State v. Ramos

Decision Date01 June 1987
Citation526 A.2d 284,217 N.J.Super. 530
PartiesSTATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Santiago RAMOS, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtNew Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division

Alfred A. Slocum, Public Defender, for appellant (Lieberman, Ryan, Welaj & Miller, Somerville, attorneys; Thomas C. Miller, Designated Counsel and on the brief).

Santiago Ramos, pro se, (Santiago Ramos on supplemental brief).

W. Cary Edwards, Atty. Gen., for respondent (Cathleen Russo Delanoy, Deputy Atty. Gen., of counsel and on the brief).

Before Judges FURMAN, DREIER and SHEBELL.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

DREIER, J.A.D.

Defendant has appealed from his convictions of second degree burglary, N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2; third degree aggravated criminal sexual contact, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3a; third degree terroristic threats, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-2; and second degree attempted aggravated sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1 and 2C:14-2a(3). The trial judge merged the conviction for aggravated criminal sexual contact into the conviction for attempted aggravated sexual assault, and the conviction for terroristic threats into that for second degree burglary. He then sentenced defendant, a persistent offender, to an extended term of 20 years with a 10-year period of parole ineligibility for the attempted aggravated sexual assault, and for the burglary to a consecutive term of 10 years with a five-year period of parole ineligibility. Defendant's aggregate sentence, therefore, was to a term of 30 years with a 15-year period of parole ineligibility. A Violent Crimes Compensation Board penalty of $275 was also imposed.

Testimony revealed that at approximately 4:00 a.m. on November 6, 1983 defendant, after stacking cinderblocks under the window of the 14-year-old victim, opened her window and entered the bedroom in which she was sleeping alone. The victim awoke as he pulled the sheets from her. When the victim realized that defendant was not a family member playing a prank on her, she hit him in the face, causing his glasses to fall off. After retrieving his glasses he held the victim's mouth and neck onto the pillow and told her if she moved he would kill her. He then attempted to undress her but she managed to roll off the bed on the side opposite defendant and to call for her parents. Although the defendant again attempted to approach the victim, he apparently heard the victim's mother call back that she was coming to the victim's aid, whereupon he ran back to the window and jumped out head first. The victim testified that someone had turned on a light in the apartment building across the alley and she was able to see defendant's face. After the police were called, they investigated the scene, took a description from the victim and discovered butts of Kool cigarettes both near the cinderblocks beneath the window and in the area where cinderblocks had been stored nearby.

The victim described her assailant as a dark-skinned male, possibly in his 30's, approximately 5' 10"'' tall, with black curly hair, wearing dark glasses, a black jacket, blue jeans and light blue sneakers. Although he spoke fluent English, she said he looked as if he may have been Hispanic 1. She also detected an odor of alcohol on his breath and thought he might have been smoking. She did not initially recognize the person who had assaulted her. A few hours later, at 10:00 a.m., the victim viewed a lineup of nine color photographs of Hispanic males of similar age and physical appearance. She identified defendant's photograph without any doubt in her mind. As the girl was reviewing the written statement her brother spoke to her and himself recognized defendant's photo as that of a son of a friend of the victim's grandfather. The victim then also realized that she had seen the defendant before on a few occasions although she did not recall his name or anything else about him. She testified that although she had seen defendant in passing once or twice, she never spoke to him nor did she know where he lived. An arrest warrant was obtained and defendant was arrested shortly after 2:00 p.m. on the same day. Defendant resided in a building located directly behind the victim's house separated only by a yard, a collapsed fence, and the alleyway from which access was secured. Apparently, the victim's window would have been visible from defendant's building and the alleyway, and the proximity of the structures was compatible with the State's theory that the motive for defendant's entry was a sexual attack on the girl.

When the police entered defendant's apartment they found him dressed only in jogging shorts. Defendant was informed of the warrant and given Miranda warnings. He then indicated that he wished to get dressed and requested that his wife bring him a pair of shoes. Initially, she returned with a pair of light blue sneakers, but after a brief conversation with defendant in Spanish brought him a pair of dress shoes to wear. Defendant was not then wearing his glasses and one of the detectives, who had known defendant casually for several years and had seen the photograph of defendant in which he was wearing glasses, inquired where his glasses were. Defendant responded that he did not wear glasses. He was then taken to police headquarters, processed, and again read his Miranda rights. At that time he smoked three Kool cigarettes. A chemist from the State Police Laboratory analyzed the butts from these cigarettes, the cigarette butts found outside the victim's home, and samples of defendant's blood and saliva 2.

Police obtained a search warrant for defendant's apartment and found a pair of prescription glasses with dark frames, a gray jacket, a pair of blue jeans and light blue sneakers, all similar to the description the victim gave of the clothing worn by her attacker.

Defendant has raised six points on this appeal:

Point I

The trial court erred by failing to charge the jury on third degree burglary (partially raised below).

