State v. Ratliff, WD
| Decision Date | 27 April 1982 |
| Docket Number | No. WD,WD |
| Citation | 633 S.W.2d 267 |
| Parties | STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Arthur RATLIFF, Appellant. 32291. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Robert A. Simons, Kansas City, for appellant.
John Ashcroft, Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, Carl S. Yendes, Asst. Atty. Gen., Kansas City, for respondent.
Before CLARK, P. J., and MANFORD and KENNEDY, JJ.
Arthur Ratliff was convicted by a jury on two counts of sodomy and was sentenced to concurrent terms of eight years. On this appeal, he takes no issue with the sufficiency of the evidence, thus obviating the necessity for recounting the facts upon which the jury adjudicated the issue of guilt.
In his first point, Ratliff contends he was entitled to dismissal of the indictment because, in violation of § 545.780, RSMo 1978, he was not brought to trial within 180 days of arraignment. The record does reflect the date of Ratliff's arraignment to have been December 18, 1979 and the date of trial July 23, 1980, an elapsed time of 218 days. On June 10, 1980, Ratliff filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of delay in bringing the case to trial. The trial court overruled the motion on June 16, 1980 without findings or comment. Ratliff's point is twofold; first, that the statute and the time computation alone were sufficient to require his discharge. Second, he argues that the state is not entitled to the benefit of discretionary action by the trial court under the statute because no record was made by the court showing reasons for the action taken.
Ratliff's argument overlooks or ignores delays occasioned in his case by pretrial motions which he filed. On February 1, 1980, Ratliff moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that no record was made of proceedings before the grand jury which returned the indictment.
While that motion yet pended, he moved on February 19, 1980 for dismissal on a claim of multiplicitous counts and double jeopardy. Finally, on February 21, 1980, he moved for dismissal alleging the insufficiency of the arrest warrant. All of the foregoing motions were overruled by the trial court on April 17, 1980. The elapsed time from February 1, 1980 to the date of that ruling amounted to 76 days which, if excludable from computation of the 180-day time limit, brings his trial date well within the statutory mandate.
Section 545.780.3(1)(c), RSMo 1978 provides:
"3. The following periods of delay shall be excluded in computing the time within which the arraignment or trial of any such offense must commence:
(1) Any period of delay resulting from other criminal proceedings concerning the defendant, including but not limited to:
(c) Delay resulting from hearings on pretrial motions."
While Ratliff asserts that none of the excusable causes for delay enumerated in the statute are relevant to this case, he fails to advance any argument as to why the period from February 1 to April 17, 1980 consumed in disposition of the pre-trial motions he had filed is not excludable under the provision above cited.
Quite apparently, the motions filed by Ratliff between February 1 and February 21, 1980 required disposition before trial could commence and, to the extent hearings on those motions delayed the trial, that time is excludable from the computation under the statute. At the same time, it may also be reasonably assumed that the motions lay without ruling until April 17, 1980, at least for some number of days, because the court was occupied with other business and not because Ratliff was instrumental in postponing a decision. The failure by Ratliff even to recognize that some period is excludable because of the motions he filed deprives the court of any argument as to what time should be assigned and deducted on this account.
It is unnecessary to confront in this case the issue of what number of days between February 1 and April 17, 1980 is to be deducted under § 545.780.3(1) (c), RSMo 1978 in computing the time allowable for bringing Ratliff to trial. This follows because Ratliff bears the burden under the statute of showing that any delay beyond the statutory limit was occasioned by the state. State v. Newberry, 605 S.W.2d 117, 124 (Mo.1980). Even were it assumed that no tolling was accomplished by presentation of Ratliff's three pre-trial motions, he was nevertheless not entitled to invoke the potential remedy of dismissal of the charges unless he met the threshold requirement of showing that delay of his trial beyond 180 days was occasioned by the state.
In State v. Richmond, 611 S.W.2d 351 (Mo.App.1980), this court held that a defendant meets his burden to show trial delay occasioned by the state when he produces a record confirming that trial was not had within 180 days of arraignment. This follows because it is the duty of the state to bring the defendant to trial and the state may not excuse delay by its neglect to move the case forward. In this case, however, the delay between February 1 and April 17, 1980, a sufficient time if deducted to meet speedy trial requirements, was not occasioned by activity or inactivity by the state but by the pending unruled motions Ratliff had filed.
No case has been cited to us and independent research has disclosed none which settles upon the state a presumptive responsibility for trial delay caused by unruled motions filed by the defendant. A more reasonable view would require that the proof show which of the parties acted to advance and which delayed disposition, or if the delay was merely that normally incident to the pre-trial relief sought. That is not to say that a defendant necessarily bears the consequence of delay merely because he authored the unruled motion. Under the statute, however, it is the initial burden of the defendant to show the state was responsible for the delay. If the proof fails to demonstrate that the state caused or contributed to cause delay in disposition of the motion, or if the delay was merely a normal and...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Collins, 65285
...642 S.W.2d 917 (Mo.App.1982); State v. Reed, 640 S.W.2d 188 (Mo.App.1982); State v. Harris, 639 S.W.2d 122 (Mo.App.1982); State v. Ratliff, 633 S.W.2d 267 (Mo.App.1982); State v. McClure, 632 S.W.2d 314 (Mo.App.1982). While appellate courts have pursued this course, trial courts have become......
-
State v. Moore, WD
...courts should not reverse an exercise of discretion unless the trial court has committed an abuse of discretion. See State v. Ratliff, 633 S.W.2d 267, 270 (Mo.App.1982). In my opinion, there was no abuse of discretion here. On that basis I join in the conclusion of the majority KENNEDY, Jud......
-
State v. Johnson
...time during which the pretrial motions were being decided. § 545.780(3)(1)(c), RSMo.Supp.1984. The trial was timely. State v. Ratliff, 633 S.W.2d 267, 270 (Mo.App.1982). The remaining claim of error relates to an exhibit which was admitted over objection that it constituted hearsay and viol......
-
State v. Green, 46607
...elicited by defendant's counsel and he cannot now complain about a line of questioning he initially put at issue. See State v. Ratliff, 633 S.W.2d 267, 271 (Mo.App.1982). Point Defendant further contends the court erred in admitting Exhibits 23 and 24 into evidence. First, he argues Exhibit......