to be void.
Lenihan, 184 Mont. at 342, 602 P.2d at 1000 (quoting State v. Braughton, 28 Or.App. 891, 561 P.2d 1040, 1041 n. 2 (1977)). The Lenihan exception affords to a defendant the right to appeal an illegal sentence, a right the State is accorded by statute. Therefore, this appeal is properly before the Court.
¶ 15 Did the District Court impose an illegal sentence?
¶ 16 The penalty for sexual intercourse without consent when the victim is less than 16 years old and the offender is three or more years older is set forth in § 45–5–503(3)(a), MCA, which provides:
If the victim is less than 16 years old and the offender is 3 or more years older than the victim or if the offender inflicts bodily injury upon anyone in the course of committing sexual intercourse without consent, the offender shall be punished by life imprisonment or by imprisonment in the state prison for a term of not less than 4 years....
The District Court was required to impose a sentence pursuant to this provision unless a separate statutory exception also applied. Section 46–18–222, MCA, lists exceptions to that mandatory minimum sentence, and Rambold conceded at sentencing that none of those exceptions applied. In his appeal to this Court, Rambold argues that an exception should have been considered under § 46–18–222(5), MCA, which provides an exception when “the threat of bodily injury or actual infliction of bodily injury is an actual element of the crime” and “no serious bodily injury was inflicted on the victim....” That exception is inapplicable, however, due to the nature of the charges filed against Rambold. The State never alleged that Rambold had used physical force against C.M., nor did Rambold plead guilty to any facts involving infliction of bodily injury. The “threat or actual infliction of bodily injury” is not an “ actual element of the crime” charged in this case. Rambold is therefore ineligible for this exception to the mandatory minimum sentence.
¶ 17 With no other applicable exceptions to the mandatory minimum, we now turn to the legality of the suspended portion of Rambold's sentence. The District Court relied on § 46–18–205(1), MCA, in formulating its sentence. That subsection reads:
If the victim was less than 16 years of age, the imposition or execution of the first 30 days of a sentence of imprisonment imposed under the following sections may not be deferred or suspended and the provisions of 46–18–222 do not apply to the first 30...
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Inquiry Concerning Complaint of Judicial Standards Comm'n of State v. Baugh, PR 14–0078.
...criminal case against Rambold. We recently vacated his sentence and remanded for resentencing by a new judge. See State v. Rambold, 2014 MT 116, 375 Mont. 30, 325 P.3d 686.DISCUSSION¶ 9 Rule 1.2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires judges to act in a manner that promotes public confiden......
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Inquiry Concerning Complaint of Judicial Standards Comm'n of State v. Judge G. Todd Baugh, PR 14–0078.
...criminal case against Rambold. We recently vacated his sentence and remanded for resentencing by a new judge. See State v. Rambold, 2014 MT 116, 375 Mont. 30, 325 P.3d 686. DISCUSSION ¶ 9 Rule 1.2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires judges to act in a manner that promotes public confid......
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...it falls outside "the statutory parameters for that sentence," or if the sentencing court lacks statutory authority to impose it. State v. Rambold , 2014 MT 116, ¶ 14, 375 Mont. 30, 325 P.3d 686. Keefe asserts that his sentence is unconstitutional and does not comport with Miller and Steilm......
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...for that sentence," or if the sentencing court lacks statutory authority to impose it. State v. Rambold, 2014 MT 116, ¶ 14, 375 Mont. 30, 324 P.3d 686. Keefe that his sentence is unconstitutional and does not comport with Miller and Steilman because it does not provide him with a meaningful......