State v. Rangitsch
| Decision Date | 28 May 1985 |
| Docket Number | No. 14133-3-I,14133-3-I |
| Citation | 40 Wn.App. 771,700 P.2d 382 |
| Parties | STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Kevin Danforth RANGITSCH, Appellant. |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
Browne, Ressler & Foster, Allen M. Ressler, Seattle, for appellant.
Seth Dawson, Snohomish County Pros. Atty., S. Aaron Fine, Deputy, Everett, for respondent.
Kevin Rangitsch appeals his judgment and sentence for five counts of negligent homicide and one count of possession of a controlled substance. We affirm the negligent homicide convictions and reverse the controlled substance conviction.
On April 17, 1983, a 3-car collision at an intersection in Lynnwood caused the death of five people. There was testimony at the trial that the defendant was driving northbound in a Camaro, applied his brakes some 26 feet ahead of a stop sign, and slid 41 feet before he collided with an eastbound vehicle which was sent spinning into a westbound vehicle, thereby causing the deaths. Expert testimony on behalf of the State set the defendant's speed at 42 m.p.h. at the time he applied his brakes. The speed limit on the northbound road was 25 m.p.h.
Trooper Lewis found the defendant at a nearby home and observed that he was shaking, mumbling, and sniffling but did not seem under the influence of alcohol. Lewis was told that the defendant had recently undergone back surgery. This information made her suspicious that he was under the influence of drugs, because potent painkillers often are prescribed for back injury. Lewis was directed by Trooper Walser, who was in charge of the accident investigation, to arrest the defendant and take him to the hospital to get a blood sample. Lewis had been with the State Patrol for 4 years and had received training in recognition of drug use symptoms. On the way to the hospital and once there, Lewis observed that the defendant's moods varied. At times he was detached and unresponsive, and minutes later he would be hyperactive and agitated. She also noticed that his pupils remained dilated even in the bright lights of the hospital. Although she had not previously seen persons under the influence of cocaine, she had experience in recognizing shock symptoms exhibited by accident victims. Based on her experience, training, and observations of the defendant's appearance and moods, she believed that he was under the influence of drugs.
In the waiting room of the hospital, Lewis arrested the defendant and advised him of his Miranda rights. He signed the advice of rights form without help. His wife was present and signed the form as a witness. Lewis also read him the special evidence warning pertaining to negligent homicide, including the caution that if he refused to have a blood sample taken his blood would be forcibly taken. Defendant acknowledged that he understood his rights. Both he and his wife signed the form. When he was asked if he would give the blood sample, he said that he would do so and signed the form granting permission for the blood to be taken. Minutes after the blood was taken, Lewis asked the defendant if he would give a urine sample, telling him that he did not have to do so. She explained that if he refused, a search warrant would have to be obtained. Defendant gave the urine sample. After both samples were taken, Lewis noticed numerous needle track marks on the defendant's arms characteristic of those found on persons who habitually inject drugs. Defendant was released and returned home that night.
Five days after the collision, Walser executed an affidavit for a warrant to search the defendant's home and automobile. He related in the affidavit what Lewis had observed concerning the defendant's possible use of drugs. He also related the statement of a Kimberly White who was with the defendant in a nearby house about 15 minutes before the collision. She said the defendant stated in her presence that he had shot up cocaine one-half hour or so before and needed another fix. In her opinion, the defendant was high at that time. She previously had seen people under the influence of cocaine, and the defendant was the worst she had ever seen. She saw him leave the house in his Camaro, spinning his tires as he drove off at a high rate of speed. She followed in her vehicle and observed him proceed north at a speed she estimated to be greater than 60 m.p.h. Walser further stated in the affidavit that it was the experience of another trooper working in the narcotics department that cocaine users would commonly have cocaine and drug paraphernalia in their vehicles and residences.
On the basis of this affidavit, a search warrant was issued for the defendant's home and automobile. In the search of the home, drug paraphernalia and traces of cocaine were found. This was the basis for count 6 of the information, charging the defendant with a violation of RCW 69.50.401(d), the Uniform Controlled Substances Act (VUCSA).
