State v. Rancourt

• Decision Date: 19 October 1981
• Citation: 435 A.2d 1095
• Parties: . Supreme Judicial Court of Maine
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 1095

435 A.2d 1095

STATE of Maine v. Louis RANCOURT, II.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued June 18, 1981.

Decided Oct. 19, 1981.

Charles K. Leadbetter, Herbert Bunker, Jr., Frederick C. Moore (orally), Wayne S. Moss, Asst. Attys. Gen., Augusta, for plaintiff.

Daviau, Jabar & Batten, Robert J. Daviau, Joseph Jabar (orally), Waterville, for defendant.

Before McKUSICK, C. J., and WERNICK, ^* NICHOLS, ROBERTS and CARTER, JJ.

CARTER, Justice.

Following a three-week jury trial in the Superior Court (Kennebec County), the defendant, Louis Rancourt, II, was convicted of manslaughter. On appeal, the defendant contends that errors were committed in the jury voir dire examination, in evidentiary rulings during the trial, and in the jury instructions. We affirm the judgment below.

The defendant was charged with murder resulting from the May 10, 1980 killing of Stephen Quimby. The state attempted to show that the defendant knew the identity of his victim, and that a possible motive for the killing was the defendant's belief that Quimby was "fooling around" with the defendant's girlfriend, Barbara Caswell. Mindful of the rule that an appellate court must view the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in a light most favorable to the jury verdict, State v. Goyette, Me., 407 A.2d 1104, 1107 (1979), we find the trial record discloses the following facts.

On May 3, 1980, while visiting Stephen Quimby at Quimby's home, the defendant told Quimby that if he ever heard of or caught Quimby fooling around with Barbara Caswell, he would shoot him or have someone do it for him.

On May 9, the day before the killing, the defendant left a message for Quimby to come that evening to the defendant's house. Living with the defendant were his girlfriend, Barbara Caswell, his step-brother, Ron Webber, and his step-brother's girlfriend, Chris Dyer. The defendant testified that Quimby would know that the reason for the request was to sell Quimby some marijuana. Quimby received the message the next day, May 10.

Quimby and his nephew, Paul Davidson, spent the 10th drinking and smoking marijuana. Shortly after 9:00 p. m., they went to the defendant's house because Quimby said that he wanted to get some marijuana, and that if the defendant wasn't home he was going to have sex with Barbara Caswell.

At the defendant's house, the defendant and Barbara Caswell were upstairs asleep, while Webber was sleeping downstairs. Dyer was downstairs cleaning. Quimby and Davidson entered the house. Dyer told Quimby that the defendant was upstairs. Quimby then called to the defendant, and began climbing the stairs to the second floor. The defendant and Caswell both yelled at him to get out of the house, but Quimby continued to the defendant's bedroom. The defendant fired one "warning" shot through an outside wall, and then fired a second shot which killed Quimby.

Davidson testified that the defendant called out Quimby's name several times before the killing. Webber heard an argument; Dyer said Quimby was upstairs for a few minutes before he was shot. The defendant testified to the following. He did not know who was climbing the stairs. After the defendant fired the warning shot, the intruder entered the bedroom and grabbed the rifle. They struggled; the rifle discharged. The defendant turned on the light, and first discovered that the intruder was Quimby.

After the shooting, Caswell said to a neighbor: "He shot my boyfriend." The defendant told a policeman: "I did not know who he was. I told him to leave, so I shot him, at a silhouette."

Other facts appear below where relevant to our discussion of the issues.

I. Voir Dire

The defendant argues that the trial court erred by stopping counsel from continuing to ask questions on individual voir dire of prospective jurors.

After the court conducted a general voir dire of the entire jury panel, the court at first permitted counsel to question the individual panel members. Defense counsel's ¹ first question recited the facts to which, counsel represented, the defendant would testify. ² The state objected, and the juror was excused for cause. A conference in the justice's chambers followed, at which counsel's proposed questions were reviewed and ruled on. Individual questioning by counsel then continued. Defense counsel repeatedly attempted to ask questions which the court had previously ruled in chambers or during earlier voir dire were not permissible. Defense counsel asked repetitious questions, and continued to do so after admonishment by the court. Finally, after completing the questioning of only eight individual jurors, over the span of an afternoon and the following morning, the trial court terminated voir dire by counsel, stating:

Voir dire questioning has been almost uncontrollable. That is undoubtedly somewhat my fault, but I must say (that defense counsel is) pushing the limit of proper courtroom behavior, and as a result of that, I am not going to permit individual voir dire by counsel of any of the remaining members of the jury panel.

The justice later explained that defense counsel had been asking questions which were "absolutely irrelevant to (one's) qualifications as a juror," and that some of defense counsel's questions "touched on areas that counsel should have known would not be permitted ... because similar objections had been sustained (previously)." Our review of the record establishes the correctness of these conclusions reached by the trial judge.

The remaining individual voir dire was conducted by the court, counsel being permitted to orally submit proposed questions in advance for each juror.

Relying on 15 M.R.S.A. § 1258-A and M.R.Crim.P. 24(a), the defendant contends that he has an absolute right to address questions to the prospective jurors either himself or through his attorney. Title 15 M.R.S.A. § 1258-A states: "Any rule of court or statute to the contrary notwithstanding, the court shall permit voir dire examination to be conducted by the parties or their attorneys under its direction." (Emphasis added.) Under this statute, a trial justice may not arbitrarily refuse to allow counsel to conduct any voir dire examination. However, counsel's right to such examination is limited by the requirement that he or she act under the court's direction. Counsel has no right to conduct voir dire examination outside of the court's direction. M.R.Crim.P. 24(a) provides that the court "shall permit the parties or their attorneys to address additional questions to the prospective jurors on any subject which has not been fully covered in the court's examination and which is germane to the jurors' qualifications." Again, the right of counsel to ask questions is not unlimited. Where counsel demonstrates a generalized inability or an adamant refusal to ask germane question or to act under the court's direction, the trial court may refuse to permit counsel to personally ask further questions. Indeed, it is the trial court's duty to take appropriate steps to control voir dire so that potential jurors are not needlessly and improperly tainted during jury selection procedures.

The defendant does not contend that the trial court erred in any of its rulings on specific questions proposed or asked by counsel during the individual voir dire examination. The record amply supports the court's findings that defense counsel persisted in asking questions irrelevant to the jurors' qualifications, and questions which he should have known would not be permitted because of prior rulings of the court. Counsel's attempts to present to prospective jurors the defendant's expected testimony was improper. The defendant is not entitled to "obtain a pre-judgment by the prospective juror as to what his verdict would be on facts hypothesized by the question." State v. Abney, 347 So.2d 498, 501 (La.1977); State v. Clark, 164 Conn. 224, 400, 419 A.2d 398, 399 (1973); Sweet v. Stutch, 240 Cal.App. 891, 893, 50 Cal.Rptr. 9, 11 (Dist.Ct.App.1966).

Thus, on this record, it is manifest that the trial judge's actions were necessary to assure the proper conduct of the voir dire function and to guard against the commission of deliberate error in the jury selection process. Defense counsel's continuing and stubborn refusal to abide by simple, clear rulings of the court in the course of voir dire demonstrated that his conduct was wilful. See Swanson v. Evans Oil, Inc., 12 A.D.2d 875, 209 N.Y.S.2d 860 (1961). Viewed from this perspective, the court's action in taking control of the questioning was not only a necessary but a moderate response to defense counsel's patent attempt to obtain unfair and improper advantage by his conduct of the voir dire examination in total disregard of the trial court's repeated rulings. The trial court's substituted procedure of itself asking the prospective jurors questions proposed by the parties protected the defendant's right to demonstrate prejudice in the array. ³ See State v. Littlefield, Me., 374 A.2d 590, 596 (1977). We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's handling of the voir dire.

II. Evidentiary Rulings

A. Expert Testimony

Dr. Ryan, an expert forensic pathologist, testified that the fatal gunshot wound was not a contact wound. Later, William Manduca, a firearms expert, testified that he found no nitrites on the victim's clothes, and that in his opinion, the gun was at least 21/2 feet away from the victim at the time the fatal shot was fired. On cross-examination, Manduca indicated that no nitrites would be found on the victim's clothes if the fatal wound was a contact wound. On redirect, over objection, the state was permitted to ask Manduca:

Q. Did you determine from Dr. Ryan the nature of the wound ...?

A. Yes, sir, I did.

Q. Was it a contact wound?

A. No, sir, it wasn't.

The defendant argues that in the above testimony Manduca, a firearms expert, was erroneously permitted to give an opinion concerning forensic pathology. Manduca was not...