State v. Ransberger

• Decision Date: 12 October 1891
• Citation: 17 S.W. 290,106 Mo. 135
• Parties: The State v. Ransberger, Appellant
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

17 S.W. 290

106 Mo. 135

The State v. Ransberger, Appellant

Supreme Court of Missouri, Second Division

October 12, 1891

April 1891

Certified from Kansas City Court of Appeals.

Transferred to Kansas City Court of Appeals.

J. P Strother for appellant.

John M. Wood, Attorney General, and A. F. Rector for the State.

OPINION

Thomas, J.

The reasons for the transfer of this case to this court from the Kansas City court of appeals will fully appear by the following excerpts from the very able opinion delivered by Judge Ellison, on behalf of that court: "This prosecution," says Judge Ellison, "was begun before a justice of the peace of Saline county by information from the prosecuting attorney charging defendant with lasciviously and lewdly cohabiting with a female therein named. The only objection urged to the information is in relation to the affidavit made by the prosecuting attorney and attached thereto. The affidavit is that the facts stated in the foregoing information are true according to his best information and belief. The specific objection is that the affidavit should have been based upon the knowledge of the prosecuting attorney, and not merely his information or belief.

"The attorney for the state concedes the defendant's point, if the cases of State v. Humble, 34 Mo.App. 343, and State v. Wilkson, 36 Mo.App. 373, are to be regarded as sound law, but he insists that they should not be so regarded. * * * The constitution provides that offenses of the description at bar 'shall be prosecuted criminally by indictment or information as concurrent remedies.' Sec. 12, art. 2. The prosecution in this case is by information. The important question then is, what is an information? The answer is not what the legislature may prescribe or designate as an information, which at the adoption of the constitution was well known. The information of the common law is the information prescribed by the constitution, and no other mode can be authorized by the legislature. This has been so frequently adjudicated by the supreme court of the state as not to be debatable or questionable. State v. Kelm, 79 Mo. 515; State v. Briscoe, 80 Mo. 643; State v. Russell, 88 Mo. 648."

Judge Ellison, after reviewing the law as to the nature and attributes of an information, and the method of its presentation to the court, adds: "From these considerations, it would be clear to the legal mind that a common-law information is one that is intrusted solely to the discretion of our state attorney to be given or withheld at his will, unhampered by statutory restraint, and, as the case in some respects presents a constitutional question, it becomes, under our conclusion herein, of great public importance, that the opinion of the supreme court should be taken."

The information in this case did not recite that the prosecuting attorney presented it on his own knowledge, but, yet, made the charge against defendant in direct, affirmative language, and the affidavit attached is in the form indicated by Judge Ellison. We will add that, since the decision in this case by the Kansas City court of appeals, the St. Louis court of appeals has affirmed the doctrine of State v. Humble and State v. Wilkson, supra, in the case of State v. Hatfield, 40 Mo.App. 358, and State v. Buck, 43 Mo.App. 443. The doctrine of these cases is this: An information before a justice of the peace "must be based on the personal knowledge of some one, either on that of some private person lodging with the prosecuting attorney a complaint, verified by affidavit and setting forth the facts, or on an information filed by the prosecuting attorney on his own personal knowledge." And this must affirmatively appear either in the body of the information or in the affidavit attached thereto. We have given the subject a very careful consideration, and our conclusion is that the information in this case conforms to the requirements of the statute, and, therefore, the constitutional question suggested does not arise for decision.

I. The act of 1885, under the provisions of which this prosecution was instituted, declares that, "When any person has knowledge that any offense has been committed * * * he may make complaint verified by his oath * * * and deposit it with the prosecuting attorney; and whenever the prosecuting attorney has knowledge of the commission of an offense * * * or shall be informed thereof by complaint deposited with him as aforesaid, it shall be his duty to file an information." Sess. Acts, 1885, p. 145. The contention is that the word "knowledge" as here used means personal or actual knowledge as contradistinguished from information derived from others. We do not concur in this contention and from these considerations:

First. The words "actual" and "personal" do not occur in the statute, and we have no right to interpolate both or either in our interpretation of the word whose meaning we now seek. Those qualifying adjectives must, therefore, be eliminated from the discussion.

Second. "Knowledge" in its ordinary and usual sense has not the restricted meaning contended for by defendant. A discussion of this subject in a philosophical and transcendental sense is not required. The courts, in the administration of law, must look to the substance of things and not fritter away the rights of men and society by refinements beyond the reach of the common mind and never contemplated by the legislator.

The contention under review assumes that, when a person is informed of a fact, he does not know that fact within the meaning of the law. Mr. Webster defines "know," "to have knowledge; to possess information, instruction or wisdom." "Knowledge," he defines to be "the act of knowing; clear perception of truth and duty; information." Worcester says, "the word knowledge strictly employed implies three things, viz., truth, proof and conviction." He defines knowledge as "information, intelligence; as to have knowledge of a fact." Anderson says, knowledge is information. Knowledge imparted or obtained; knowledge however communicated is information. Bouvier's definition is "knowledge is information of fact." Best in his work on the principles of evidence uses this language: "By knowledge, strictly speaking, is meant an actual perception of the agreement or disagreement of any of our ideas, and it is only to such a perception that the term certainty is properly applicable. Knowledge is intuitive when this agreement or disagreement is perceived immediately by comparison of the ideas themselves; demonstrative, when it is only perceived mediately, i. e., when it is deduced from a comparison of each with intervening ideas which have constant and immutable connection with them, as in the case of mathematical truths, of which the mind has taken in the proof. And, lastly, when through the agency of our senses we obtain a perception of the existence of external objects, our knowledge is said to be sensitive. But knowledge and certainty are constantly used in a secondary sense, which it is important not to overlook, viz., as synonymous with settled belief and reasonable conviction, as when we say that such a one received stolen goods knowing them to have been stolen; or that we are certain or morally certain of the existence of such fact." Justice Strong in Shaw v. Railroad, 101 U.S. 557, 25 L.Ed. 892, says: "It may fairly be assumed that one, who has reason to believe a fact exists, knows it exists. Certainly, if he be a reasonable being." "Knowledge is information, and information knowledge." Eddington v. Ins. Co., 1 Hem. 1; Robson v. Kemp, 5 Esp. 53. "Absolute knowledge can be had of but few things." Story v. Buffum, 8 Allen 35. "Knowledge is nothing more than a man's firm belief," says Shaw, C. J., in Hatch v. Carpenter, 9 Gray 271. Sir William Hamilton in his work on logic, page 442, says: "The doctrine, therefore, of the acquisition of knowledge must consist of two parts -- the one treating of the acquisition of knowledge through the data of experience, the second of the acquisition of knowledge through the data of intelligence. In regard to the first of these sources, viz., experience -- this is either our own experience or the experience of others, and in either case it is a means of knowledge. It is manifest that the knowledge we acquire through our personal experience is far superior in degree to that which we obtain through the experience of other men; inasmuch as our knowledge of an object in the former case is far clearer and more distinct, far more complete and lively, than in the latter. On the other hand the latter is far superior to our proper experience in this, -- that it is much more comprehensive, and that, without this, man would be deprived of those branches of knowledge which are to him of the most indispensable importance."

Thus in the domain of literature, of law, of philosophy, we find a consensus of opinion that information is knowledge and that what we know is not confined to what we have personally observed or to what we have evolved by our own cognitive faculties. These definitions accord, too, with the common understanding of men in the ordinary affairs of life. We speak of historical knowledge, scientific knowledge geographical knowledge, legal knowledge. A telegram announces that a president has been assassinated, and the people of the nation are instantly thrilled with horror and indignation. They do not know that the president has been assassinated in the strict sense, but they are firmly convinced of it, and they know it in a practical sense so that action follows spontaneously. And so with the social and business intercourse of the people; action is taken habitually on information alone, and if it was not...