Because of the multiple deaths, the collision received wide coverage by the media, including coverage of allegations that the defendant was a cocaine addict. His previous reckless driving charges were also given extensive publicity when they came to trial in district court while his trial for negligent homicide was pending. Defendant moved for a change of venue, alleging that the extensive publicity prevented him from receiving a fair trial in Snohomish County. The court denied his motion.
Prior to trial, the defendant moved to sever the controlled substances count from the five counts of negligent homicide and to suppress evidence. The court granted the motion to sever and denied the motions to suppress.
The VUCSA charge was tried to the court on stipulated evidence, and the negligent homicide charges were presented to a jury on the alternative bases that the defendant was driving: a) under the influence of or affected by cocaine, or b) in a reckless manner, or c) with disregard for the safety of others. During trial, the defense objected strongly to the testimony of Dr. Bonnell, a pathologist called by the State as an expert witness on the effects of cocaine and on how it might affect motor skills.
The jury found the defendant guilty on all five counts of negligent homicide, and the court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law finding the defendant guilty of the VUCSA charge.
Was there probable cause to believe the defendant was under the influence of drugs so as to justify the taking of blood?
Defendant argues that when Walser directed the arrest be made, he had no knowledge of the defendant's intoxication, and therefore probable cause did not exist to require a blood sample.
A sample of a defendant's blood may be seized without a warrant at the direction of a police officer who has probable cause to believe the defendant was driving while intoxicated and committed the crime of negligent homicide. RCW 46.20.308(1); State v. Judge, 100 Wash.2d 706, 712, 675 P.2d 219 (1984).
Although probable cause might not have existed for Walser to require a blood sample, there was probable cause to arrest for negligent homicide. There was evidence from which Walser could have concluded that the defendant was operating the vehicle in a reckless manner with disregard for the safety of others which proximately caused the deaths. RCW 46.61.520. The arrest was therefore valid. The request for a blood sample was not made until Lewis had reached the conclusion that the defendant was under the influence of drugs.
The testimony concerning Walser's training, experience, and observations at the scene of the accident supports the finding and conclusion that there was probable cause to arrest the defendant for negligent homicide. The testimony concerning the training, experience, and observations of Trooper Lewis supports the finding and conclusion that there was probable cause to believe the defendant was under the influence of drugs at the time of the collision. 1
Was there consent to the taking of urine?
Defendant alleges that he was confused by the advice of rights and obligation to give blood, and therefore did not truly consent to the taking of a urine sample.
There was substantial evidence from which the trial court did find and conclude that the defendant voluntarily consented to give a urine sample. The voluntary nature of such consent is a question of fact to be determined by considering the totality of the circumstances, including: (1) whether the Miranda warnings were given; (2) the defendant's education and intelligence; and (3) whether he was advised of his right not to consent. State v. Shoemaker, 85 Wash.2d 207, 212, 533 P.2d 123 (1975); State v. Rodriguez, 32 Wash.App. 758, 762, 650 P.2d 225 (1982). In this regard, the findings of the trial court will be given great weight. State v. Smith, 72 Wash.2d 479, 481, 434 P.2d 5 (1967). We do not find the defendant's claim of confusion to be supported by other evidence in the record.
The court did not err by refusing to suppress evidence of cocaine in the blood and urine samples. The court was correct in finding probable cause and consent.
Was the defendant entitled to an instruction that evidence relating to drug use be disregarded?
Defendant argues that there was no evidence to establish a nexus between cocaine use and the accident, and therefore evidence of such drug use was inflammatory and irrelevant.
The jury was instructed that driving under the influence of drugs was an alternate means of committing the crime. Two other means are set out in the statute, RCW 46.61.520 2, and the jury was appropriately instructed concerning all three. Since the statute describes a single offense and since the alternative means of committing it are not repugnant to each other, the jury was also properly instructed that unanimity on any particular means was not required. State v. Orsborn, 28 Wash.App. 111, 116-17, 626 P.2d 980 (1980); see State v. Johnson, 100 Wash.2d 607, 626, 674...
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