Point II

The trial court erred in denying defense counsel's motion to suppress the statement made by the defendant in the absence of a valid waiver by the defendant of his Miranda rights.

Point III

The trial court erred in permitting improper and highly prejudicial testimony on redirect examination.

Point IV

The trial court erred in failing to charge the jury regarding its use of prior inconsistent statements of the victim as substantive evidence.

Point V

The trial court erred by failing to merge Count I involving burglary into Count IV involving attempted aggravated sexual assault during a burglary.

Point VI

The trial court abused its sentencing discretion by imposing maximum terms and parole disqualifiers as well as consecutive sentences.

Defendant first claims that the court should have charged third degree burglary. Burglary is a third degree crime unless there is a showing that the actor either "purposely, knowingly or recklessly inflicts, attempts to inflict, or threatens to inflict bodily injury on anyone," or "is armed with or displays what appears to be explosives or a deadly weapon," in which case the crime is one of second degree. The judge only charged second degree burglary.

In the case before us it is clear that defendant at least threatened to inflict bodily injury. But it is conceivable that a jury might have found that his purpose for entering the premises was other than to attack the young victim, and proceeded to do so only when she was discovered in the room. This was urged by defense counsel at trial after the court on its own motion raised the question of whether third degree burglary should also be charged. The prosecutor opposed such a charge and the court requested that defense counsel state specifically whether he wanted the charge to be given. He informed the judge that he would let the court decide, and the judge then decided to omit the charge.

Without a proper request to charge, even granting that robbery was a theoretical possibility, no facts appear from which a motive could be determined for the entry other than to attack the child. We thus determine that the only basis for reversal on this point would be a finding of plain error under R. 2:10-2, notwithstanding the discussion at trial. Defense counsel cannot leave a matter up to the trial judge's discretion and then urge a particular resolution on appeal different than what the judge had determined at trial, unless it is plain error "clearly capable of producing an unjust result," and separately remediable on appeal. R. 2:10-2. Such a trial tactic leaves the defense in a position to claim on appeal that he demanded the opposite action of whatever the trial court determined. A trial judge's decision not to charge a lesser-included offense will not be upset on appeal unless the facts adduced at trial clearly indicated the appropriateness of the omitted action 3. State v. Choice, 98 N.J. 295, 299-300, 486 A.2d 833 (1985); State v. Powell, 84 N.J. 305, 318, 419 A.2d 406 (1980); State v. Vujosevic, 198 N.J.Super. 435, 445, 489 A.2d 751 (App.Div.1985), certif. den. 101 N.J. 247, 501 A.2d 920 (1986). And see N.J.S.A. 2C:1-8e. In view of our sentencing decision, to be stated infra, even if there were error which should be noticed at this stage, the practical effect upon defendant is nil.

Defendant's second point is that defendant's statement that he did not wear glasses should have been suppressed since it was the result of an improper custodial interrogation in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Defendant had already been informed of his constitutional rights before he answered and knew that he did not have to answer the question. However, an express waiver had not yet been obtained. The judge stated that he did not believe that the question was a part of a custodial interrogation, but even if it was defendant had been informed of his rights. When defense counsel...

To continue reading

Request your trial
15 cases
  • State v. M.L.
    • United States
    • New Jersey Superior Court – Appellate Division
    • 16 Octubre 1991
    ...to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect." Id. at 301, 100 S.Ct. at 1689-90, 64 L.Ed.2d at 308; State v. Ramos, 217 N.J.Super. 530, 537, 526 A.2d 284 (App.Div.1987) (footnotes omitted). It is abundantly evident that here the officer had no reason to know that the response would ......
  • State v. Leopardi
    • United States
    • New Jersey Superior Court – Appellate Division
    • 24 Octubre 1997
    ...47, 51, 392 A.2d 210 (App.Div.1978), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 80 N.J. 239, 403 A.2d 457 (1979); State v. Ramos, 217 N.J.Super. 530, 538, 526 A.2d 284 (App.Div.1987); State v. Provet, 133 N.J.Super. 432, 436-38, 337 A.2d 374 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 68 N.J. 174, 343 A.2d 462 (1975). ......
  • State v. Adams
    • United States
    • New Jersey Superior Court – Appellate Division
    • 27 Julio 1988
    ...criminal sexual contact into his conviction for attempted aggravated sexual assault, essentially relying on State v. Ramos, 217 N.J.Super. 530, 526 A.2d 284 (App.Div.1987). The State argues against merger and takes the position that Ramos was wrongly decided on the merger issue. Moreover, i......
  • State v. Mallozzi
    • United States
    • New Jersey Superior Court – Appellate Division
    • 8 Marzo 1991
    ...to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect." Id. at 301, 100 S.Ct. at 1689, 64 L.Ed.2d at 308; State v. Ramos, 217 N.J.Super. 530, 537, 526 A.2d 284 (App.Div.1987) (footnotes Defendant asserts that the actions of Agent Lamar constituted the functional equivalent of interrogation r......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT