State v. Ravencraft, 16654
| Citation | 71 S.E.2d 798,222 S.C. 139 |
| Decision Date | 28 July 1952 |
| Docket Number | No. 16654,16654 |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE v. RAVENCRAFT. |
Nicholson & Nicholson, A. R. McElhaney, Greenwood, for appellant.
Hugh Beasley, Sol., Greenwood, for respondent.
Appellant was tried at the January, 1951, term of the Court of General Sessions for Greenwood County on an indictment charging him with burglary, assault with intent to ravish, and assault of a high and aggravated nature, before Honorable T. B. Greneker, Presiding Judge, and a jury. During the course of the trial, the State's witness, Mrs. Kathleen McKelley, testified that the appellant came into her home on the same night, a short period of time before he was alleged to have entered the home of the prosecuting witness, J. L. Haviard. The next morning, after her testimony had been admitted, appellant made a motion for a mistrial by reason of said testimony about this previous entry into the McKelley home and the motion was granted by the Court.
At a special term of the Court of General Sessions for Greenwood County in February, 1951, the appellant, a young white man, employed as a textile worker in Panola Mill at Greenwood, came on for trial again on the same indictment for the same offenses before Honorable T. B. Greneker, Presiding Judge, and a jury. During the course of this trial, the State's witness, Deputy Sheriff Raymond Anderson, testified without any objection or motion to strike that the appellant admitted going into the McKelley home on the same night just prior to the alleged offense for which he was being tried. This testimony came out while the State's witness was being examined in chief, and the Presiding Judge stopped the witness from testifying and ordered a mistrial without a motion being made therefor and without objection from appellant.
The June, 1951, term of the Court of General Sessions for Greenwood County, the appellant came on for trial on the same indictment, for the same offenses, before Honorable Steve C. Griffith, Presiding Judge, and a jury. At the June trial before Judge Griffith, the appellant interposed a plea of former jeopardy when the case was called for trial. Appellant's motion was reduced to writing and Judge Griffith heard the arguments thereon and overruled appellant's plea.
At the trial in January and February, appellant was tried upon a valid indictment; before a Court of competent jurisdiction; after he had been arraigned; after he had pleaded to the indictment; and after a competent jury had been impaneled and sworn. When appellant interposed his plea of former jeopardy in June, he contended that there was no legal necessity for the trial Judge to order a mistrial at his trial in February. The State opposed this contention.
The jury convicted appellant of burglary, with recommendation to mercy of the Court, and assault of a high and aggravated nature. Whereupon, the trial Judge sentenced the appellant to imprisonment on the Public Works of Greenwood County or in the State Penitentiary for a period of five years on each count, with the sentences to run concurrently.
Appellant now...
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...State v. Romeo, 43 N.J. 188, 203 A.2d 23 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 970, 85 S.Ct. 668, 13 L.Ed.2d 563 (1965); State v. Ravencraft, 222 S.C. 139, 71 S.E.2d 798 (1952); DeYoung v. State, 160 Tex.Crim.R. 628, 274 S.W.2d 406 (1964); Note, Double Jeopardy: The Reprosecution Problem, 77 Harv.......
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State v. Jones
...for it, the discharge is equivalent to an acquittal and may be pleaded as a bar to a subsequent indictment. See also State v. Ravencraft, 222 S.C. 139, 71 S.E.2d 798 (1952). Our ruling must hinge on the question of whether there was a manifest necessity for declaring the mistrial. The power......
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State v. Rowlands, 3269.
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